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Congo (Kinshasa): Peace Agreement
Congo (Kinshasa): Peace Agreement
Date distributed (ymd): 990826
Document reposted by APIC
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: Central Africa
Issue Areas: +peace/security+
Summary Contents:
This posting contains a slightly condensed version of the
executive summary of a new 43-page report by the International
Crisis Group on the peace agreement in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The report outlines the background to the
agreement and the numerous obstacles to its implementation.
The full report is available on the web:
http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/cafrica/reports/ca07repa.htm
The executive summary is preceded by brief excerpts from
recent updates from the UN's Integrated Regional Information
Network (IRIN).
http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/archive/drc.htm
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
U N I T E D N A T I O N S
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Integrated Regional Information Network
for Central and Eastern Africa
Tel: +254 2 622147; Fax: +254 2 622129
e-mail: [email protected]
IRIN-CEA Update No. 741
for Central and Eastern Africa (Monday 23 August 1999)
WHO "amazed at turnout" for vaccination campaign
WHO and UNICEF reported that 8.2 million polio vaccinations
were carried out by over 75,000 volunteer vaccinators during
last week's mass vaccination against the polio virus, and the
figure should be closer to 9 million once complete data were
available, officials said. Some 10 million children under the
age of five had been targeted. "We have been amazed at the
turnout. Mothers in every village have brought their children
... often walking several kilometres with their infants on
their backs to get this precious vaccine", a WHO press release
stated. DRC, with the most intense virus transmission in the
world, was the single biggest priority for the global effort
to eradicate polio, it added.
"Catch-up" campaign scheduled for Kisangani
In Kisangani, 70 percent were reported to have been
vaccinated, despite the outbreak of fighting between Rwandan
and Ugandan forces, while mothers and children earlier trapped
in vaccination clinics by the fighting had managed to return
home, WHO reported, adding that an extra "catch-up" campaign
targeting those children not yet reached was scheduled.
IRIN-CEA Update No. 742
for Central and Eastern Africa (Tuesday 24 August 1999)
Democratic Republic of Congo: Rebels agree to sign peace
agreement
The long-awaited signing of the Lusaka ceasefire agreement by
rebels of the Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD)
was on Tuesday reported to be imminent after the RCD-Goma
faction said it intended to sign. All the founding members of
the RCD - covering both factions currently antagonistic
towards each other - are expected to sign in a breakthrough
arrangement agreed at the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) summit in the Mozambican capital Maputo last
week, news agencies reported. The development had been
previously flagged, with some sources suggesting it could be
signed as early as Monday.
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisweb.org
The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of
Congo:
An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace
20 August 1999
Executive Summary
After a year of failed attempts by Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the Organisation for African
Unity (OAU), South Africa and other regional powerbrokers, the
six countries involved in Africa's seven-nation war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Agreement for a
Cease-fire in the DRC in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. The war has
pitched Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia
against a Congolese rebellion backed by Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi since August 1998. The main provisions of the
agreement include: immediate cessation of hostilities; the
establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed
of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire
violations, to work out mechanisms to disarm the identified
militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops
according to an established calendar; the deployment of a UN
chapter 7 force tasked with disarming the armed groups,
collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian
assistance and protection to the displaced persons and
refugees; and the initiating of a Congolese National Dialogue
intended to lead to a "new political dispensation in the DRC".
However, a month after signing, the war continues. While it
does not dispute the content of the document, the main rebel
group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) has refused to
sign the agreement. The RCD split earlier in May, when Ernest
Wamba dia Wamba was ousted as head of the group, but refused
to step down and established his headquarters in Kisangani
with Ugandan backing. Both the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and
the RCD-Kisangani, supported by Uganda, have demanded the
exclusive right to sign the peace agreement. This has delayed
the implementation of the agreement and encouraged factions to
engage in strategies to buy time. Since the signing, more
troops have been deployed and the rebels and their allies have
continued to make territorial advances. Many claims and
counterclaims of violations of the agreement have already been
made, making the commitment by both parties to the cease-fire
agreement more and more suspect.
Relations between Rwanda and Uganda have grown increasingly
strained since the RCD split. Soldiers from both countries
have been stationed at the airport and control separate parts
of the city of Kisangani. Despite recent efforts by South
Africa and Zambia to verify leadership claims and to put
pressure on both factions to sign, the disagreement
degenerated into open urban warfare between the two armies on
14 August. The former allies fought for the control of several
installations as well as of the city international airport,
employing heavy artillery. On 17 August, Rwanda and Uganda
agreed on a cease-fire. They say they will send a military
team to find out why the fighting erupted. They also agree
that they will respect the outcome of the investigation on
leadership claims within the RCD undertaken by the South
Africans and the Zambians. If the investigation committee
doesn't come up with a clear result, both will recommend that
the 28 founders of RCD should sign the agreement.
The Lusaka agreement, however, meets the demands of the rebels
and their supporters, and more specifically of the Rwandans by
recognising their pledge to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR
in the Great Lakes region. But the current fighting between
Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani makes quite clear that the
security interests of those countries, which their
intervention in the DRC was supposed to protect, are not the
only motivation for the war. ...
The fighting between Uganda and Rwanda also legitimises
Kabila's claim that those countries are aggressors, an
argument the Congolese leader seized upon when he called on
the Security Council to strongly condemn the violations of the
cease-fire and to demand the "immediate departure" of forces
from Uganda and Rwanda. ...
Key questions remain unanswered. Is peace in sight at last or
is the stage set for the war to continue? Can the Lusaka
cease-fire agreement be resurrected in light of the glaring
cease-fire violations by both sides in the conflict? Can the
pressure that was put on all the parties to sign the agreement
be sustained?
The high level of tension between Uganda and Rwanda is likely
to affect the geopolitical order of the region; it could lead
to further fragmentation and a de facto partition of the DRC,
with each army occupying a sector and a very volatile military
situation. If Ugandan troops remain in the North, Rwanda could
be tempted to concentrate its efforts on Mbuji-Mayi. It could
also convince Uganda to give up and withdraw, leaving Rwanda
alone facing accusations of aggression. Parliament members in
Uganda have already announced its intentions to move a motion
seeking the complete withdrawal of the troops from the DRC.
And last, but not least, anti-Rwanda feelings are already
growing in the Ugandan army, even though government officials
in both countries have played down the impact of the Kisangani
clash on the broad alliance of Uganda and Rwanda. The Ugandans
have lost a lot of soldiers in the battle and some of their
strongholds have been taken by the Rwandans, which is
perceived as a humiliation by the UDPF.
Since the beginning of the war, the fragility of the Congolese
state has been exploited by all foreign forces, whether allies
or enemies of the Kabila government. For the first time, with
the Lusaka agreement, the Congolese domestic agenda was
brought back to the centre stage. If the cease-fire agreement
is not implemented, the continuation of violence could
postpone the National Dialogue, which is key to the deployment
of a peacekeeping force, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the
formation of a new Congolese army and the re-establishment of
state administration on DRC territory. As long as the military
situation remains unresolved, it is unlikely that the
Congolese will be in charge of their own fate.
This report analyses the motivations of each of the main
parties to the conflict to sign the Lusaka agreement. It also
looks at the difficulties that lie ahead if the agreement is
to be implemented.
Each belligerent party took the opportunity to put his own
domestic concerns on record, especially by demanding that
rebel groups fighting their governments be disarmed, and also
by securing a regional commitment to address their national
security interests. One of the main precedents created by the
agreement is that the belligerent parties are, through the
JMC, turned into the enforcers of the agreement. The JMC is
supposed to share intelligence regarding militias and work out
mechanisms to disarm them. However, it will take time for the
parties to overcome their suspicions and do more than make
sure that their enemies don't continue supporting the rebels.
Furthermore, it will be difficult for Kabila and Zimbabwe to
turn against and disarm their allies, the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe. Intelligence reports have already indicated that
some armed groups have started going underground.
The DRC conflict has three dimensions: local, national and
regional. For peace to return to the DRC, the peace process
should comprehensively deal with the conflict at all three
levels. For the international community, this is a unique
opportunity to re-engage with the region, to demonstrate
commitment to African peace processes, and to rebuild
credibility with national partners in Central, Eastern and
Southern Africa. In particular, the international community
should support regional efforts to restore the territorial
integrity of the DRC and to resolve its security issues. Given
the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and to
address the long term security issues it created, ICG
recommends that the UN Security Council, its members, and the
OAU seize the opportunity to:
At the Regional Security Level
-
Put continuous pressure on all rebel factions to sign the
Lusaka cease-fire agreement and on all parties to respect it
US, Security Council and regional diplomatic pressure should
be directed towards Uganda and Rwanda to respect the Kisangani
cease-fire; to respect their commitment to the Lusaka
cease-fire; and to take a common stand on the issue of the RCD
signature, so that the Congolese may start their National
Debate process. Although the rebel leaders have developed
their own individual and group interests, Rwanda and Uganda
can still prevail on them.
-
Support the Joint Military Commission (JMC)
The Security Council Member states should undertake a serious
examination of the needs of the JMC, and support those needs
fully.
- Strengthen the mandate of the OAU-appointed chairman of the
Joint Military Commission
Understanding that the JMC is composed of representatives of
the belligerent parties and has no accountability nor
supervision mechanism by any neutral body, ICG recommends that
the OAU should play a more active role as arbitrator of the
agreement and carry out that role until the UN PK force is
able to provide accountability and supervision, as mandated in
the agreement.
-
Mobilise international and regional efforts for a proactive
non-military response to the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe problem
by:
Putting pressure on the Kabila and Zimbabwe governments to
demobilise Interahamwe and ex-FAR as a gesture of good will in
the regional peace process;
Encouraging the neighbouring countries of the DRC to make a
special effort to arrest the leaders of those groups
responsible for the genocide and whose names are on the list
of the International Tribunal in Arusha;
Supporting a demobilisation and re-integration plan for the
Interahamwe and ex-FAR, who are estimated to count between
30,000 and 45,000 members. This recommendation is based on the
experience of successful re-integration of Interahamwe and
ex-FAR (since February 1999) into Rwandan society.
The governments of the region should be strongly encouraged to
practice inclusive politics and offer reintegration
alternatives to their respective rebellions
-
Support a peace-keeping force in the DRC with a realistic and
concrete mandate
The terms set by the Lusaka agreement ask for a chapter 7
force that will have the mandate to, among other things:
"track down all armed groups in the DRC." A chapter 7 force
would require at least 100,000 soldiers to monitor the
situation from the Sudanese to the Zambian borders and from
the Congo-Brazzaville to the Tanzanian borders. In the event
the Security Council doesn't authorise a chapter 7 force,
support should be given to the JMC to carry out that mandate
and more UN/OAU observers should be sent. In a second stage,
a chapter 6 force should be authorised by the Security Council
as a confidence building mechanism and sign that the
international community has an interest in the DRC; as an
observer of the implementation of the agreement; as an
investigator of the violations of the cease-fire and protector
of civilian populations; as a catalytic mechanism to help the
population distance itself form the fighters; and as a
provider of humanitarian assistance.
At the National Level
-
Support the Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation
Debate by:
Giving expert technical support to the Facilitator chosen by
SADC;
Encouraging the Facilitator to include Congolese armed groups
that were not represented in Lusaka. These are the Mai - Mai,
the Banyamulenge and the former Mobutu soldiers, and to make
sure no potential disrupters are excluded;
Enforcing the provisions in the agreement stating that all
participants should have an equal status;
Monitoring the proceedings of the debate and ensuring that
they are free of manipulation and intimidation.
At the Local Level
-
Create a donor liaison group to mobilise resources for
humanitarian assistance, local reconstruction, rehabilitation
of infrastructures and reconciliation initiatives at the
community level.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by the
Africa Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary
objective is to widen the policy debate in the United States
around African issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by
concentrating on providing accessible policy-relevant
information and analysis usable by a wide range of groups and
individuals.
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