|
Get AfricaFocus Bulletin by e-mail!
Print this page
|
Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published
by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action
from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived
document may not work.
|
Kenya: Political Violence
Kenya: Political Violence
Date distributed (ymd): 020611
Document reposted by Africa Action
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africaaction.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: East Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +security/peace+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This posting contains a press releases and excerpts from the
executive summary of a new report from Human Rights Watch on
political violence in Kenya. The full report, Playing with Fire:
Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in
Kenya, as well as other material from Human Rights Watch on Kenya,
is available online at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Human Rights Watch
Press Release, May 31, 2002
Kenya: Political Killers Admit to Official Backing Weapons Flow
Risks Renewed Violence
(New York, May 31, 2002) Speaking for the first time, perpetrators
of armed attacks in the run-up to the last general election in
Kenya have said that they were backed by ruling party officials,
Human Rights Watch revealed in a report released today.
The 119-page report, entitled Playing with Fire: Weapons
Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya,
documents the dangerous nexus between arms availability and ethnic
attacks in Kenya. The report highlights politically instigated
armed violence on Kenya's coast during the last general election
cycle, in 1997. It calls for decisive action to prevent any such
violence as Kenya prepares for general elections later this year.
"The spread of small arms and the manipulation of ethnic tensions
are an explosive mix," said Lisa Misol, researcher with the Arms
Division of Human Rights Watch and author of the report. "Kenya
must stop weapons from getting into the hands of people who would
use them to disrupt the vote."
For years Kenya has been a conduit for arms shipments destined to
nearby areas of violent conflict. More recently the flood of
weapons has spilled back into Kenya itself, making the resort to
violence more likely-and more deadly.
Since the end of one-party rule in Kenya, election years have been
routinely characterized by political violence. Politicians who
have been implicated in past incidents of political violence have
not been held to account.
Human Rights Watch describes in detail the armed political violence
in Kenya's Coast Province in mid-1997 and the role of ruling-party
officials in stoking the violence. A quasi-military force of
well-organized and well-armed attackers carried out brutal attacks
on civilians from other ethnic groups in areas around Mombasa,
Coast Province.
In interviews with Human Rights Watch, several individuals involved
in the attacks acknowledged their direct participation in the
violence and described how it was organized. Their first-hand
accounts and other evidence indicate that local ruling party
politicians-with support from some national politicians-were
instrumental in organizing, supporting, and sustaining the
violence in order to displace ethnic communities viewed as likely
opposition voters in general elections that were held at the end of
1997. More than a hundred people were killed and some 100,000
people were displaced, bringing to 400,000 the number displaced as
a result of political violence since 1992.
A government commission of inquiry was appointed in 1998 to look
into ethnic violence in Kenya since 1991. After months of hearing
testimony, the commission submitted a report to President Daniel
arap Moi in August 1999, but the government has refused to make it
public.
"Kenya and the international community must act, and act soon, to
curb the spread of these weapons and bring to justice the people
who orchestrate violence for political gain," said Misol.
Human Rights Watch called on the government of Kenya to take action
to prevent politically motivated ethnic violence and end impunity
for past incidents of violence; ensure accountability of local
security structures; and strengthen legal controls, particularly
those related to the manufacture, possession, and transfer of
firearms and ammunition.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
[Excerpts only: For full text of the executive summary, and the
report, see:
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/kenya ]
Viewed in contrast to many of its neighbors, Kenya is often seen as
a bastion of stability. The country has several strengths that
mitigate against the outbreak of mass violence, but it also
exhibits many of the factors that have been markers of civil
strife elsewhere in Africa: strong ethnic divisions, polarized
political issues, political manipulation, rampant violence,
socio-economic disparities and a lack of economic opportunity, and
endemic corruption. When combined with the increased availability
of firearms, this dangerous mix becomes all the more volatile. ...
Small Arms Proliferation in Kenya
Small arms proliferation across the globe leads to the more rapid
spread of violence and magnifies the devastating effects of
violence, contributing significantly in areas of armed conflict to
human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian
law. ... In Kenya and other countries not at war, the ready
availability of these weapons undermines security (including with
relation to crime), erodes prospects for development, contributes
to social disintegration, and makes the resort to violence more
likely-and more deadly.
Kenya is vulnerable to weapons trafficking because of its
geographic location in a conflict-ridden region. The weapons
circulating in Kenya originate from places as far away as China and
the United States, but most of them passed through war zones in
neighboring countries before making their way to Kenya's illegal
gun markets. ...
For the time being, guns in Kenya are circulating on a small scale
when compared to its war-torn neighbors. They are smuggled into
the country a few at a time in a steady flow and sold by traders in
secret markets, with some larger-scale illegal arms trafficking
also reportedly taking place. The impact of even relatively modest
quantities of such weapons, however, is already being felt.
The increasing availability of weapons in Kenya has helped fuel
rising insecurity and, in some areas, the growing militarization
of society. Much media attention has focused on the prevalent use
of sophisticated weapons in urban crime, particularly in Nairobi.
Often, refugees living in Kenya are scapegoated as the source of
these weapons. The proliferation of small arms is most serious
along Kenya's northern and western borders, where pastoralist
communities have ready access to AK-47s and other automatic rifles
obtained from neighboring countries. The introduction and spread
of such sophisticated weapons among these communities has
intensified conflict and blurred the line between long-standing
ethnic competition-traditionally manifested in cattle theft or
rustling-and political violence. Guns are now widely used to carry
out acts of banditry and cattle rustling in Kenya, and have been
responsible for growing numbers of human casualties, including
during armed confrontations that pit ethnic groups against each
other. This grave insecurity, as rightly noted by a Kenyan civic
leader, derives both from "the influx of small arms" and "careless
utterances and incitement" by politicians.
Equally disturbing is Kenya's ruling party's use of violence to
retain political power since the government was forced to concede
to a multiparty system in 1992. It has been estimated that in the
past decade at least some 2,000 people have been killed and
400,000 have been displaced in politically motivated violence
directed at ethnic groups perceived to support the opposition.
High-ranking ruling party officials have been directly implicated
in instigating past episodes of violence, and the government has
not taken adequate steps to punish the perpetrators. Whereas in
the large-scale violence in the early 1990s attackers relied
overwhelmingly on traditional weapons such as bows and arrows,
attacks in more recent incidents in 1997 and 1998 were carried out
with the aid of firearms. Attackers armed with guns enabled
others-armed with clubs, machetes, and other crude weapons-to
kill, maim, burn, and loot with impunity. ...
Violence for Political Ends: The Coast
This report examines in detail the outbreak of political violence
on the Kenyan coast in mid-1997 as a case study of both the
orchestration of violence as a political tool and the devastating
impact of small arms on human rights. At that time, the country
was gearing up for elections and calls for constitutional reform
were increasing, putting the ruling party on the defensive. Against
this political backdrop, well-organized and well-armed irregular
paramilitary forces-known as "raiders"-carried out a series of
brash and deadly attacks on non-indigenous residents around
Mombasa, Coast Province.
Although the events chronicled in this case study took place
several years ago, Human Rights Watch believes that the
information is still important, both to document the role of ruling
party officials in the violence and to expose the manner in which
it was organized, particularly as Kenyans prepare to go to the
polls again in general elections that must by law be held in 2002.
The Coast raiders targeted members of ethnic communities that
had voted disproportionately against the ruling Kenya African
National Union (KANU) party in the 1992 election, causing KANU to
lose two of four parliamentary seats in one district that year. As
a result of the 1997 attacks these likely opposition voters were
forced to flee their homes and, in spite of an unexpected backlash
against the government over police abuses, KANU won three of the
parliamentary seats in elections later that year, with a fourth
seat (the one in the area where the violence was sparked) being
won by a KANU ally registered under a new party. In a neighboring
district that was also at the center of the violence, KANU won all
three parliamentary seats, as it had in 1992. President Daniel
arap Moi, who needed to win at least 25 percent of the presidential
vote in Coast Province to ensure his reelection, carried the
province easily, and his vote tally rose considerably in
violence-affected areas that previously had been opposition
strongholds.
The perpetrators of the Coast attacks were largely disgruntled
local young men whose hostility toward non-indigenous residents of
the region led them to support a divisive ethnic agenda that also
served the ruling party's political aspirations. Many strongly
felt that long-term migrants from other parts of Kenya, as well as
other ethnic minority communities settled there, were to blame for
the poor conditions faced by their indigenous ethnic group, the
Digo. They were motivated by anger over the economic
marginalization of the local population, which contrasted sharply
with the wealth generated by the area's tourism economy. Their
goal was to drive away members of the ethnic groups originating
from inland Kenya-the "up-country" population-in order to gain
access to jobs, land, and educational opportunities. They used
brutal tactics to terrorize their targets for weeks on end.
In a meeting of these interests, a number of local-level KANU
politicians and supporters mobilized marginalized Digo youth to
take up arms against opposition supporters for political ends. In
interviews with Human Rights Watch, several members of the Digo
raider force described how the assaults were organized with help
from local figures who were politically active with the ruling
party. For example, a number of local KANU politicians and
supporters were instrumental in recruiting young men to join the
raiders. A politically connected spiritual leader used a local
cultural practice, oathing, to bind the raiders to secrecy (while
promising to make them immune to bullets). He also helped dictate
the raiders' targets and strategy. Most of the raiders' commanders
had prior military experience, and raiders said some of the
rank-and-file members also had previously served in the Kenyan
armed services and a few were active-duty servicemen. In addition,
the raiders benefited from the participation of a mysterious group
of highly trained and well-armed fighters whom they described as
soldiers and, in part because they apparently did not speak
Swahili, believed were foreigners. ...
The evidence strongly suggests that higher-level government
officials and politicians, acting behind the scenes, also
contributed to the organization of the raider force and supported
the operations of the raiders once the violence was unleashed.
Raiders described several visitors to their training camps, whom
they were told were KANU members of parliament (MPs) and key party
activists. ... According to their testimonies, the raiders
benefited from both direct and indirect support from the
politicians, the latter often supplied via their spiritual leader.
In light of the sustained support they received from ruling party
politicians, some of the raiders interpreted calls to halt the
violence as a sign that it had gone on too long and had become a
liability, not as an indicator that the politicians objected to
their actions.
Looking back on the events that occurred in 1997, those raiders who
decided to speak to Human Rights Watch did so because they felt
betrayed and manipulated by the ruling party officials who used and
then discarded them. ... the raiders we interviewed maintain that
top Coast Province political leaders orchestrated the events from
behind the scenes on behalf of the government of President Moi. ...
Despite numerous advance warnings, the government took no action to
stop the raiders at an early stage. Once the raids had begun,
government security forces did not mount serious security
operations and instead took a number of steps that undermined the
effective pursuit of the raiders. In addition, they denied
effective protection to the victims of the targeted raids and were
responsible for a number ofserious human rights abuses, including
arbitrary arrests and torture, in a crackdown directed in part
against opposition party activists whom they accused of being
raiders. ... In the end, despite hundreds of arrests and a long
government inquiry, no one has been brought to justice for
organizing the attacks. ...
A Time of Transition
With the next national election anticipated for late 2002, the new
political landscape in Kenya is one of transition and uncertainty.
President Moi, whom the constitution bars from running again, has
indicated that he will step down. He arranged to merge KANU with
another party and recruited politicians from ethnic groups allied
to the opposition, thereby bolstering prospects for his party's
electoral success. Moi himself was elected chair of the merged
party, a position from which he was anticipated to exercise
considerable power. At this writing there was much speculation
about whom Moi may intend to be his successor as president, as
well as jockeying for position among the contenders for power, but
it remained unclear who would emerge as the ruling party's
presidential candidate. The opposition had not unified behind a
single presidential candidate. In February 2002 five opposition
parties announced they would coordinate electoral efforts and, if
elected, would share power.
In early 2002, the country also remained focused on the
constitutional reform debate. One of the central reform issues
under consideration was the devolution of state power. A number of
proposals, including a draft put forward by the ruling party in
2001, envision a federalist system. In this context, the term
"majimbo" (literally meaning "federalism") again gained currency
in the national political debate. The proposals put forward were
vague and left the modalities undefined, but politicians who
promoted their proposals as pro-majimbo were generally careful to
state that they did not wish to promote an ethnically exclusive
form of federalism, as had been advanced during previous election
campaigns and had served as the rallying-cry for past incidents of
politically motivated ethnic violence. Nevertheless, some Kenyans,
mindful of past violence carried out in the name of majimbo,
remained wary.
Events in 2001 and early 2002 showed that violence continued to mar
Kenyan politics. For example, parliamentary by-elections in early
2001 were associated with serious violence. Violence against
opposition activists continued, with police cracking down on
government critics in numerous incidents, and pro-KANU youth gangs
attacking political opposition rallies. Sporadic violence between
members of ethnic groups seen to be allied to the ruling party and
those perceived to support the opposition continued in the run-up
to the 2002 election. Inter-ethnic fightingin late 2001 in the
interior of Coast Province, as well as episodes of such violence
in Nairobi in late 2001 and early 2002, claimed dozens of lives.
Many observers considered that politicians were to blame for
inflaming existing tensions. ...
The government has recognized some of the grave dangers small arms
proliferation poses for the country and is working with regional
partners to stem the tide of weapons with a focus on
information-sharing, enhanced border controls, and harmonization
of legislation. It also has sought international assistance to curb
weapons flows. Its efforts are welcome, but its approach and
implementation leave much to be desired. As with other security
issues, it has cracked down on select targets only. It rightly has
recognized the role of external actors, especially arms exporters
in Europe and Asia who flood the region with weapons, as well as
armed groups in neighboring countries who supply recycled weapons
to Kenya. But it has been loath to examine its own practices,
including its role as a transit point for regional weapons flows.
Instead, it has scapegoated refugee populations for illegal
weapons flows within the country, often associating all refugees
indiscriminately with the actions of armed and criminal elements.
International donors, concerned with the potential for terrorist
attacks in the wake of the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and,
more recently, attacks in the United States in 2001, have not
questioned this approach. Most dangerously, the international
community to date has disregarded the potentially explosive link
between weapons availability and domestic political violence. ...
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.
|
