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Sudan: Peace Process Update
AFRICA ACTION
Africa Policy E-Journal
February 21, 2003 (030221)
Sudan: Peace Process Update
(Reposted from sources cited below)
This posting contains excerpts from a recent update from the
International Crisis Group on the peace process in Sudan, including
reports on new agreements on strengthening cease-fire
implementation, reached between the government of Sudan and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army earlier this month. Despite
this agreement, the report warns that this process is dangerously
fragile.
Additional background analysis, from the International Crisis
Group, the Kampala-based Justice Africa, and other sources, can be
found in earlier postings at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs02/sud0204.php> and
http://www.africafocus.org/docs02/sud0211.php>
Justice Africa has also posted the Kampala Declaration from the
November 21-24 meeting of the Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile
Civil Society Forum, at
http://www.justiceafrica.org/nuba_blue_nile.htm
Additional current sources are available at
http://www.africafiles.org/sudan.asp
and
http://allafrica.com/sudan
Churches from Sudan will be meeting Feb. 22-27 for a consultation
in South Africa, the first time this consultation has been held in
Africa instead of Europe. For more details see:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200302140564.html
+++++++++++++++++end summary/introduction+++++++++++++++++++++++
Sudan's Oilfields Burn Again:
Brinkmanship Endangers the Peace Process
Nairobi/Brussels, 10 February 2003
International Crisis Group
http://www.crisisweb.org
International Crisis Group International Headquarters
149 Avenue
Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 502 90 38; Fax: +32 2
502 50 38
E-mail: [email protected]
New York Office
400 Madison Avenue, Suite 11C, New York 10017
Tel: +1 212 813 08 20; Fax: +1 212 813 08 25
E-mail: [email protected]
[excerpts: full text of this and earlier ICG reports on Sudan are
available at http://www.crisisweb.org]
I. OVERVIEW
Sudan's peace process survived a major challenge in the first weeks
of the new year. Indeed, signature by the parties of a strengthened
cessation of hostilities agreement on 4 February and a memorandum
of understanding codifying points of agreement on outstanding
issues of power and wealth sharing two days later indicates that
the momentum to end the twenty-year old conflict is strong.
However, the crisis produced by a government-sponsored offensive in
the Western Upper Nile oilfields at the end of 2002 and through
January raised questions about the Khartoum government's commitment
to peace and showed that much more attention needs to be paid to
pro-government southern militias and the commercial and political
agendas for which they are being used.
The fighting, the brunt of which was borne by those militias, with
regular government troops in support and backup roles, highlighted
three major obstacles in the path of a final peace deal:
- the willingness of the government to disregard signed agreements;
- the spoiler role that the government-supported militias can play
in the peace process, including following conclusion of a formal
peace agreement, if greater efforts are not made to encourage their
reconciliation with the SPLA insurgents; and
- the ongoing danger that the dynamic of oil development represents
for the peace process, at least so long as the government and a
number of foreign oil companies with which it is in partnership are
prepared to pursue that development by whatever means necessary.
Strong international engagement remains the key to buttressing a
still fragile peace process and seeing it through to success in the
next several months. In the first instance that means insisting on
full implementation of the newly agreed ceasefire provisions
including an active role for the authorised verification team and
the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the
offensive. Holding the parties publicly accountable for violations
will be key in ensuring their seriousness at the negotiating table.
The offensive from late December until the beginning of February
was an extension of the government's long-time strategy of
depopulating oilrich areas through indiscriminate attacks on
civilians in order to clear the way for further development of
infrastructure. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the tactics
included the abduction of women and children, gang rapes, ground
assaults supported by helicopter gunships, destruction of
humanitarian relief sites, and burning of villages. A senior
Sudanese civil society member concluded: "The Nuer militias are the
most potent threat to human security and stability in the South,
regardless of whether peace is concluded or not".
The Khartoum authorities deny it, but their responsibility for the
latest round of hostilities is clear. They and the other
participants in the fragile peace process now face crucial
decisions. The government must choose between continued reliance on
military brinkmanship, which would bring it renewed international
condemnation and isolation, or the benefits of a peace that is
within reach. The latest fighting reflected a calculated decision
to violate the cessation of hostilities agreement signed on 15
October 2002. The signing of new agreements, therefore, does not
guarantee their implementation.
The SPLA, which was forced onto the defensive by the attacks, must
decide not only whether to keep its emphasis on the negotiating
track but also whether to intensify its efforts to achieve
reconciliation with the Nuer militia leaders who did most of the
recent fighting for Khartoum. Despite the new agreements, many in
the SPLA feel increasingly pessimistic about the intentions of the
government, as well as about the commitment and ability of the
international community to hold Khartoum to its word.
The next several months will be decisive for the peace process. A
looming crossroads date may be 21 April, when President Bush is
required to report to the U.S. Congress on the state of progress in
the negotiations. If Khartoum is assessed to be obstructing the
process, that report could trigger new U.S. action under its recent
legislation (the "Sudan Peace Act"). Because of the State
Department's policy of engagement, "Khartoum is underestimating our
response. That would be a mistake", said one well- placed U.S.
official, citing Congressional and constituency pressure as unknown
variables. "The whole thing could blow up", a Western official
close to the talks said in January 2003 out of concern for the
consequences if the offensive continued. The peace process held
together narrowly this time but the situation remains volatile.
II. A DIFFICULT NEW YEAR
A. DIPLOMATIC PROGRESS DESPITE THE FIGHTING
When the peace talks facilitated by the regional InterGovernmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) adjourned for Kenya's
election in November 2002, it was anticipated that the parties
would be back around the table by early January 2003. That schedule
ran into problems at the same time as the guns began to fire again
in the oil regions.
Negotiations were to have resumed on 15 January 2003 with the
status of three contested areas Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and
Southern Blue Nile first on the agenda. Due to government
hesitancy to treat this subject within the IGAD framework,6 the
parties had reluctantly agreed before the November break to
consider it in a forum that would be technically and physically
distinct from the formal IGAD process that is conducted in the
Kenyan town of Machakos.
General Lazaro Sumbeiywo was to facilitate as a Kenyan
representative rather than in his normal capacity as IGAD's chief
mediator. However, as the starting date neared, the government
reneged and demanded resumption of the official IGAD talks on power
and wealth sharing.
Regional conferences in SPLA-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains
and Southern Blue Nile in late November and early December,
respectively, appear to have shaken the government's confidence.
Participants in both conferences unambiguously concluded that they
wished to be represented by the SPLA and administered within the
southern entity during the interim period that is expected to
follow a final peace deal and precede a southern selfdetermination
referendum. The parties finally compromised by holding a three-day
symposium from 18 to 20 January 2003 that attempted, but failed, to
agree on resuming discussion of the three areas.
The official IGAD talks finally restarted on 23 January and made
considerable progress on the wealth sharing issue, under the
continued able leadership of General Sumbeiywo, the chief mediator,
and with helpful facilitation from World Bank and IMF officials.
The parties signed on 6 February 2003 a memorandum of understanding
elaborating points of agreement on both political and economic
issues as a signal of continued seriousness about the
negotiations. (These will be the subject of the next ICG report.)
The talks are now in recess and will resume in late February or
early March.
However, it remains unclear when and how the status of the three
contested areas will be taken up. The war in Sudan will continue if
these areas are left out of the IGAD process.
There has been encouraging news on the humanitarian side. Most
importantly, an agreement by the parties to allow the UN-led
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) access to Southern Blue Nile and
Kassala State in the Northeast in order to provide aid to areas
that had previously been off limits to it. A meeting of the
Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA), originally
scheduled for December 2002, was held from 18 to 20 January,
separate from the abortive political symposium, and produced
agreement by the parties on a number of issues, principally around
the facilitation of crossline access (i.e. between government- and
SPLAcontrolled areas) for humanitarian aid and aid workers.
B. TO THE EDGE AND BACK ON THE BATTLEFIELD
The political and humanitarian discussions occurred against a
backdrop of an offensive by governmentsupported militias since the
end of December 2002 in Western Upper Nile that threatened to make
a nullity of the cessation of hostilities agreement and put the
entire peace process at risk. Western Upper Nile, which is home to
most of the oil resources in the Sudan, has produced some of the
fiercest fighting and worst humanitarian conditions in the world
over the past decade.
...
By the beginning of February 2003, there was a highly dangerous
prospect of further escalation, with well armed forces in close
proximity to each other on a number of southern fronts.
3. The New Agreement to Stop the Fighting
The government and SPLA pulled back from the brink of such an
escalation, and the likely collapse of the peace negotiations, by
signing an "Addendum" to the 15 October 2002 cessation of
hostilities agreement. Under the terms of the new document, the
fighting is to end, and both sides are to return their forces to
where they were on that earlier date. They have also obliged
themselves to report on the locations and movements of their
troops. The government agreed specifically to halt construction
of the all-purpose road in the oilfields.
Many of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled the
fighting on the Leer front (the first prong of the offensive) moved
toward Dablual. The food and water situation in that area is
precarious and could easily become a humanitarian disaster. Many
residents of the villages south of Mayom and Mankien (the second
prong of the offensive) are IDPs from fighting over the last few
years in Rubkona, Nhialdiu, and other areas now controlled by the
government. They were forced to flee again to escape attacks that
were aimed as much at civilians and civilian structures, such as
tukuls (civilian huts), as military targets. The new agreement
acknowledges the plight of all these IDPs and calls for their safe
return, and for the international community to facilitate this.
Most significantly the Addendum provides for the kind of mechanism
to monitor implementation that was conspicuously absent from the
original document. It does so by expanding the mandate of an
existing body that was originally created for a more limited
purpose. This is the U.S.-led Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
(CPMT), which contains both military and civilian personnel, and
was agreed to by the parties in March 2002 for the narrow purpose
of investigating some of the essentially human rights and law of
war violations taking place in Western Upper Nile. The
verification group for the cessation of hostilities agreement will
now be housed within an enlarged CPMT, and the two bodies will
share resources and responsibilities.
There is no single answer to why, if its military strategy was
succeeding, the government agreed to end its offensive, reverse
some of its apparent gains, and accept a monitoring arrangement
that should make renewal of the tactic more difficult. The planned
oilfield road from Bentiu to Adok has now been completed as far as
Leer and oil infrastructure moved further south, the major
commercial objective of the operation. It may be considered in the
oil consortium's interest to have a monitored ceasefire that can
protect newly deployed assets and so facilitate exploitation of the
oil further south than ever before. However, the requirement to
withdraw troops from territory captured during the fighting implies
that the government should abandon the garrisons it established as
it advanced the road to Leer. While the road itself will remain an
accomplishment, and a monitored ceasefire provides a new measure of
stability, there is a question whether foreign oil companies will
be prepared to operate beyond the limits of Khartoum's military
protection, and if they do whether this will require them to reach
understandings with the SPLA. ,,,
...
V. CONCLUSION
The juxtaposition of quiet progress on the wealth and power sharing
issues in the latest phase of IGAD talks with the high visibility
government offensive that almost collapsed the process demonstrates
the fragile nature of the peace initiative. The offensive
highlighted both government willingness to disregard signed
agreements and the spoiler role that the southern militias aligned
with Khartoum can play if they are not brought meaningfully into
that process ideally after reconciliation with the SPLA to
harmonise southern positions.
The agreements reached on 4 and 6 February 2003 show that despite
the serious fighting that greeted the new year and for which it was
responsible, Khartoum has not decided to forsake negotiations and
again seek a military victory. The brinkmanship that it conducted
for relatively limited diplomatic and commercial purposes, however,
involved huge risks. The best way to ensure that it is not allowed
to strain the promising peace process again is for the
international community, in particular the official observer
countries (U.S., UK, Norway, Italy) and others that are directly
supporting the talks such as the UN, the Arab League and the
African Union, to engage strongly on behalf of the IGAD mediation.
It should be made clear to the parties that any violation of the
existing agreements, most particularly the cessation of hostilities
agreement of 15 October 2002 as amended and supplemented, will
bring unrelenting, public condemnation from governments and
multilateral bodies alike. Earlier and wider condemnation of the
Khartoum authorities for violating the cessation of hostilities
agreement in December and January could have led to much earlier
agreement on an end to the offensive and establishment of a
verification regime.
There has been reluctance to condemn the government publicly,
apparently for fear of provoking a reaction in Khartoum against the
negotiations. This is a mistaken reading of the political
psychology. A low-key reaction is more likely to encourage
hardliners in the Sudanese capital rather than restrain them.
Coordinated and sustained multilateral diplomatic pressure can
support moderate voices, as the recent humanitarian, power and
wealth sharing and cessation of hostilities agreements testify.
As part of the post-conflict reconstruction effort that is being
prepared, adequate resources should be earmarked to address the
root causes of local violence in the South. These include chronic
underdevelopment in parts of the Upper Nile, competition over
natural resources among pastoralist communities within the South
and along the North- South administrative border, and the resulting
proliferation of small arms in these communities. Donors'
post-conflict aid planning needs to remain in step with the IGAD
process, however, so that mixed signals are not sent regarding the
normalisation of relations Khartoum desires. Some analysts are
becoming rightly concerned at the speed with which this "Planning
for Peace" effort is advancing. Donors may not be taking adequately
into consideration the absorption capacity of either the SPLA or
the government and the long-term sustainability of the peace
itself in the rush to put together large reconstruction
packages.
It is important for the SPLA not to be diverted by the recent
fighting from taking further significant steps towards
reconciliation with the many disavowed and disaffected southern
militias aligned with the government. The events of the last
several months have shown that these groups are potentially the
great spoilers of the peace process because of the ease with which
their anger and sense of exclusion can be manipulated. They can
make governing certain areas of the South all but impossible for an
SPLA-led southern government following a peace agreement, but if
they are kept on the outside, they also have the capacity to ensure
that such an agreement is never signed. Donors can help by
increasing support for efforts by Sudanese civil society to build
on the process that unfolded at the December 2002 Entebbe
conference for South-South reconciliation, convened by the New
Sudan Council of Churches.
The international community should work urgently to ensure that the
verification team called for in the Addendum to the cessation of
hostilities agreement signed on 4 February is allowed full access
to locations and forces, has the necessary resources, and
publicises its findings in a timely way in order to maintain
pressure for full compliance on the parties so that the last
political issues can be addressed in a positive atmosphere. No
doubt should be left that the ceasefire applies to the militias
equally as it applies to the parties that signed it.
Consideration should be given to adding to the arrangements for
monitoring the ceasefire that are already in place a mechanism for
soliciting input from Sudanese civil society, North and South.
Robust, early and public condemnation by the international
community of any violation will make an enormous contribution to
the calculations of the parties at the negotiating table. If they
understand the clear choice between the benefits of peace and the
isolation of war, the prospects for a final agreement will be
strengthened considerably.
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Date distributed (ymd): 030221
Region: East Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+
+security/peace+
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