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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published
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Africa: Conflict Diamonds, 2
Africa: Conflict Diamonds, 2
Date distributed (ymd): 011130
Document reposted by APIC
Africa Policy Electronic Distribution List: an information
service provided by AFRICA ACTION (incorporating the Africa
Policy Information Center, The Africa Fund, and the American
Committee on Africa). Find more information for action for
Africa at http://www.africapolicy.org
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: Continent-Wide
Issue Areas: +economy/development+ +security/peace+
SUMMARY CONTENTS:
This week and last, in Gaborone and Washington, campaigners for
tighter control over "conflict diamonds" gained ground with an
agreement in the multilateral Kimberley Process, to be presented to
the UN later this year, and with passage of the compromise Clean
Diamonds Trade Act in the US House of Representatives. Activists
stress, however, that there are still many gaps which can only be
filled if there is strong government action over the next year.
This set of two postings contains a selection of relevant
background documents and links. In this posting, recommended
links on conflict diamonds, and a summary of the latest monitoring
report on sanctions in Angola. from the UN's Integrated Regional
Information Network (IRIN) Another posting today contains reports
and statements from IRIN, Physicians for Human Rights, the Fatal
Transactions Campaign, and Partnership Africa Canada.
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Additional Sources on Conflict Diamonds
http://www.phrusa.org/campaigns/sierra_leone/conflict_diamonds.html
Physicians for Human Rights, USA. Page for the Campaign to
Eliminate Conflict Diamonds.
http://www.oneworld.org/globalwitness
Global Witness. This organization has played a leading role in exposing the role
of conflict diamonds. Original research reports and updates are available here.
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com
This site has official communiques from the Kimberly Process, but
as of this posting had not been updated recently.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond
Background information and links from the Global Policy Forum, a
non-governmental group that follows UN-related issues. Includes
links to both background reports and recent news.
http://www.diamonds.net
An information service on the diamond industry. Includes the
most recent news in a section on conflict diamonds.
http://www.niza.nl/uk/campaigns/diamonds
Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa. Provides links to
information from UN, NGOs and official European sources, including
recent detailed reports on failings of European controls on
diamond imports and a case study on Belgium, UK and the
Netherlands.
http://partnershipafricacanada.org/hsdp
Partnership Africa Canada, Human Security and the International
Diamond Trade. Includes extensive research. Particularly strong
on West Africa.
UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)
ANGOLA: UNITA adapts its war as sanctions bite
IRIN-SA, Tel: +27 11 880-4633; Fax: +27 11 447-5472;
Email: [email protected]
[This Item is Delivered to the "Africa-English" Service of the
UN's IRIN humanitarian information unit, but may not necessarily
reflect the views of the United Nations. For further information,
contact e-mail: [email protected] or Web:
http://www.irinnews.org . If you re-print, copy, archive or
re-post this item, please retain this credit and disclaimer.]
JOHANNESBURG, 8 November (IRIN) - Sanctions against UNITA have
reduced Jonas Savimbi's capacity to wage an expensive
conventional war against the Angolan state, but according to
analysts and a detailed UN report, they have not reduced the
rebel movement's ability to indefinitely embroil the battered
country in a state of war.
The Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA - as part of
what has become known as a "name-and-shame campaign" aimed at
deterring illicit diamond and arms trading - submitted its third
report to the UN Security Council in October, detailing progress
regarding a UN embargo on UNITA diamond sales and arms purchases.
[The full report is available at:
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/Angola/966e.pdf
Another summary and additional background is available in the
monthly Angola Peace Monitor, at:
http://www.actsa.org/apm or http://www.anc.org.za/angola]
The mechanism's report paints a picture of a military force which
has adapted well to its waning fortunes and of a leader who has
become increasingly paranoid and firm in his belief that he can
overthrow the Luanda government. It says UNITA is probably
selling about US $250,000 dollars worth of diamonds illicitly
each day and is still, for the most part, using its old routes
and connections to do so. It also says that UNITA continues to
buy the arms it needs to wage guerrilla warfare and that it is
using new information technology, like the Internet, to spread
its message more widely than ever before.
And, as Patrick Smith, editor of Africa Confidential, says, one
can not write UNITA off because it has no - or very little -
international support. "I guess if you judge a military threat on
the amount of hardware and cash resources, then in terms of
diamonds and access to fuel and transportation, there is no doubt
that UNITA is weaker than it was in 1990," Smith says. However,
he stresses that UNITA does not need conventional forces to
continue being a serious threat. "They are a much more random and
mobile threat. They still have recruiting mechanisms and there is
still loyalty to UNITA's ideas. In my view UNITA is still a
formidable force," he told IRIN.
The mechanism says in its report: "UNITA has increased its
terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. It has attacked schools,
buses and trains. It has shot at people fleeing to escape from
the flames of a burning explosion. It has shot at World Food
Programme (WFP) planes carrying not weapons but desperately
needed food and humanitarian supplies. Sadly, such instances and
far too numerous to cite here. During the last six-month period
UNITA has pursued its military activities with attacks in several
provinces...
"The activities of UNITA serve multiple purposes. Through its
attacks, the organisation aims to show the world that it is to be
reckoned with. The attacks are also aimed at forcing the Angolan
armed forces to deploy more units in government-controlled areas,
thus diverting attention away from what UNITA considers vital,
such as protecting its leadership in the province of Moxico
(eastern Angola), and important UNITA bases in other provinces.
The attacks are also invaluable opportunities for obtaining
supplies (from the FAA and from civilians)."
Wealth outweighs risk
The mechanism says it believes that arms deliveries to UNITA have
been "drastically decreased", but adds: "The mechanism's
monitoring of the arms embargo has also had a deterrent effect.
Nevertheless, there are indications that some businessmen are
still willing to take the risk if the payoff is sufficient.
Cross-border supplies still reach UNITA from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The mechanism also received repeated
allegations that the country remains a major transit country for
UNITA diamonds."
One of the businessmen named is Victor Bout, alleged to be the
provider of forged end-user certificates and identified as the
owner of air cargo company Air Cess, carrier of the bulk of the
equipment suspected to be headed for UNITA. It says Bout has
subcontracted his work to five companies since he was exposed in
March 2000, in an attempt to confuse the trail, and that at least
three of the companies he uses are registered in South Africa.
South African intelligence sources told IRIN a local
investigation into arms and diamond deals involving UNITA was
under way, but would not divulge details.
The mechanism's investigations, however, established that KAS
Engineering Gibraltar, a broker of exports from Bulgaria, acted
as the sole contractor and initial buyer of the arms exported by
suppliers based in Bulgaria. Its says KAS received payment in
coverage of initial expenditures from Standard Chartered Bank and
that the mechanism has asked the US authorities for cooperation
in obtaining information on the account from which the payments
were drawn - allegedly held at a New York branch of Standard
Chartered Bank.
"This development," says the report, "has permitted the mechanism
to reconstruct a particular modus operandi in the UNITA arms
procurement methods. This method involved the use of forged
end-user certificates, and the investigation demonstrated the key
role played by Victor Bout as the alleged provider of the forged
documents and formally identified as the latter's air cargo
company, Air Cess, as the carrier of the bulk of the equipment."
The mechanism says the "financial trail relating to the arms
purchase shows a fragmented pattern designed to break the link
between the payment of funds and the supply of weapons". It says
it is awaiting information from the authorities in the Bahamas on
the East European Shipping Corporation, "the broker of arms deals
between SN ROM ARM and, purportedly, Togo". It says it is also
awaiting information from the British authorities on the dealings
of Trade Investment International Limited, "said to be the
European representative of the East European Shipping
Corporation".
Legal requirements in the Bahamas impeded efforts to fully
disclose the role the East European Shipping Corporation in
purchasing weapons destined for UNITA. Another company named as
having links to arms procurements for UNITA is the Panama
City-based Armitech Company Inc - a broker of arms transactions
between Arsenalul Armatei Romania and Burkina Faso.
In addition, in trying to trace the origin of UNITA equipment
seized in Togo in 1997, the mechanism has uncovered flying routes
involving airports in Togo, Khartoum, Nairobi, Johannesburg, and
even Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. It has also traced some
flights suspected of carrying arms to UNITA as having reportedly
originated in the Republic of Moldova and from Uzbekistan.
Ultimately, however, the mechanism has not managed to connect all
the dots and to identify who is selling arms to UNITA.
In its own words: "The ongoing project on the profiling of arms
dealers mentioned in the previous report (released in April),
namely Imad Kebir, alias Piotr Godunov, and Victor Bout, has not
recorded any major progress. The mechanism has not been able to
collect information other than that already published, except in
the case of Victor Bout." Neither has the mechanism managed to
secure cooperation from all the states implicated, in its attempt
to isolate UNITA.
Results are disappointing
Andrea Lari, an independent consultant on Angola to the
international lobby group, Human Rights Watch, says the
monitoring mechanism report is "disappointing". "If you read
between the lines, very little has been achieved in terms of
tightening of controls and the effectiveness of sanctions," he
notes. Acknowledging the difficulty of tracing the origin of arms
and diamonds sellers and buyers, Lari says more pressure must be
brought to bear on sanctions busters by sovereign states.
Like other observers and analysts, he says there is a need to
re-evaluate the sanctions regime to give it teeth. Global Witness
campaigner Alex Yearsley points to the absence of a proper
mechanism to investigate and prosecute diamond and arms sanctions
busters as a major loophole - a point the monitoring mechanism
itself seems to acknowledge. In its report, it recommends the
creation of a permanent structure with increased powers, but says
that the form of such a body needs to be debated.
In the meantime, though, UNITA has secured itself a global
audience via the Internet, which it is using effectively to
spread its message and to facilitate communications between Jonas
Savimbi and his army, and the internal and external wings of
UNITA. "Electronic technology is becoming an increasingly
important asset for UNITA in its propaganda campaign. Use and
abuse of Internet web sites and e-mail by UNITA enables the
rebels to maintain an even higher profile than the group had
prior to the prohibition of its representational activities
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1127 (1997)," the report
states.
The mechanism says the "most important UNITA representatives are
found in Belgium, Burkina Faso, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Switzerland, Togo and the US" - with Portugal being the most
important UNITA base in Europe. It lists two Ireland-based
websites run by Colm Croasdell and Leon Dias as UNITA sites. It
says that Joffre Justino, a vocal UNITA representative in
Portugal, as well as Jonas Savimbi and other senior UNITA
officials use e-mail addresses administered in Portugal.
"Although these facts have been brought to the attention of the
Irish and Portuguese authorities, neither government has
succeeded in closing the sites," the mechanism writes.
Many ways to sell a diamond
Turning its attention to UNITA's diamond trading, the mechanism
says UNITA probably sells between 25 and 30 percent of the
illegal diamonds leaving Angola, excluding sales from stockpiles.
It is estimated that about US $1 million worth of illicit
diamonds leave Angola each day. While the mechanism has not been
able to accurately detail UNITA's diamond stockpile, it says it
has information that Savimbi himself holds a stockpile of
coloured diamonds. The only coloured stones found in Angola are
pink and yellow.
While saying that information on UNITA's diamond trading systems
are incredibly patchy because it is one of the secrets UNITA
guards most tightly, the mechanism says: - It has heard repeated
reports that UNITA has been selling diamonds from its stockpile
during 2001 - that UNITA is selling diamonds to dealers by tender
using third countries, selling directly to friendly dealers,
engaging in small opportunistic sales to raise money for food and
medicines and is bartering diamonds for anything from arms to
food and medicines. - it is possible, based on information
provided by a UNITA defector, that Malange and the Angolan
interior remain important mining areas for UNITA - it holds the
view that UNITA is still in possession of some diamond mines in
the provinces of Lunda Norte, Uige and Bie, among others.
In spite of various attempts, the mechanism has not been able to
track end-buyers, even though it has identified various South
African-linked dealers as possible middle-men, saying only that
Savimbi himself seems to be controlling mined diamonds and that
Zambia and the DRC remain important conduits. Quoting the
defector, the mechanism says: "He described seeing six sealed
opaque plastic sacks, about 16"X10", filled with diamonds, arrive
through this route in March 2001."
If the Kimberley Process, aimed at keeping UNITA and other rebel
forces from selling diamonds to fund their wars, ends its last
meeting successfully in Botswana in November, then the sale of
such diamonds could be severely curtailed. However, there is
still, among others, disagreement over the certification system
being proposed. And analysts and diamond experts alike agrees
that criminal syndicates will always find a way of doing
business.
It's war - business as usual
So, while the mechanism reports cooperation from some individual
states, it seems that a lack of intelligence sharing among
governments, sophisticated smuggling modus operandi, the secrecy
of the diamond and arms trades and the mechanism's lack of
capacity conspire to ensure that Savimbi can operate with a
degree of impunity.
In the last six months the mechanism, through a wide range of
interviews and its own investigations, has determined that UNITA
is now built along a classical guerrilla cell structure, with
operatives knowing only what they have to in order to carry out
operations. It has also discovered that the rebel movement no
longer has the civilian/administrative structure it used to have
and that many civilians in its areas of control starve - unless
they have senior connections.
It says there is ample evidence that UNITA's leadership is
concentrated in the province of Moxico, where the government
recently launched a major offensive, sending civilians and UNITA
cells fleeing.
"For security reasons and because of the military offensive of
the government troops, the various organisational units are not
kept together. Jonas Savimbi is said to move with 14 or 15 highly
trained military guards and a male nurse," the mechanism says,
adding that several other senior UNITA members on the UN list of
officials who are subject to sanctions, seem to be based in
Moxico.
In addition, Savimbi, via a satellite communications system,
continues to be able to reach any of the UNITA representatives
abroad. More importantly though, his firm hold on the rebel
movement (which has seen many of his detractors, defectors and
powerful military leaders killed) keeps Savimbi in constant
contact with his military commanders throughout the country via a
good radio network. This has enabled them to plan and execute
attacks throughout the country in the past six months, in defence
of UNITA's smuggling routes and in search of food, medicines and
arms.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by
Africa Action (incorporating the Africa Policy Information
Center, The Africa Fund, and the American Committee on Africa).
Africa Action's information services provide accessible
information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and
international policies toward Africa that advance economic,
political and social justice and the full spectrum of human
rights.
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