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Sudan: Peace, No Peace
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 6, 2004 (040306)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
As peace talks continue in Kenya between the Sudanese government
and its principal opponent, the SPLM/A, the prospects of securing
a sustainable peace are increasingly threatened by other issues not
on the table in this process. These include intense fighting in
Darfur in western Sudan and unresolved questions of democratic
participation throughout the country. The humanitarian crisis of as
many as one million people displaced in Darfur and across the
border in Chad, is currently rated among the worst in the world.
This issue of AfricaFocus Bulletin contains several brief
statements from different sources on the current crisis. The e-mail
version also contains excerpts from the latest monthly report from
the Sudan Focal Point, while the web version contains the full text
of that monthly report.
Other sources for updates and analysis include:
AllAfrica.com
http://allafrica.com/sudan
A variety of current news and statements.
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
http://www.irinnews.org/frontpage.asp?SelectCountry=Sudan
Includes a series of "Special Reports" on peace prospects as well
as current news.
Sudan Tribune
http://www.sudantribune.com/mot.php3?id_mot=42
Extensive portal for news & views
Sudan Information Gateway
http://www.unsudanig.org
Wide variety of reports and news links provided by UN
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Darfur Conflict Threatens Peace in Sudan
Sudan Ecumenical Forum Press Release
27th February 2004
Contact persons:
John Ashworth, Sudan Focal Point Africa, [email protected].
+27-82-853-3556
Marina Peter, Sudan Focal Point Europe, [email protected],
+49-175-1647-413
"A new threat to peace in Sudan has emerged." This stark warning
was given by South African Catholic Bishop Kevin Dowling after his
recent visit to Sudan, as the conflict in Darfur continues to
escalate. The armed forces and associated militia of both the
Government of Sudan and the liberation movements have been
responsible for gross violations of human rights, and a
humanitarian tragedy is unfolding in Darfur. Hundreds of thousands
of people have been displaced and many thousands killed. To date
the Government of Sudan has restricted humanitarian access, and has
prevented human rights monitors from visiting Darfur.
Bishop Dowling was speaking in his capacity as Chair of the Sudan
Ecumenical Forum, a coalition of Sudanese and international
churches under the auspices of the World Council of Churches. Dr
Sam Kobia, the Secretary- General of the World Council of Churches,
added his voice, expressing concern at "the on-going conflict in
the western region of Darfur that has resulted in an alarming
deterioration in the humanitarian and human rights situation and
threatens to unravel the gains made in the peace process."
While negotiations aimed at ending the war in southern Sudan
continue under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD), there are no talks in sight to end the conflict
in Darfur. The Sudan Ecumenical Forum urges the international
community, and particularly the African Union and the European
Union, to press for meaningful internationally-supervised
negotiations to end this conflict, and calls on the parties to the
conflict to negotiate in good faith. At the same time, the Sudan
Ecumenical Forum calls on all parties to immediately safeguard the
lives and property of the citizens of the area, and to allow
unimpeded international access for humanitarian aid and human
rights monitoring.
Bishop Dowling made a special plea to African countries, and
particularly South Africa, to engage in this issue which poses such
a threat to the security and development of the region. "African
countries have taken the lead in working for peace in southern
Sudan through IGAD; let Africans now also stand in solidarity with
their suffering sisters and brothers in Darfur."
[For additional background on Darfur see the IRIN special report
most easily available at:
http://allafrica.com/stories/200402160771.html]
Sudan: Peace process threatened by exclusivity, says think-tank
UN Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN)
http://www.irinnews.org
3 March 2004
[This material comes via IRIN, a UN humanitarian information unit,
but may not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or
its agencies. If you re-print, copy, archive or re-post any item on
this site, please retain this credit and disclaimer.]
NAIROBI, 3 Mar 2004 (IRIN) - The ongoing peace process between the
government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
is threatened by its almost total exclusivity, necessitating a new
approach from both the negotiating parties and Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) mediators, according to the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) think-tank.
Whereas the first phase of the process had necessitated a narrow
focus on the two main belligerents, a second phase after the
signing of a bilateral peace agreement would need to radically
change to involve the Sudanese public, said ISS in a report
entitled: "The Sudan IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way
Forward".
"For IGAD it means a marked change in philosophy and direction from
that of the first stage, which can be characterised as secretive,
eite driven, narrowly focused and which pointedly ignored the issue
of human rights, to the next stage where transparency, engaging the
large mass of Sudanese, and vastly expanding the focus and
direction of the peace initiative, must set the tone," it said.
Once a peace agreement was signed, a new approach taking account of
the rights of all Sudan's citizens needed to be implemented, said
the report. "It will be a critical test of the IGAD mediators
whether they can adapt to the new demands placed upon them and
carry the process forward."
The Machakos Protocol, signed by both the government and the SPLM/A
in July 2002, underlines the need for a democratic transformation
of Sudan, referring to "democratic governance, accountability,
equality, respect and justice for all citizens of Sudan", and for
the Sudanese to establish "a democratic system of governance".
But so far, a number of key groups, including northern opposition
groups, southern militias and the National Democratic Alliance have
been pointedly excluded from peace negotiations.
The rebellion in Darfur, northwestern Sudan, which exploded in
February 2003, is deemed by observers to be a direct reaction to
this exclusivity and to fears that the national cake is being
divided up into only two slices.
In southern Sudan, there has also been no sustained effort to bring
about south-south reconciliation, despite the fact that the South
Sudan Defence Forces, an umbrella of government-aligned militias,
are armed, control large swathes of the region, and hold many
strategic positions particularly around the oil fields.
According to ISS, a failure to win the popular support of Sudanese
civil society and the country's major political players threatens
the viability of the entire peace process and raises the
possibility of a return to war. "However difficult the task, IGAD
must play a leading role in the intimately linked objectives of an
inclusive peace process and establishing a democratic Sudan," it
warned.
"The building of a democratic Sudan is not a luxury, but the best
- and perhaps only - insurance that the many aggrieved groups in
Sudan do not take up arms," said ISS, adding that southern
grievances increasingly coming to the fore represented "only the
tip of the iceberg of resentment".
"Remarkably, the issue of human rights has received almost no
attention thus far in the IGAD negotiations, but it cannot be
ignored much longer," it added, urging a change of approach and the
setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Last week, the US State Department's 2003 report for Sudan noted
that the two key parties to the peace process - who will be
governing Sudan once a peace agreement is signed - had poor human
rights records.
The Sudanese government's record "remained extremely poor", with
security forces and associated militias responsible for
extrajudicial killings and disappearances, beatings, torture, rape
and harassment with impunity. Similarly, the SPLM/A was accused of
killings, beatings, rape, arbitrary detention, forcible military
conscription of underage young men, and the manipulation of
humanitarian assistance for military advantage.
[For the ISS report The Sudan IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the
Way Forward, see
http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=1796
or visit http://www.iss.co.za]
Largely Ignored by International Community, Yearlong Massive
Displacement and Death in Darfur Region Continues
United States Committee for Refugees (Washington, DC)
http://www.refugees.org/news/press_releases/2004/022404.cfm
Press Release
February 26, 2004
Violence that erupted in Sudan's western Darfur region nearly one
year ago and continues unrestrained today, has displaced at least
800,000 Sudanese civilians-including more than 110,000 who have
fled to the remote deserts of eastern Chad-and has killed countless
thousands of others. Although precise numbers are difficult to
determine, it is estimated that the displacement caused by the
Darfur crisis has increased the number of uprooted Sudanese from
more than 4.5 million to nearly 5.5 million.
Poor security and Sudanese government-imposed travel restrictions
to the Darfur region have prevented humanitarian assistance
agencies from conducting adequate assessment missions to determine
the extent of the crisis and the precise number and needs of
displaced people in the region. Various sources suggest that an
estimated more than 1,000 Darfurians are dying every week. While
the true scale of the violence remains largely unknown, some
international observers believe that the yearlong bloodshed has
disrupted the lives and further isolated more than half of the
Darfur region's estimated six million residents.
High-level peace negotiations seeking to end 20 years of civil war
in Sudan between the Islamic government in Khartoum and the mainly
southern Christian and animist Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) have garnered tremendous international attention, but are
void of discussions surrounding the crisis in Darfur.
Roots of Conflict
Residents of Darfur's North, West, and South states-which cover
approximately one-fifth of Sudan's territory-have long claimed that
they inhabit one of the most neglected and underdeveloped areas of
the country. The arid Darfur region also suffers from chronic
drought. In addition, nomadic groups reportedly killed hundreds of
civilians from pastoral and sedentary agriculture populations in
the region from 2000-2002.
In early 2003, Sudanese authorities reportedly armed and provided
horses to the Janjaweed, a pro-government western nomadic tribe,
and tasked them with patrolling Sudan's 850-mile (1,400 km) border
with Chad. The growing presence of these government-supported armed
patrols raised fears among already terrified Darfurians,
contributing to the growing tension between Darfur's marginalized
population and the government. The tensions soon accelerated into
sporadic violence and then escalated into recurrent and systemic
Janjaweed raids against civilian populations. "These attacks have
reportedly included burning and looting of villages, large-scale
killings, and abductions," the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recently reported.
Responding, in part, to the lack of government protection against
increasingly frequent raids and indiscriminate killings, Darfurian
residents organized and armed themselves. Two main groups, the
Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), eventually emerged as formidable forces in the Darfur
region. Initially, the Sudanese government and the SLA sought to
peacefully resolve the burgeoning conflict through dialogue.
Halting talks failed to produce meaningful resolution, however.
Massive Internal Displacement
In late April 2003, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir declared
that, "Khartoum will not negotiate with those who raised arms in
Darfur." Immediately after President al-Bashir's statement,
targeted attacks against civilians intensified. SLA assaults on
government administrative and military sites also increased. The
violence surrounding the massive displacement began in earnest in
June 2003 and slowed briefly during a tentative agreement between
the Sudanese government and the SLA to end hostilities in September
before resuming and expanding in late 2003.
Intensified and sustained Janjaweed raids, Sudanese government
aerial bombings, and alleged joint Chadian military and Sudanese
government-aligned militia offensives on Darfurian civilian
populations have decimated and emptied hundreds of towns, villages,
and other populated areas throughout the Darfur region. SLA and JEM
retaliatory attacks have added to the massive displacement and
destruction.
Nearly 400,000 Darfurians remain sheltered in some 20 displacement
camps scattered throughout the Darfur states, including nearly 10
camps with more than 50,000 residents each. An estimated additional
300,000 internally displaced Darfurians remain disbursed in remote
mountains, in the desert near the Sudan-Chad border, and with
relatives and others in host communities.
A UN Rapid Response Team visited Nyala, El Geneina, and El Fasher,
the three capitals of the Darfur states, to assess humanitarian
needs last week, while UN agencies began to pre-position food and
other supplies for 250,000 displaced persons. Poor security
prohibited the team-the first of its kind to access the region
since the outbreak of violence in early 2003-from visiting
surrounding villages, where most of the population remains
displaced. "This assistance is long overdue," stated a member of
the UN team. "However, we are still not reaching the majority of
those in need."
Refugee Flows
The situation in and around sites hosting refugees immediately
across the border in neighboring Chad, where militia incursions and
aerial bombardments have reportedly occurred, is as troublesome as
the internal displacement in Sudan.
Many of the more than 110,000 Sudanese refugees who fled to
neighboring Chad during the past 10 months remain strewn along a
375-mile (600 km) stretch of border and are struggling to survive
under difficult humanitarian and climatic conditions. Chadian
villagers provided already scarce food and water to refugees upon
their arrival last year. The sizeable Sudanese influx, however,
quickly exhausted meager local resources.
Sudanese refugees continue to battle harsh weather in eastern Chad,
where international humanitarian assistance has been slow to
arrive. Tens of thousands of refugees, many who fled with minimal
personal belongings, are living in the open and enduring sandstorms
and temperatures that exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit (50 degrees
Centigrade) during the day and fall below freezing during the
night. They are also susceptible to cross border Sudanese
government and militia attacks.
In late January, Sudanese-government military aircraft dropped
bombs that killed at least three Sudanese refugees, including a
28-year-old man and his two-year-old child, and injured some 15
others near the Chadian border town of Tine. The incident prompted
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accelerate its
efforts to relocate refugees to safer sites further inland.
Sudanese refugees who have recently arrived in Chad, including
several with shrapnel, burn, and other injuries, have reported
similar aerial bombings and militia ground attacks in several
western Sudanese border villages.
During the past three weeks, UNHCR has transferred more than 4,000
Sudanese refugees away from the volatile border to three newly
constructed camps at least 25 miles (40 km) inside Chad. UNHCR has
relocated approximately 1,600 refugees huddled in and around Tine,
in the north of the 375-mile (600 km) affected border area, to
Touloum camp. UNHCR also relocated nearly 1,700 refugees living
near the village of Birak, in the center of the affected border
area, to Farchana camp, and several hundred refugees scattered
further south of Birak to Kounoungo camp. "But we've still along
way to go, with tens of thousands of refugees still needing
relocation - possibly as many as 80,000," a UNHCR spokesman
announced last week.
UNHCR has begun airlifting 265 tons of relief supplies to the
border region and has identified three additional sites to
construct camps. International donors have provided the agency with
approximately $1 million, or one-tenth of what UNHCR estimates is
needed to continue and expand its relocation and humanitarian
assistance operations.
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) is a public information and
advocacy program of Immigration and Refugee Services of America
(IRSA), a nongovernmental, non-profit organization. Since 1958,
USCR has defended the rights of refugees, asylum seekers, and
internally displaced persons worldwide.
A View of Sudan from Africa
Sudan Focal Point Africa, Pretoria
Monthly Briefing February 2004
24th February 2004
[For more information about the Monthly Briefings and other
information from Sudan Focal Point - Africa, contact John Ashworth
at [email protected]]
The Peace Process
Peace talks under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority
on Development (IGAD) have resumed in Naivasha, Kenya, after a
break to allow members of the Government of Sudan (GoS) delegation
to complete the hajj. For many years it was in the interest of GoS
to delay the talks. Then from about 2002 GoS colluded with US
attempts at a "quick fix", which would be a broad framework rather
than a detailed peace agreement and would allow GoS to manipulate
the detailed negotiations later, when the international spotlight
had lifted. When this tactic failed, as the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) insisted on negotiating all the
details before signing anything, and when it became clear that the
mediators expected GoS to make significant concessions, it again
became in their interest to procrastinate. Thus, whilst avoiding
artificial externally imposed deadlines based on the US election
timetable, and while giving both parties the time they need to
negotiate thoroughly and to ensure ownership within their
constituencies, international pressure must nevertheless be
maintained to prevent undue delay.
The first item of business is the "contested areas" of the Nuba
Mountains, the Funj Region (also known as southern Blue Nile), and
Abyei, which are technically in the north according to the 1956
colonial boundaries but which are culturally, ethnically,
politically and militarily closer to the south. A tentative
agreement is believed to have been reached on the first two, but
Abyei remains a major stumbling block. GoS appears unwilling to
offer even the limited concessions which it made on the other two
areas. Once agreement has been reached, the talks will move on to
the issue of power-sharing.
Much of the discussion on power-sharing will be relatively easy.
There will be haggling over the percentages of southerners in key
positions such as the cabinet and the civil service, and discussion
of safeguards such as a bi-cameral legislature to prevent the north
from using its automatic majority to force through legislation
detrimental to the south or in contravention of the peace
agreement. SPLM/A will probably drop its demand for a rotating
presidency in return for assurances of a strong collegiate
presidency with a northern president and southern vice-president
who can only make key decisions by consensus.
More controversial and less easily solved is the status of the
national capital. For GoS, it is in the north, the majority of its
citizens are Muslims (this partially explains why GoS brutally
transported internally displaced southerners from the outskirts of
Khartoum into camps in the desert - there was a real danger that
the more than two million southerners resident there would change
the electoral balance within the capital), and therefore Islamic
shari'a should be the source of law. For southerners, the national
capital must be equally accessible to all Sudanese who might be
based there as cabinet ministers, members of parliament, civil
servants, other government officials or employees, or simply
citizens accessing their national government, and therefore its law
should not be that of only one section of the community. Thus
southerners seek at least an enclave within the national capital
which is free of shari'a. This is an issue which challenges GoS as
to what are its real priorities - the territorial integrity of
Sudan or the primacy of Islam. It cannot have both.
Another difficulty is the future role of the current
vice-president, Ali Osman Taha. He is a powerful figure and is
unlikely to fade away when he loses this position. Some within the
SPLM/A leadership feel that he should be offered some other
meaningful post, on the basis that in practice he will remain a
power-broker whatever happens and so it is better to have him in a
recognisable position rather than operating from the shadows.
However this would be extremely unpopular with southerners in
general, who would view this as undermining the role of the new
southern vice-president.
Once these issues have all been agreed, the next stage is to
discuss the implementation of the peace agreement, and this opens
up a new range of pitfalls and potential disagreements. Nobody
trusts GoS to implement the agreement without reneging, based on
southerners' bitter experience of agreements with the north since
1947, and most agree that strong guarantees must be built into the
implementation process. In particular a robust peace-keeping force
is needed, preferably under Chapter VII (peace-keeping) rather than
Chapter VI (monitoring), although the latter looks more likely at
the moment. The USA has estimated that up to 10,000 troops could be
needed. SPLM/A has welcomed the prospect of foreign troops, saying
that Sudan needs not only monitors but also peace-keepers on the
ground to ensure that both parties fully implement the terms of the
peace accord during the interim period. GoS is completely opposed.
"What are they afraid of? They are worried because they want to
violate the peace agreement and sabotage the transitional period,"
according to SPLM/A's Dr Samson Kwaje.
It is convenient to speak of "pragmatists" and "hard-liners" within
the ruling regime, but it is unlikely that the National Islamic
Front has really changed. For some years it has been willing to
make superficial (and usually reversible) changes as part of a
"charm offensive" to regain international respectability. Since
September 2001 it has succumbed to international pressure, the US
"war on terror", which has forced it to the negotiating table and
has allowed the peace talks to reach the current advanced stage.
But few believe that a leopard can change its spots. Its radical
expansionist Islamic agenda may be on the back burner for a while
but has not gone away. And southerners have also yet to be
convinced that the north in general has changed. After all, it was
not the current regime that reneged on treaties and promises from
1947 to 1989 - it was the northern political elite of all parties.
However the biggest threat to the peace process at the moment comes
from outside the south. The escalating conflict in Darfur poses an
imminent and concrete threat, while the ongoing conflict in
northern Uganda presents a less immediate but no less real threat
to peace and stability in the south.
Darfur
Conflicts in Darfur between settled farmers and nomads moving south
in search of water and pastures have been commonplace for
centuries. During the 1980s and '90s these conflicts intensified,
aggravated by drought, the influx of arms from wars in neighbouring
countries, and the policy pursued by GoS of arming "Arab"
tribesmen. Low-intensity conflict continued until early 2003, when
a number of interacting factors including ethnic conflict, an
increase in armed robberies and a perception of Darfur
marginalisation, led to the formation of two political and military
resistance movements, the Sudanese Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). They have formulated
and articulated political demands and have indicated their
willingness to negotiate. The GoS response, however, has been to
call the rebels a gang of bandits, ignore their political agenda
and to reject international efforts to find a peaceful solution to
the crisis. Unless serious negotiations are initiated, the most
likely scenario is an escalation of the Darfur crisis resulting in
further displacement of people and serious hampering of
humanitarian interventions.
Darfur means "homeland of the Fur", but is inhabited by 5-7 million
people of various ethnic groups. The region has three distinct
ecological zones. The central belt includes the fertile Jebel Marra
massif, which is inhabited by "African" sedentary farmers,
including the Fur, Berti, Bargu, Bergid, Tama and Tunjur. Camel
nomads roam the northern zone of Darfur, which is part of the
Sahara. The main ethnic groups in this part of the region are the
Zayadia, Zaghawa and Bedeyat, all "non-Arab", and the "Arab"
Mahariya, Irayqat, Mahamid and Beni Hussein. The northern zone, the
most ecologically fragile, is often affected by drought. The
eastern and southern zones are home to nomadic "Arab" cattle
herders, mainly from the Rezeigat, Misseriya, Habbaniya, Beni
Halba, Taaisha and Maaliyya. These zones are less subject to
drought, although still prone to fluctuations in rainfall and less
ecologically stable than the central part of Darfur.
Until 1916, when it was incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian
Condominium, Darfur was an independent Sultanate. Darfur did not
integrate easily into the larger political entity which had
absorbed it. In both the condominium and post-independence periods,
under-development generated strong feelings of regional
discrimination amongst all the peoples of Darfur. Popular
resentment against regional marginalisation was articulated
politically in the 1960s by various groups, but they did not resort
to violence. It remained one region within Sudan until it was
divided into three states in 1989. Each state has an assembly and
a Governor (wali), who is appointed by the central government. The
population is predominantly Sunni Muslim.
Nomads, semi-nomadic groups and farmers have long co-existed in
social and economic interdependence. When disputes arose over
scarce grazing land and water, localised armed conflict was usually
settled by traditional means. The early 1980s witnessed the first
outbreak of conflict along ethnic lines. Conflicts initially
occurred between Fur cultivators and nomads moving south in search
of pastures. The ecological devastation and its consequences for
the population is one of the root causes of the current situation
besides the ethnic factor and the political situation. Darfur used
to be the stronghold of the Umma party. It was Sadiq al Mahdi who
began the arming of Arabised groups in Darfur (and also in
Kordofan), predominantly nomads known as murahiliin, composed of
mainly ethnic Baggara and Rizeigat, in order to use them to fight
the southerners. More arms came into the region as a fall-out of
the war in Chad in the late 1980s. Illicit arms trade from the
Central African Republic, Libya and southern Sudan added to the
problem. After 1989, the new military regime continued arming
groups of Arabised people in Darfur mainly to keep on fighting the
southerners but now also to break the stronghold of the Umma party.
Throughout the 1990s, there were reports of armed militias known
as janjawid (men on horses) raiding villages of "African" tribes
in Darfur. Even then this caused thousands of people to cross the
border into Chad.
The situation in Darfur, like in the other regions in Sudan
except for Khartoum and the rich El-Gezira region can be
described as one of political marginalisation and severe
underdevelopment. Lack of infrastructure, lack of investment in
both physical and human resources, absence of basic services, rare
employment opportunities, and the proliferation of small arms are
characteristics of this situation. The continuous raids and looting
by militia have encouraged banditry and acts of armed robbery, and
led to a situation of general insecurity.
Since 2001, Darfur has been governed under central government
decree, with special courts to try people suspected of illegal
possession or smuggling of weapons, murder and armed robbery. But
the security forces have misused these powers for arbitrary and
indefinite detention of people. Anyone suspected of criticising the
government can be and often is arrested without charge for months.
2003 saw the emergence of the two movements, SLM/A and JEM (a third
group, the Sudan Federal Alliance, had already been formed in the
late 1980s but never attracted much support). These movements seem
to be separate. The SLM/A has got more Fur members while the JEM is
dominated by Zaghawa. However, operating separately for the time
being might only be a tactical move both share the same political
aims and values. SLM/A leaders are more military minded, while JEM
aims at becoming a political party and is perceived as being close
to Dr Hassan al Turabi's Popular National Congress, although the
JEM strongly denies any current links. These groups are not calling
for self-determination but are unionists espousing a "New Sudan",
a completely new political system based on a strong federal
arrangement, to abolish minority rule once and for all. In this
they are very close to the "New Sudan" ideological concept of the
SPLM/A, which has almost certainly also supported them militarily.
There is overwhelming evidence that the GoS is now using the same
tactics against these new movements which it applied fighting the
SPLM/A and the people in the south. The GoS is in the first place
using the Arabised janjawid to fight the people in Darfur,
supported by GoS regular forces. Reports by Amnesty International
clearly shows the government's responsibility for the severe
escalation of violence in Darfur.
The new Darfur movements should not be underestimated. The history
of their leaders, their contacts, the very fact that the Zaghawa in
particular are very well organised and have economic power, makes
them a political factor to reckon with. And the Darfur people do
have a cause. They will certainly not just lay down their arms and
keep silent as long as they feel excluded from power. In a worstcase
scenario (and evidently forming a severe obstacle to any peace
arrangement in the south), they might aim at forming an alliance
reaching from Darfur via Kordofan, perhaps northern Upper Nile, the
Funj Region, up to the East, perhaps even supported by al Turabi
and his party. They already have an agreement in writing with the
Beja in the east.
Another factor should also not be underestimated: the
"Africanisation" of these conflicts. Like the Nuba, the
southerners, the Beja and the people of Funj, behind the scenes
both JEM and SLM/A refer to their African origin. In the long run
they might claim "Sudan for the Africans". With that objective they
concur with some "unionist" leaders in the south, and might strike
a chord with other parts of Africa.
The devastating escalation in Darfur could have been prevented. For
years many analysts have described the roots of the armed conflicts
in Sudan as being not merely a "South North" or a "Christian
Muslim" problem, but a systemic problem of the entire country,
characterised by bad governance, gross injustice, denial of basic
human security, systematic violation of human rights, ethnic and
religious discrimination, attempts to impose a particular cultural
identity on a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural
society, and political, social and economic marginalisation of
large parts of the population. For at least the last three years,
substantial information has been available about developments and
events in Darfur, enough to take the conflict in Darfur seriously
and not to downplay it as merely "armed robbery" or "minor tribal
clashes about water and land" as the GoS has apparently
successfully portrayed it. The current situation in Darfur is
another classic case of failed "early warning". It once again
proves that early warning mechanisms are useless as long as there
is no political will to take effective "early action". This must be
urgently addressed by the international community at al levels,
including the UN, AU, EU, and national governments.
The crisis in Darfur has reached a dimension which can no longer be
ignored. It is a serious threat to the ongoing southern peace
process, and itself has the potential for continued warfare and
systematic, massive violation of human rights. It is also a
regional threat, encompassing not only countries to the west of
Sudan but also Eritrea, which has been accused by GoS of supporting
the liberation movements in Darfur. The Chadian government, as well
as attempting to mediate, has openly supplied troops to the
Sudanese army in Darfur, while different ethnic groups in Chad may
also be supplying both the SLA and JEM, as well as the militias
aligned with GoS, with manpower. As many as 16 ethnic groups
straddle the border.
The GoS must be held responsible for the denial of humanitarian
access to those in need. This tactic is well known from the war in
the south. The international community must demand full, guaranteed
humanitarian access (and closely monitor whether GoS complies),
must condemn the severe human rights abuses, and must demand
accountability. It must support the request of the acting UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights for an immediately halt to the
violence, respect for human rights and international humanitarian
law, and ensuring the safety and personal security of civilians,
and must vote for a new mandate for a Special UN Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Sudan. Finally, the international community must
not only be aware that any anticipated peace agreement between GoS
and SPLM/A can only work if conflicts in other parts of the country
are also resolved peacefully, but also act accordingly to ensure
meaningful, internationally-supervised peace negotiations.
Northern Uganda
The conflict in northern Uganda could be said to have begun in
August 1986 and has continued for eighteen years with no end in
sight. Whereas it was originally part of a wider range of guerrilla
activities in the eastern and north-western parts of Uganda, most
of which have now died down, in Acholiland it has continued
unabated and has assumed a regional dimension across the Sudanese
border. The conflict has undergone so much transformation that
Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) can no longer be
considered as "remnants" of old armies. It has reached a level of
human rights violations which is difficult to comprehend. It has
again began to spread to the east of the country: indeed there are
new fears that what at first appeared to be an Acholi war is
assuming a Uganda-wide dimension. The government of Uganda seems
intent on a military solution to the conflict, but has so far
failed to achieve this. The scale of human suffering in both
northern Uganda and southern Sudan has been immense.
At times it seems impossible to understand the conflict,
particularly as the LRA appears to have no coherent political
policy. It is therefore important to examine the underlying causes.
At the forefront of these are the deeply embedded divisions brought
about by the unbalanced development of Uganda during and after the
colonial era, by a colonial policy of "divide and rule", and by the
consequent politicisation of ethnicity by the Ugandan political
elite. Many would argue that the ruling regime is driven by a
determination to maintain power at any cost. Uganda is not the only
country in the world where war has helped a government to remain in
power. An increased democratisation of governance in Uganda might
contribute to the ending of the war.
Events in the Luwero Triangle play a key role, although there are
differing opinions on exactly what that role is. Most would argue
that the Ugandan government has pursued oppressive policies in the
north as a result of the atrocities that were committed in the
Luwero Triangle by northern (perceived as predominantly Acholi)
soldiers. Others argue rather that these same atrocities were the
consequence of an ethnic war that was initiated by the National
Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A) against the "northerners". In this
scenario the NRM/A leadership believed that Uganda's politics had,
since independence, been dominated by northerners as a result of
their supposed domination of the armed forces.
Kony's ideology, such as it is, draws from (and corrupts) various
sources, including Islamic, Christian and African traditional
spiritual elements, but is full of contradictions. He claims to
have been traditionally blessed to fight the war and yet wages war
against those same traditions. He claims to have inherited Alice
Auma's "Lakwena" ("messenger") spirit but at the same time commits
atrocities against the people. Whereas volunteers followed Alice
due to her charisma and initial military success, Kony's forces are
made up largely of abducted villagers, particularly children. These
abductees have been used as soldiers, porters, labourers, and in
the case of girls, as sexual slaves. The LRA has cut off the hands,
ears or lips of many villagers. Kony claims to be fighting for a
system of governance based on the Ten Commandments, yet his actions
are diametrically opposed to the Commandments. These contradictions
may explain why the LRA has not enjoyed the same enthusiastic
support among the Acholi grassroots as they gave to Alice and her
movement. However some argue that Alice could play a role in
bringing an end to the conflict, "ideologically" engaging Kony
since he claims to have inherited the spirit of "Lakwena" from her.
There are economic factors which may encourage top military
commanders of both the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) and
the LRA to continue a war from which they make substantial
financial and material gains. The war may have become an incomegenerating
project for some. There are serious concerns at the
UPDF's lack of effectiveness in providing security to the people of
the area, as well as its behaviour. The UPDF has operated inside
Sudan since March 2002 with the consent of GoS, but this Operation
Iron Fist was spectacularly unsuccessful and only increased the
suffering of the people on both sides of the border. The formation
of local militias by arming civilians and former soldiers in the
community may provide improved short-term security but is ominous
in the long-term. Despite some clashes between SPLM/A and LRA, many
question why the SPLM/A has been unable (or unwilling?) to protect
the people of southern Sudan's Eastern Equatoria region from the
ravages of the LRA.
Apart from internal factors, it is clear that the conflict in
northern Uganda has been fuelled by external support. Clearly GoS
has been supporting LRA (and almost certainly still is, despite
denials) while the Ugandan government supports the SPLM/A. The US
"war on terror" has added another dimension to the Acholi conflict
in that the US administration has designated the LRA a "foreign
terrorist organisation." This makes mediation more difficult (as
the prevailing wisdom is that one is not allowed to talk to
"terrorists") and apparently contradicts amnesty measures. Acholi
traditional and religious leaders were involved in talks with the
LRA leadership, with peak periods when the LRA expressed a wish for
talks but appeared to lose interest when their own military
fortunes were going well, and when the government of Uganda reemphasised
the military option. And incongruously, the abducted
children who make up the overwhelming bulk of the LRA are now
regarded as international terrorists. A leading children's NGO
recently warned that the children in northern Uganda may suffer
most if the International Criminal Court decides to prosecute LRA
rebels for war crimes, unless questions of child protection are
raised before it proceeds to investigate the rebels. Since
"children are by far the main witnesses (and victims)" of war
crimes committed by the LRA, the LRA leadership "might apply even
more strict discipline to prevent witnesses from escaping".
The spread of the conflict to the Teso and Karamajong areas is
significant in that it makes the conflict more of a national issue
rather than a local one and undermines claims that the LRA is an
Acholi rebellion. However insecurity amongst the Teso and
Karamajong cannot be de-linked from cattle rustling. One
consequence is that in Teso, the fighters of the LRA are not seen
as "our abducted and abused children" as is the case amongst the
Acholi, and thus the community is more in favour of the military
option leading to elimination and military victory. Sudanese
villagers have also proved very hostile to abducted children trying
to escape from LRA.
The complexity of the conflict is thus increasing due to economic,
social, cultural, and political factors, metaphysics, arms
trafficking, and external factors which include Sudan and the "war
on terror". The possibility of a peace agreement in southern Sudan
may have a positive impact on the conflict in northern Uganda, as
GoS may feel it no longer has an interest in supporting LRA. But
there is another scenario that the peace agreement in southern
Sudan may be destabilised by the ongoing war in Uganda, and that a
GoS which is looking for ways to undermine the agreement may still
see the LRA as a useful tool.
It is difficult to map a way forward in such a brutal and confusing
conflict. Most advocacy concentrates on measures to stop human
rights abuses and alleviate the humanitarian disaster, both clearly
priorities which must be addressed urgently. But the international
community must take an interest in the resolution of the conflict,
a conflict which has regional dimensions as well as being a
terrible human tragedy within northern Uganda and parts of southern
Sudan. At the same time the Ugandan government must be challenged
to address the causes of the conflict and to recreate a climate
where negotiations can take place. Despite the horrific atrocities
committed by the LRA, the difficulty in understanding what its
political demands are, and the consequent tendency to reject
negotiations with a movement that behaves in such an abhorrent and
apparently meaningless manner, nevertheless the conflict will not
be ended by military means alone and talks must restart. Ways of
reconciliation must be explored, and the re-integration of the
brutalised abducted child soldiers and sex slaves into family and
community will present a major challenge.
The civil society leaders of the area, traditional and religious,
are probably best placed to do this. "We think we have demonstrated
that pressure must be put on the rebels of the LRA and above all
the Ugandan army to renounce any military solution, and to show
readiness for dialogue and sincere desire to put an end to this
terrible war," according to Acholi religious leaders. Any attempts
to doctor Uganda's amnesty law so that it excludes the rebel
leaders would be a disaster for peace in northern Uganda. "Without
an amnesty for instigators of rebellion, it will be impossible for
those of us still engaged in luring the LRA leadership into peace
talks with the government to do so. It will close the door to
[talks], as has been the case in most conflicts worldwide."
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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