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Africa: Policy Outlook 1999
Africa: Policy Outlook 1999
Date distributed (ymd): 990126
APIC Document
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: Continent-Wide
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+ +US policy focus+
Summary Contents:
This posting contains a summary overview of expected Africa
policy issues for the year, with a focus on U.S. policy. For
more information on the issues and countries mentioned please
visit the Africa Policy Web Site
(http://www.africapolicy.org).
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Africa Policy Outlook 1999
The resurgence of conflict in several regions of the continent
in 1998 underlined the fragility of efforts to advance Africa
on both the political and economic fronts. Despite improved
food crop production and continued economic growth in many
countries, economic expansion was set back by fallout from the
Asian economic crisis and by low prices for oil exports, among
other factors. The most dramatic shift in the prospects for
democratization came from the death of Nigerian military ruler
Sani Abacha in mid-1998, opening up new political space in
Africa's most populous country. At the beginning of 1999,
nevertheless, Nigeria's transition to civilian rule still
faces a perilous course.
President Clinton's trip to Africa in spring 1998 represented
the high point of official U.S. attention to the continent.
After the trip, however, despite the efforts of some
policy-makers, Africa quickly resumed its place near the
bottom of the foreign policy agenda. Washington's military
response to the terrorist attack in August on U.S. embassies
in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi quickly sidelined the
"partnership" theme in favor of unilateral action.
Meanwhile, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, pushed by
the Administration and many in Congress as a "paradigm shift"
from aid to trade and investment, did not make it through
Congress. But critics failed to move the debate to
constructive discussion on how trade and investment might be
combined with other measures to promote mutually profitable
U.S-African relations.
The "new start" in Africa policy is still more rhetoric than
reality. The dominant de facto guidelines of U.S. policy remain
unchanged: promotion of free-market fundamentalism as a
panacea for economic woes, together with endorsement of
democracy, human rights and conflict resolution. The latter
is implemented in practice primarily by ad-hoc response to
crises without sustained high-level attention.
Washington is not alone, however, in failing to craft a
comprehensive response to Africa's complex crises. Escalated
conflict threatens not only to undermine the image of the
"African Renaissance," but also to siphon off resources and
energies from efforts toward political and economic progress.
This affects even the majority of countries that are not at
war. A central imperative for 1999 is to regain momentum in
resolving-or at least checking-conflict in several key areas.
Conflict Zones
Last year saw the eruption of border war between former allies
Ethiopia and Eritrea, intensified conflict in Sierra Leone,
war in Guinea-Bissau, continued war in Sudan and the Great
Lakes region, conflict and intervention in Lesotho, the
breakdown of the Lusaka peace process in Angola, and a return
to full-scale war in Congo (Kinshasa) involving not only
Congolese but also most of Congo's neighbors. At the end of
the year fragile cease-fires were in effect on the
Ethiopian/Eritrean border, in Guinea-Bissau, and in Lesotho.
Elsewhere, diplomatic initiatives seemed to have little
momentum and to have low priority on the international agenda.
All these conflicts have resulted in abuses against civilians
and humanitarian emergencies. Efforts to address these are
likely to have only a limited impact in the near future, even
if there are significant improvements in the international
capacity to respond. Reversing the pattern will require, at
minimum, more significant coordinated peace-making, combined
with meaningful sanctions against the most abusive and
recalcitrant parties.
The conflict with the widest repercussions outside its own
borders pits the regime of Laurent Kabila in Kinshasa against
a rebel force composed in large part of allies who in 1997
joined with Kabila to overthrow the Mobutu regime. Rwandan
and Ugandan troops are engaged on the side of Congolese rebel
forces, while troops from Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad
are defending Kabila. At the beginning of 1999, the major
stumbling blocks to productive peace talks are Kabila's
refusal to include the rebels in negotiations and all the
armed parties' indifference to the voices of civilian
Congolese.
The prospects of breakthroughs in peace in 1999 are highly
uncertain in this and other ongoing conflicts. In Angola, the
United Nations appears ready to abandon its peacekeeping
mission, while Jonas Savimbi's military wing of UNITA
continues to sell diamonds to finance arms purchases as it
returns to war. Disgust with leaders who find ideological or
ethnic excuses for continuing or reigniting conflicts
continues to grow among the public in almost all African
countries. The difficult, yet imperative task is to translate
such sentiment into effective national or international
peace-making mechanisms.
Development Priorities
Africa's aggregate growth rates for 1998 were estimated at 3.7
percent at year end, almost one percent less than predicted,
but still the highest for any world region. More than half of
African countries maintained economic growth rates of 3
percent or more, enough to enable marginal increases in per
capita income. Nevertheless, the full effect of the Asian
crisis on African exports is yet to be felt, and low oil
prices have cut dramatically into the earnings of
oil-exporting countries.
In 1999 Africa will remain highly vulnerable to shifts in
commodity prices and to global economic developments in
general. Of Africa's two largest economies, Nigeria is
affected by low oil prices as well as political uncertainties,
while South Africa faces currency fluctuations, capital
outflows, and the potentially devastating impact of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Private investment in Africa is likely to continue to grow,
averaging high rates of return, while still accounting for
less than 10 percent of investment flows to developing
countries as a group. Such investment will continue to be
highly concentrated in a few countries and in selected export
commodities, such as oil. Meanwhile, international aid
continues to decline and African government budgets are
stretched by "structural adjustment" programs. By 1997, the
proportion of GNP devoted to development assistance by
developed countries had fallen to 0.22 per cent, the lowest
ever. Among them, the U.S. was the lowest, at 0.08 percent.
The gap between rhetorical commitment to development and the
public investment needed to implement it is likely to continue
to grow.
Areas likely to receive greater attention in 1999 include: (1)
the threat to economic growth as well as human welfare posed
by the HIV/AIDS epidemic and inadequate health services
generally; and (2) the massive debt burden carried by most
African countries, and the inadequacy of international debt
relief initiatives to date.
Responding to Africa's need for increased public investment
and balanced economic policies would require more active
questioning of the "Washington consensus" on unfettered market
liberalization. Such critiques will likely find more
sympathetic ears in 1999, including within Washington-based
institutions such as the World Bank. But the International
Monetary Fund and the U.S. government remain particularly
resistant to rethinking.
Governance Issues
In 1999 as in 1998, prospects for advances in democratization
of African countries present a very mixed picture. Across the
continent, entrenched hierarchical and repressive structures
are vying against a wide array of new initiatives. Africa's
media and nongovernmental organizations are beginning to
benefit significantly from Internet access to spread their
messages across national and international boundaries, and
this trend will likely accelerate during the year. However,
the dominant tendency among African rulers is still to regard
independent critics as a threat.
As the year begins, the most prominent test case for
democratization is Nigeria. The country is midway through a
series of elections promised to deliver civilian rule by May,
as military ruler Abdusalam Abubakr gradually eases his
predecessor's repressive policies. The transition process,
however, is still fragile.
Even a successful move to civilian rule in Nigeria would leave
basic issues of democratization unaddressed. These include
regional and ethnic inequalities and the division of powers
between the federal government and other units. The
distribution of oil wealth, concentrated in the country's
Delta region, is a particularly explosive issue. As protest
in the Delta escalates, both the Nigerian military government
and the international oil companies which exploit the region's
wealth (Shell, Mobil, Chevron and others) continue to opt for
repression over dialogue.
The outcome in Nigeria will have a major impact not only in
West Africa, but across the continent. In Southern Africa,
forthcoming elections in South Africa and Mozambique offer
opportunities for consolidating democratic institutions.
Central Africa and much of East Africa are preoccupied by
conflict. For Africa as a whole, the momentum towards greater
democratization is threatened not only by conflict, but by
growing perceptions that elites can manipulate electoral
processes to evade popular accountability and that economic
policy decisions are still largely dictated by outside forces.
Despite the obstacles, the trend towards more open discussion
of these issues, not only by nongovernmental organizations but
also within African governments and inter-governmental
agencies, is likely to continue in 1999.
This material is produced and distributed by the
Africa Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary
objective is to widen the policy debate in the United States
around African issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by
providing accessible policy-relevant information and analysis
usable by a wide range of groups and individuals.
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