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USA/Africa: Making Peace or Fueling War

AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 18, 2009 (090318)
(Reposted from sources cited below)

Editor's Note

"Will de facto U.S. security policy toward the continent focus on anti-terrorism and access to natural resources and prioritize bilateral military relations with African countries? Or will the United States give priority to enhancing multilateral capacity to respond to Africa's own urgent security needs? If the first option is taken, it will undermine rather than advance both U.S. and African security." - Daniel Volman and William Minter, in new special report from Foreign Policy in Focus on AFRICOM and alternative policy frameworks.

This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts and an outline with links for the report "Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa," released by Foreign Policy in Focus on March 13. The full 16-page report is available at http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/5960 or http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on U.S./Africa policy, visit http://www.africafocus.org/country/usa-africa.php

For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on peace and security issues, visit http://www.africafocus.org/peaceexp.php

Also newly available from TransAfrica Forum is report on Inclusive Human Security: U.S. National Security Policy, Africa, and the African Diaspora. For this report, in html or php, visit http://www.africafocus.org/editor/taf0902.php

++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++

Making Peace or Fueling War in Africa

Daniel Volman and William Minter | March 13, 2009
Editor: Emira Woods and Emily Schwartz Greco

Foreign Policy in Focus

http://fpif.org/fpiftxt/5960
or
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php

[Excerpts and outline only. Click on the links above for the full report in html or pdf, including graphics and links to sources, or on the links below for specific sections of this special report for Foreign Policy in Focus]

Daniel Volman is the director of the African Security Research Project and a member of the board of directors of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (http://concernedafricascholars.org). William Minter is the editor of AfricaFocus Bulletin and co-editor with Gail Hovey and Charles Cobb, Jr. of No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists over a Half Century, 1950-2000 (Africa World Press, 2007) (http://www.noeasyvictories.org).

At the end of President Barack Obama's inauguration ceremony, civil rights leader Rev. Joseph Lowery invoked the hope of a day "when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, when tanks will be beaten into tractors." No one expects such a utopian vision to materialize any time soon. But both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have spoken eloquently of the need to emphasize diplomacy over a narrow military agenda. In her confirmation hearing, Clinton stressed the need for "smart power," perhaps inadvertently echoing Obama's opposition to the invasion of Iraq as a "dumb war." Even top U.S. military officials, such as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, have warned against overly militarizing U.S. foreign policy.

In practice, such a shift in emphasis is certain to be inconsistent. At a global level, the most immediate challenge to the credibility of change in foreign policy is Afghanistan, where promised troop increases are given little chance of bringing stability and the country risks becoming Obama's "Vietnam." Africa policy is for the most part under the radar of public debate. But it also poses a clear choice for the new administration. Will de facto U.S. security policy toward the continent focus on anti-terrorism and access to natural resources and prioritize bilateral military relations with African countries? Or will the United States give priority to enhancing multilateral capacity to respond to Africa's own urgent security needs?

If the first option is taken, it will undermine rather than advance both U.S. and African security. Taking the second option won't be easy. There are no quick fixes. But U.S. security in fact requires that policymakers take a broader view of Africa's security needs and a multilateral approach to addressing them.

The need for immediate action to promote peace in Africa is clear. While much of the continent is at peace, there are large areas of great violence and insecurity, most prominently centered on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. These crises require not only a continuing emphasis on diplomacy but also resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping. And yet the Bush administration has bequeathed the new president a new military command for Africa (the United States Africa Command, known as AFRICOM). Meanwhile, Washington has starved the United Nations and other multilateral institutions of resources, even while entrusting them with enormous peacekeeping responsibilities.

The government has presented AFRICOM as a cost-effective institutional restructuring and a benign program for supporting African governments in humanitarian as well as necessary security operations. In fact, it represents the institutionalization and increased funding for a model of bilateral military ties a replay of the mistakes of the Cold War.

Shaping a new U.S. security policy toward Africa requires more than just a modest tilt toward more active diplomacy. It also requires questioning this inherited security framework, and shaping an alternative framework that aligns U.S. and African security interests within a broader perspective of inclusive human security. In particular, it requires that the United States shift from a primarily bilateral and increasingly military approach to one that prioritizes joint action with both African and global partners.

AFRICOM in Theory and Practice


http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#practice

...

Pentagon spokespeople describe AFRICOM as a logical bureaucratic restructuring that will ensure that Africa gets the attention it deserves. They insist AFRICOM won't set the priorities for U.S. policy toward Africa or increase Pentagon influence at the expense of civilian agencies. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2007, Whelan denied that AFRICOM was being established "solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China," countering: "This is not true."

But other statements by Whelan herself, by General William "Kip" Ward, the four-star African-American general who commands AFRICOM, and Vice-Admiral Robert Moeller, his military deputy, lay out AFRICOM's priorities in more conventional terms. ... On February 19, 2008, Moeller told an AFRICOM conference that protecting "the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market" was one of AFRICOM's "guiding principles," citing "oil disruption," "terrorism," and the "growing influence" of China as major "challenges" to U.S. interests in Africa. Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 13, 2008, General Ward echoed the same views and identified combating terrorism as "AFRICOM's number one theater-wide goal." ...

In practice, AFRICOM, which became a fully independent combatant command on October 1, 2008, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is built on the paradigm of U.S. military commands which span the globe. Although AFRICOM features less "kinetic" (combat) operations than the active wars falling under CENTCOM in Iraq and Afghanistan, its goals and programs are more conventional than the public relations image would imply. ...

The new strategic framework for Africa emphasizes, above all, the threat of global terrorism and the risk posed by weak states, "empty spaces," and countries with large Muslim populations as vulnerable territories where terrorists may find safe haven and political support. This framework is fundamentally flawed. ... Counterinsurgency analysts such as Robert Berschinski and David Kilcullen have warned that "aggregating" disparate local insurgencies into an all-encompassing vision of global terrorism in fact facilitates al-Qaeda's efforts to woo such groups. Heavy-handed military action such as air strikes that kill civilians and collaboration with counter-insurgency efforts by incumbent regimes, far from diminishing the threat of terrorism, helps it grow.

While AFRICOM may be new, there's already a track record for such policies in programs now incorporated into AFRICOM. That record shows little evidence that these policies contribute to U.S. or African security. To the contrary, there are substantial indications that they are in fact counterproductive, both increasing insecurity in Africa and energizing potential threats to U.S. interests.

Examining the Record: Somalia
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#somalia

...
In short, Somalia provided a textbook case of the negative results of "aggregating" local threats into an undifferentiated concept of global terrorism. It has left the new Obama administration with what Ken Menkhaus, a leading academic expert on Somalia, called "a policy nightmare."

Examining the Record: The Sahel
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#sahel

Less in the news, but also disturbing because of the wide range of countries involved in both North and West Africa, is the U.S. military involvement in the Sahara and Sahel region, now under AFRICOM. Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) provides military support to the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, which comprises the United States and eleven African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Its goals are defined on the AFRICOM web site as "to assist traditionally moderate Muslim governments and populations in the Trans-Sahara region to combat the spread of extremist ideology and terrorism in the region." ...

In his November 2007 paper on AFRICOM, cited above, Berschinski noted that the United States and Algeria exaggerated the threat from the small rebel group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), officially allied with al-Qaeda. A scary, if geographically inappropriate, headline in Air Force Magazine in November 2004 heralded the threat from a "Swamp of Terror in the Sahara." The emphasis on counterinsurgency, Berschinski argues, has disrupted traditional trade networks and allowed local governments to neglect the need for finding negotiated solutions to concerns of Tuareg areas and other neglected regions. ... The specifics of each country differ, but the common reality is that the benefits of U.S. collaboration with local militaries in building counterinsurgency capacity haven't been demonstrated.

Potential Threats
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#threats

...

Of particular strategic importance for the future is Nigeria, where U.S. military concerns of anti-terrorism and energy security converge. As Nigeria specialists Paul Lubeck, Michael Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz outline in a 2007 policy study, the threat to Nigeria from Islamic extremism is wildly exaggerated in statements by U.S. military officials. In contrast, they note, "nobody doubts the strategic significance of contemporary Nigeria for West Africa, for the African continent as a whole, and for the oil-thirsty American economy." But the solution to the growing insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta isn't a buildup of U.S. naval forces and support for counter-insurgency actions by the Nigerian military. The priority is rather to resolve the problems of poverty, environmental destruction, and to promote responsible use of the country's oil wealth, particularly for the people of the oil-producing regions.

...

The threats cited by U.S. officials to justify AFRICOM aren't imaginary. Global terrorist networks do seek allies and recruits throughout the African continent, with potential impact in the Middle East, Europe, and even North America as well as in Africa. In the Niger Delta, the production of oil has been repeatedly interrupted by attacks by militants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). More broadly, insecurity creates a environment vulnerable to piracy and to the drug trade, as well as to motivating potential recruits to extremist political violence.

It doesn't follow, however, that such threats can be effectively countered by increased U.S. military engagement, even if the direct involvement of U.S. troops is minimized. The focus on building counter-insurgency capacity for African governments with U.S. assistance diverts attention from more fundamental issues of conflict resolution. It also heightens the risks of increasing conflict and concomitantly increasing hostility to the United States.

Continuity or Change


http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#change

Will the Obama administration seriously reexamine the Africa policy it has inherited from its predecessors? Or will continuity be the watchword? The few indications we have so far, from campaign statements and Obama's choice of top officials, point to continuity. Yet the critical tests will be in practice, as African crises force their way onto the agenda even while the administration's energies are primarily focused on more prominent domestic and international challenges.

Patterns from the Past
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#past

...

On February 9, 2009, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Phil Carter, speaking at the Pentagon's Africa Center for Strategic Studies, opened his remarks with the claim that "the one foreign policy success of the previous administration is Africa." He outlined four priorities, beginning with "providing security assistance programs" to African partners, followed by promoting "democratic systems and practices," "sustainable and broad-based market-led economic growth," and "health and social development." Although he prefaced his list of priorities with a reference to support for ending conflict in Africa and "African solutions to African problems," it's telling that the description of the security priority includes military capacity-building and AFRICOM operations, but no mention at all of diplomacy.

Such indications do not give great confidence in any major shift in security strategy. Nevertheless, there are also signals that U.S. officials, including some in the military and intelligence community, do recognize the need to give greater emphasis to diplomacy and development. ...

Changing Priorities
http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#priorities

For Africa in particular, realities call for a different ordering of priorities, recognizing the significance of less conventional threats and the inadequacy of narrow military responses. In a report released in February this year, TransAfrica Forum called for a new policy framework based on "inclusive human security." Such a framework would require fundamental shifts in thinking, stressing multilateral cooperation over unilateral initiatives, a broad range of threats than only those from violent enemies, and investment in basic economic and social rights over blind trust in the market.

U.S. Africa policy based on such a framework would look very different than that outlined by Assistant Secretary of State Carter as the inheritance from the Bush administration, even if containing many of the same elements. ...

Within the arena of traditional security issues, the United States should minimize bilateral military involvement with Africa, which risks sucking the U.S. into local conflicts, in favor of multilateral diplomacy and peacekeeping, including paying U.S. peacekeeping arrears at the UN. It should take care not to aid repressive regimes or to prioritize military-to-military relationships, in favor of dialogue not only with incumbent governments but also civil society. In short, it should shift from an emphasis on counter-insurgency and building Washington-centered networks of influence with African military establishments to an emphasis on U.S. participation in multilateral efforts to enhance African security. ...

The United States does have resources, particularly logistical and financial, that are relevant for peacekeeping operations, and has the responsibility to make its fair contribution as a leading member of the international community. But ensuring that these actually contribute to peace requires a new framework, giving priority to multilateral diplomacy and peacekeeping over bilateral programs.

Elements of a New Security Framework


http://www.africafocus.org/editor/africom0903.php#framework

Moving to a new framework isn't a matter of finding new formulas to replace the inherited emphasis on building counter-insurgency capacity against terrorism and threats to natural resources. There's no one prescription for those countries now facing violent conflicts, much less for the wide range of issues faced by over 50 African countries. Africa's serious problems, moreover, will not be solved from outside, either by the United States or by the "international community."

Nevertheless, it's important to ensure that U.S. Africa policy does no harm and that the United States makes a significant contribution to diminishing the real security threats on the continent. Once one recognizes that U.S. national security also depends on the human security of Africans, some essential elements of such a framework do become clear. To what extent they can be embodied into practice will depend not only on the internal deliberations of the new administration in Washington, but also on whether Africans working for peace and justice on the continent can themselves chart new directions and make their voices heard.

(1) Prioritize long-term inclusive human security.

...

(2) Pay Attention to Crises, but Avoid "One-Size Fits All" Approaches.

...

The list of Africa's hottest crises is familiar: Sudan (including but not limited to Darfur), Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zimbabwe. Others fester as well, out of the spotlight of the world's media: Chad, C�te d'Ivoire, and Uganda, to name only a few. In each case, it's not only the countries and their immediate neighbors that are involved. Other stakeholders, including regional African organizations, the African Union, the United Nations, and global powers such as the United States are called on to respond. And the responses or failures to respond matter. But no "one-size-fits-all" response can possibly make sense, and certainly not the AFRICOM model focused on building counter-insurgency capacity for Africa's armies.

...

But the time has long passed for anyone to take current African heads of state as the only spokespeople for the continent, or to focus hopes for change on replacing one leader with another. Finding the best way forward in responding to crises or to Africa's structural problems, must go beyond the top. Africa's resources for change and for leadership are also found in civil society, among respected retired leaders and other elders, and among professionals working both in governments and in multilateral organizations, including both diplomats and military professionals. The challenge for U.S. policy is to engage actively and productively in responding to crises, bringing U.S. resources to bear without assuming that it is either possible or wise for the United States to dominate.

(3) Build Institutional Capacity for Multilateral Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.

In contrast to the emphasis on building bilateral U.S. military ties with Africa, being institutionalized in AFRICOM, U.S. security policy toward Africa should instead concentrate on building institutional capacity within the United Nations, as well as coordinating U.S. relationships with African regional institutions with United Nations capacity-building programs. At the same time, it should work to ensure that both U.S. and United Nations policies and operations with respect to African crises are transparent and open to review by legislative bodies and civil society groups in Africa, in the United States, and in other countries that are involved. ...

Despite the expectations for change, it is likely that shifts by the Obama administration in security policy toward Africa will only emerge piecemeal, if at all, after appointment of new mid-level personnel and policy reviews reportedly under way in every agency. The new president's popularity and the range of domestic and global problems he faces are likely to give the administration a large window of opportunity before disillusionment sets in. But events on the ground will not allow indefinite delay. It will soon become apparent, in Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and perhaps in other crises not now predictable, to what extent African hopes placed in President Obama will find answers in changes that make a difference for Africa.


AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.

AfricaFocus Bulletin can be reached at [email protected]. Please write to this address to subscribe or unsubscribe to the bulletin, or to suggest material for inclusion. For more information about reposted material, please contact directly the original source mentioned. For a full archive and other resources, see http://www.africafocus.org


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