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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived document may not work.


Africa: Economic Policy Lessons, 2

AFRICA ACTION
Africa Policy E-Journal
August 2, 2003 (030802)

Africa: Economic Policy Lessons, 2
(Reposted from sources cited below)

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in its annual Economic Report on Africa released on July 30, painted a sobering picture of slowed growth rates for 2002 and "mixed" prospects for 2003, while citing successes in some countries. In addition to a continent-wide review, the report also contains detailed studies of Mauritius, Rwanda, Ghana, Gabon, Egypt, Mozambique and Uganda

An earlier E-Journal posting contained summary observations from the report on the current economic situation. Today's two postings contain the sections from the report's overview with policy proposals emerging from the country studies. The full report is available in PDF format on the ECA website at
http://www.uneca.org/era2003

+++++++++++++++++end summary/introduction+++++++++++++++++++++++

DISTILLING LESSONS FROM THE SEVEN COUNTRIES

The countries profiled in this year's Report reveal the range of African policy challenges. Summarized here are four key challenges in accelerating the pace of development:

I. Escaping poverty--going beyond averages. [see part 1]

II. Achieving fiscal sustainability--exiting aid dependence.[see part 1]

III. Energizing African bureaucracies--enhancing the capacity to deliver. [below]

IV. Moving to mutual accountability and coherence--taking the best route to development effectiveness. [below]

The purpose is to highlight best and worst practices, draw lessons from the experiences of the seven countries, and provide overall policy guidance to African countries. The countries profiled this year are Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda.

III. ENERGIZING AFRICAN BUREAUCRACIES WITH MORE CAPACITY TO DELIVER

The public service bureaucracies will play a critical role in accelerating the pace of development (figure 1). Yet they play a contradictory role, at once part of the problem and part of the cure (Kayiizi-Mugerwa 2003). Economic reforms are matters of public policy. But policies are no more effective than the bureaucracies trying to implement them.

Egypt and Ghana demonstrate the predicament. Despite 20 years of institutional reforms in the public sector, there is little to show for it.These reforms, like those in many African countries, focused on quantitative issues wage and hiring freezes, downsizings, and retrenchments.They paid little attention to more subtle and challenging issues of bureaucratic quality. In Egypt, state capacity needs badly to be reinvigorated to improve export competitiveness and propel the economy to a higher stage of development.

But the reform of institutions faces political and administrative constraints. In Ghana the situation has deteriorated so much that the current government now faces a crisis in the public service. Two statements from the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy reinforce this assessment (Ghana 2003, p. 109): It would appear that the totality of the public sector reform programme might be beyond the capacity of the available human and financial resources to plan and implement. However the reform process cannot proceed effectively without sustained and palpable political commitment, the enforcement of agreed proposals for reform from a political and official level and provision of adequate resources.

The key reform in Ghana the Public Financial Management Reform Programme, initiated in 1995 introduced an integrated payroll and personnel database, a medium-term expenditure framework, and a budget and public expenditure management system. But at the end of 2002 the government was still grappling with the same issues as in 1995. Several factors are responsible. But compensation and ineffectual management of the public service including the absence of an overall human resource development, use, and retention strategy are the prime causes.

Participatory policymaking can be highly effective

In stark contrast, the policy formulation process in Mauritius "contains a very strong dose of consultation, dialogue, consensus building, and democratic principles, ensuring that all concerned stakeholders are actively involved" (Bonaglia and Fukusaku 2002, pp. 171-73). Public-private partnership is pervasive in Mauritian policymaking, and nongovernmental organizations have always been an important part of Mauritian society. As a direct result, public policies have supported high rates of private investment.

The Joint Economic Council is the private sector's apex organization.When a private sector position needs to be voiced, the council expresses it after consulting with members. At least twice a year the government holds meetings with the council, chaired by the prime minister and attended by senior ministers. Structured consultations are also held with private sector organizations, trade unions, and the minister of finance to prepare the national budget. Between budget preparations sessions, there is constant dialogue between the private sector and government through meetings on specific policy matters. Business, labour unions, and government are involved in tripartite wage negotiations.

Private sector and union representatives sit on the National Negotiating Committee on Post-Lom� discussions, the World Trade Organization standing coordination committee, and the Regional Cooperation Council. They also take part regularly in World Trade Organization ministerial conferences.

The participatory policymaking in Mauritius enables all stakeholders to shape the national economic strategy, with private needs reflected in government policy, in line with the country's development objectives.

MOVING TO MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND COHERENCE--THE BEST ROUTE TO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

There is much dissatisfaction with the state of development partnerships in Africa (ECA 2001). It stems from a vicious circle of high expectations, grand promises, and only partial accomplishment of goals. There is also the frustration of Africans (that expected benefits were not fully realized) and of development partners (that implementation was not as expected and the funds provided were not used effectively). The African side blames unrealistic project design, excessive conditions (some of which were just plain wrong), and slow and unpredictable access to promised funds. The donors blame corruption, inadequate political will, and poor implementation by the Africans. There is considerable evidence to support both points of view (Lancaster and Wangwe 2001).

If the pace of Africa's development is to be accelerated it is imperative that the relationship between Africa and its partners be within the context of interdependence, cooperation, and mutual accountability (ECA and OECD 2002). That is the emerging consensus. Predictability and accountability should be mutual. National leaders should carry out their programmes and inform supporting partners of any changes. Partners should provide the promised resources in a timely manner or consult on the proposed changes. Each should be accountable for fulfilling commitments. Agreements should be clear, stating events and timing, with all to be monitored.

This consensus is reflected in the pledge by world leaders at the UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey: A substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required if developing countries are to achieve the internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration. To build support for ODA, we will cooperate to further improve policies and development strategies, both nationally and internationally, to enhance aid effectiveness (para 22).

The international community is also committed to intensifying efforts to lower external debt burdens, improve market access, and reduce constraints that prevent poor countries from fully realizing the benefits of globalization. In turn, developing countries acknowledged that they must take responsibility for good governance and sound policies, as African leaders are doing under the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). These leaders have committed to implementing sound economic policies, tackling corruption, putting in place good governance, investing in people, and establishing an investment climate to attract private capital. Mutual accountability requires that pledges by both sides be monitored. Box 2 describes an indicative "first set" of performance indicators that could be used to jointly monitor progress by African countries and external development partners on specific commitments and related reform efforts.

Increase the predictability of aid flows

Several country profiles underscore the importance of mutual accountability for development effectiveness. For instance, an important feature of mutual accountability is that partnership arrangements should be clear and predictable. It is accepted that major changes in a recipient country may legitimately require a revaluation of partnership agreements (for instance, if serious conflict breaks out in the country that had been peaceful and secure). This was the case in Uganda, where an unplanned increase in defense spending of about 0.5% of GDP in 2002/03 budget led to a reevaluation of multilateral and bilateral relationships. Defense expenditures are projected to be around 5.6% of GDP in 2002/03 compared with 4.6% in the pervious three years. The rise in the defense budget, especially the spending over budget, has raised concerns among several donors, with the government arguing that the increase in spending is necessary to decisively address the security situation in the north.

However, the foreign partner too frequently makes unilateral changes in agreements without consultation. The result: serious disruption of important national programmes and uncertainty about how to plan for the future. In Ghana development assistance that was expected in January 1, 2002 was belatedly received on December 31, 2002. The budget deficit rose to 6.9% of GDP in 2002 (from 4.4% the year before) partly because only 18% of promised grants had been received by the third quarter.

Mutual accountability requires clear understanding by both parties about the timing of release of promised aid funds, and donors should be held accountable for delivering on their promises. Consultation should be the rule if changes are thought to be needed.

To address the unpredictability of aid flows, donors need to programme their aid over a multiyear timeframe consistent with the financial planning horizon of recipient governments.

For this to happen:

  • Medium-term commitments should be aligned with medium-term expenditure frameworks, so that the country can plan Poverty Reduction Strategy activities well in advance.
  • Yearly disbursements should be aligned with the fiscal budget so that countries can deliver services planned in the medium-term expenditure framework.
  • Development partners should provide recipient governments with full information on aid flows, on a regular and a timely basis.
  • Development partners should let the recipient government know in advance what information should be included in the annual reviews, streamlining the requests and reducing the number of additional ad hoc requests for information.

Consider Rwanda, where the British government in 1998 entered a 10-year relationship to improve the predictability of resource flows and set up an independent body to review donor practices. The United Kingdom has also led the way in shifting funding towards budget support, with a new programme of budget support of 76 million pounds for 2000-03 agreed in 2000.

Reduce donor "frenzy"

Partnership based on mutual accountability should reduce the high transaction costs for recipient countries. Many African countries receive assistance from several partners in the same economic sectors, with each partner insisting on detailed conditions for its assistance. The conditions exacted by the partners often are not consistent. And the timeframe for the partner agreements tends to be short, creating uncertainty for ongoing programmes and requiring the time of national leaders to negotiate follow-on agreements.

Reducing the high transactions cost requires improving donor coordination and harmonizing development assistance programmes. For this the partners need to align their policies and programmes with the Poverty Reduction Strategy or other nationally owned development plans.

The Uganda profile shows that donors are aligning their programmes around the PRS. But this is not happening across a wide range of countries.For example, in Mozambique, where some progress has been made in this regard, the government is concerned about the burden presented by project aid that bypasses national systems and priorities. Aid there is fragmenting ministries, weakening national and ministerial identity, and undermining authority.

Rwanda has new Guidelines for Productive Aid Coordination, with the Poverty Reduction Strategy now providing the framework for aid coordination. It is also considering a lead agency arrangement, with the largest donor to a sector taking the lead in that sector. A lot more needs to be done in this area (box 3).

Reducing transaction costs may require that development partners move away from project aid towards budget support, which for countries with transparent budget procedures and sound public expenditure management systems is another critical feature of mutual accountability, as in Ghana.

The government of Ghana has a multidonor budgetary programme to support the Poverty Reduction Strategy, requiring donors to provide resources through the government budget and in line with the budget cycles. Participating development partners follow common rules for disbursement and commit themselves to firm financing over the coming year, with indicative commitments for the following two years. Funds are not earmarked for specific activities. Instead, the government and the development partners participating in the programme have agreed to focus on some key reform areas viewed as critical for the successful and efficient implementation of the strategy: public finance accountability reforms, budget processes, decentralization, civil service reform, and governance. For each area of priority actions, a policy matrix will provide benchmarks for monitoring progress. The process is facilitated through regular quarterly mini-consultative group meetings. Regular monitoring reports from the government will be in a standard format, including quarterly reports on macroeconomic indicators, the policy matrix, expenditures against the budget and releases, and implementation of the strategy. In turn, development partners are to provide quarterly reports on disbursements and projections of disbursements for the next two quarters.

Making development policies coherent

The success of development policy depends on the effects of other policies, which intentionally or unintentionally may impair development cooperation. The coherence of development policies has to do with ensuring that all policies affecting African development prospects are synergistic and do not conflict or nullify each other. A lack of coherence has been shown to lead to ineffectiveness (failure to achieve objectives), inefficiency (waste of resources), and loss of policy credibility.

Chapter 1 of the report documents several examples of incoherence in the development policies of Africa's major partners. For example, the EU advocates African countries' integration into the world economy, but its trade policy has numerous protectionist elements, especially in agriculture.An open trade policy and dismantling of the Common Agricultural Policy would complement EU development efforts rather than frustrate them.

To improve food security in West Africa, German development cooperation has promoted beef production in that region, but the success of these projects has been threatened by subsidized EU beef exports to the same countries. The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill, scaling up subsidies, is another example of a policy that conflicts with the government's pledge to reduce poverty in Africa.

In general, Africa's international partners have not implemented their commitments, particularly for enhancing market access and eliminating trade-distorting agricultural subsidies. Abolishing OECD agricultural subsidies would provide developing countries with three times their current ODA receipts. The elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers could result in static gains for developing countries of around $182 billion in services, $162 billion in manufactured goods, and $32 billion in agriculture.

Tariff escalation in the international trade regime makes it difficult for African countries to diversify their economies towards high-value-added processed goods. Tariff peaks rates above 15% are often concentrated in products of export interest to developing countries. Two sectors that matter most for developing country exporters are textiles and agriculture.Tariff barriers in textiles remain high, while high tariffs for agricultural commodities and the continued subsidization of agriculture in many OECD countries repel agricultural exports.

The success of the Doha Development round of multilateral trade negotiations is crucial for improving market access for Africa's exports. But given the apparent breakdown in these crucial talks, there is a strong case for OECD countries to frontload the benefits of trade liberalization for the poorest countries by providing immediate duty-free and quota-free market access.

Because Africa depends more on external trade than do other developing regions, expanding market access for its exports is a clear priority.Of developing country GDP in 2001, 34% came from the exports of goods and services, but for Sub-Saharan Africa, the figure was 40%.

Mutual accountability--Africa's role

Mutual accountability is a two-way process. Partners have to fulfill their part of the bargain, and Africans have to fulfill theirs. For Africans, the commitment to self-monitoring and to peer learning is the linchpin to accountability. (This is distinct from the accountability of having recipients report their compliance with donor requirements, including conditionality.) NEPAD is implementing an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to encourage self-monitoring and peer learning (box 4). This systematic assessment tool will track progress of outcomes, identify and reinforce best practices, assess capacity gaps, and implement the required corrective actions.

Several African countries have already agreed to undergo peer reviews. What is left now is to move forward with implementing APRM and show that African countries are fulfilling their side of mutual accountability.

Good governance is the key to mutual accountability

Several country profiles demonstrate the progress African countries have made in improving governance. In Mozambique the current president has announced that he will step down in 2004 and refrain from anointing a successor. This is a potent signal of the political leadership's commitment to democracy and the rule of law. Rwanda is also taking positive steps towards deepening democracy and good governance, announcing that multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections will be held in mid-2003. Crucial to the success of this gradual political normalization are attempts to foster social reconciliation through local tribunals, aimed at paving the way for the eventual reintegration of genocide suspects into their communities. Connected to these efforts is a bold decentralization programme to increase community participation, but serious capacity constraints are apparent in most localities.

Ghana's smooth political transition in January 2001 brings hope that the new government will create an atmosphere of transparency and participation. This has led to more open debates on major policy reforms, such as the recent increase in fuel prices, the adoption of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, and privatization of water.

Mauritius, with a long period of political stability, remains a sterling example of democracy. The rule of law prevails. Property rights are respected. And public sector activities have been transparent and conducive to private sector activities. The result: the transformation of a poor country with a per capita income of $260 at the beginning of the 1960s to a middle-income country with a per capita income of $3,800 in 2003.

+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++

Date distributed (ymd): 030802
Region: Continent-Wide
Issue Areas: +economy/development+


The Africa Action E-Journal is a free information service provided by Africa Action, including both original commentary and reposted documents. Africa Action provides this information and analysis in order to promote U.S. and international policies toward Africa that advance economic, political and social justice and the full spectrum of human rights.

URL for this file: http://www.africafocus.org/docs03ej/eca0308b.php