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Somalia: Situation Reports
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Mar 30, 2010 (100330)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The current military stalemate in southern Somalia is less a
reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the
Transitional Federal Government. Since the nomination of Sheikh
Sharif to the presidency and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from
Somalia early in 2009, armed opposition groups -- Al-Shabaab in
particular -- have lost their popular support base and been gravely
weakened. ... Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance,
government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and
corrupt." - UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, March 2010
UN Special Representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah had a
more upbeat judgment, highlighting the Transitional Federal
Government's recent signature of an agreement with the Sufi Muslim
group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a. But he also stressed that the "status
quo is not an option," and called for more outreach for peace and
reconciliation (http://allafrica.com/stories/201003260949.html).
This AfricaFocus Bulletin, available on the web, but not sent out
by e-mail, contains a news story on an international consultation
on public sector needs in Somalia, and the observations and
conclusions from from the latest report of the UN Monitoring Group
on Somalia. Full monitoring group reports are available at:
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml
Two other AfricaFocus Bulletins released today on Somalia include
USA/Somalia: Engage or Disengage? (http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/som1003b.php
and Somalia: Somali-Led Peacemaking (http://www.africafocus.org/docs10/som1003a.php
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Somalia, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/somalia.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
Somalia: Nation Needs More Humanitarian Aid, Less Military Help
Garowe Online (Garowe)
26 March 2010
http://allafrica.com/stories/201003260877.html
Ugandan government said sending more peacekeepers to Somalia will
not bring peace to the war-torn country unless the poor humanitarian
conditions are improved.
Speaking at the Opening the Consultative Needs Assessment Workshop
for the Somalia TFG organized by African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) in Kampala, Uganda's UPDF Commander of Land Forces, Lt. Gen
Katumba Wamala said Somalis are likely to lose confidence on TFG if
the services are not improved.
"The problem of Somalia cannot be solved by having thousands of guns
in Mogadishu. We need a holistic approach to this conflict. People
need water, they need drugs, and those in the camps need food," he
said.
The three day consultative session which closes on Friday has
brought together twenty five officials, including a minister and
civil servants from the Office of the President, Office of the Prime
Minister and six ministries, of the Somalia TFG whose consultations
with officials from AMISOM is being facilitated by public sector
development experts from African Union Member States.
On his part, The Deputy Special AU special envoy for Somalia Wafula
Wamunyinyi said emphasisi on the need to build the capacity of the
fragile UN-backed government in Mogadishu so that it can provide
basic service to its devastated people.
"Normalcy can only return to Somalia if the government is able to
provide basic services to the people and this can be made possible
if there is a public service that is equipped with the necessary
knowledge and is committed to service delivery. What we are doing
here therefore is to help the TFG build that public service," he
noted.
Uganda, one of two only Africa Union peacekeeping troops contributor
to Somalia after Burundi, has some 2050 troops that make up the
5,100-strong AU peacekeeping force in Somalia.
The Horn of African country has been without a central government
since 1991 when warlords toppled the regime of President Mohammed
Siad Bare.
UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
Report March 10, 2010
United Nations S/2010/91
[Excerpts: Full report and earlier reports by the Monitoring Group
available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/751/mongroup.shtml
VIII. Observations and conclusions
272. The current military stalemate in southern Somalia is less a
reflection of opposition strength than of the weakness of the
Transitional Federal Government. Since the nomination of Sheikh
Sharif to the presidency and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from
Somalia early in 2009, armed opposition groups -- Al-Shabaab in
particular -- have lost their popular support base and been gravely
weakened. Through necessity, they have also become more
self-reliant. Where the Transitional Federal Government depends on
foreign assistance and African Union forces for its survival, the
opposition relies on "taxation", extortion, and a sophisticated
international network of activists and propagandists to raise funds
for the struggle. Foreign fighters still represent an important
resource for Al-Shabaab, despite their small numbers. But the skills
those foreigners once contributed to the fight are increasingly
being acquired by Somalis.
273. The reluctance of the Transitional Federal Government to forge
effective partnerships with potential local allies is the result of
internal political caution rather than external pressures. Despite
infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security
forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt -- a composite
of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and
military officers who profit from the business of war and resist
their integration under a single command. As a result, external
assistance to the Transitional Federal Government continues to
function as a major loophole in the general and complete arms
embargo, through which arms, ammunition, equipment and skills all
flow to armed opposition groups. Although difficult to verify, it
is increasingly plausible that the Transitional Federal Government
represents a more important source of arms and ammunition than
foreign sponsors for its adversaries. The Transitional Federal
Government seeks to mobilize additional external resources, but the
success of the military effort hinges far more on courting domestic
allies, enhancing the cohesion of the security sector, improving
discipline and reducing corruption.
274. Likewise, provision of counter-piracy support to the Puntland
authorities is not only rewarding bad behaviour, but also risks
passing on counter-piracy tactics and equipment to pirate militias
themselves. The battle against piracy can most effectively be
advanced by holding the current leaders of Puntland individually and
collectively responsible for their complicity in the piracy
phenomenon, and holding them to the same standard as neighbouring
Somaliland, which pursues and prosecutes pirates with genuine
vigour. The central Somali piracy networks operating from
Xarardheere and Hobyo would of course continue to present a
challenge, but a reliable counter-piracy ally in Puntland would be
incalculably more valuable than committing more naval assets to the
fight.
275. The suspension of WFP operations in much of southern Somalia,
while dramatic, offers an opportunity to assert greater
accountability and control over the food aid pipeline. The move must
not become, however, simply a realignment of operations from
Al-Shabaab to Hizbul Islam-controlled areas, such as Afgooye, which
will reinforce the existing dynamics between WFP, its principal
contractors and armed opposition groups. Rather, WFP should take
immediate steps to dismantle the de facto cartel that has
monopolized its Somali operations for so many years, and to distance
itself from those business interests and individuals manifestly
aligned with armed groups or criminal activities. A more diverse,
transparent network of contractors will serve not only to enhance
competition and possibly reduce costs but also to spread financial
benefits more equitably through the Somali economy.
276. Lastly, the growing internationalization of the Somali
conflict, especially through extremist infiltration of diaspora
communities, poses a new and complex problem. Part of the solution
requires the more vigorous pursuit of individual leaders, recruiters
or fund-raisers using available domestic legislation, or designation
for targeted measures under resolution 1844 (2008). A far greater
challenge involves understanding why so many ethnic Somali youth
have become so susceptible to radicalization and recruitment in
their home countries, and beginning to address the root causes.
IX. Recommendations
277. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council
remind all United Nations agencies working in Somalia that they
should provide all necessary assistance to the work of the
Monitoring Group, including access to United Nations Humanitarian
Air Service flights.
A. Threats to peace and security
278. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Committee should proceed without further delay to designate
individuals and entities proposed by the Monitoring Group or Member
States for targeted measures under Security Council resolution 1844
(2008) and/or resolution 1907 (2009);
(b) Further to the provisions of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907
(2009), the Government of Eritrea should cease any subsidies to
members of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara and
any other armed opposition groups currently based in Asmara, cancel
and/or revoke any Eritrean passports issued to members of those
groups and permit international inspection of any facilities alleged
to be employed for training of armed groups from Somalia and the
region;
(c) The European Union Governments take urgent steps to investigate
incidents of immigration fraud and take measures to better
coordinate consular functions among their embassies in East Africa.
Recommended actions include information-sharing with respect to visa
requests; and a ban should be placed on Somali ministers, members
of parliament and officials who make fraudulent requests for travel.
B. Violations of the arms embargo
279. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Committee should review the arms embargo exemption regime,
taking into account the Monitoring Group's observations in the
present report; specifically:
(i) Provisions regarding exemptions to the arms embargo should be
clarified with respect to the responsibilities of international,
regional and subregional organizations;
(ii) Private security companies operating in Somalia should be
required to request exemptions for their operations from either
their host government or the government that contracts them to
provide services;
(iii) The Committee should request the Member States to bring to the
attention of defence and security companies registered in their
territories the existence of an arms embargo on Somalia and relevant
Security Council resolutions;
(b) The Committee should exercise greater diligence in enforcing
compliance with the arms embargo exemptions regime; specifically:
(i) The Chair should send letters on behalf of the Committee to all
States cited above for substantive or technical violations of the
arms embargo, namely, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda
and the United Arab Emirates, reminding them of their
responsibilities under relevant Security Council resolutions and
bringing to their attention the possible consequences of
non-compliance;
(ii) The Security Council should request AMISOM to inspect
inventories of weapons and ammunition obtained in accordance with
Council resolution 1772 (2007), paragraphs 11 (b) and 12, in order
to ensure that all such weapons and ammunition are accounted for,
and to share such information on a regular basis with the Monitoring
Group;
(c) The Committee should remind Member States of their obligations
under the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and
Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light
Weapons, adopted by the General Assembly in its decision 60/519;
(d) The Security Council require States and international
organizations that come into possession of weapons, ammunition or
military material that is either on Somali territory or is destined
for Somalia or has originated in Somalia to record the identifying
characteristics of those items and report them to the Monitoring
Group, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1425
(2002);
(e) The Security Council authorize international naval forces in the
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, including the United States-led
Coalition Maritime Force (TF 151), the European Union Naval Force
(Operation Atalanta -- TF 465) and the NATO maritime force
(Operation Ocean Shield -- TF 508), to seize any weapons encountered
in the course of their operations and to actively interdict arms
trafficking in accordance with their capabilities;
(f) That the Committee act upon its decision to send a mission to
the Horn of Africa region, led by the Chair, to raise awareness
among Member States, international and regional organizations and
the private sector with respect to the provisions of resolutions
1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009), specifically the expanded mandate of
the Monitoring Group.
C. Piracy
280. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Security Council request international naval forces in the
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, including the United States-led
Coalition Maritime Force, the European Union Naval Force (Operation
Atalanta) and the NATO maritime force (Operation Ocean Shield), to
transmit any information in relation to seizures of weapons and
pirate paraphernalia to the Monitoring Group;
(b) The Security Council call upon the Puntland authorities to
demonstrate their sincerity in combating piracy by apprehending and
surrendering for prosecution in foreign countries known pirate
leaders, their supporters and financiers; to consider possible
targeted measures against individual leaders who aid or abet the
commission of acts of piracy or who benefit from the proceeds of
piracy; and to prohibit the provision of security sector support to
the Puntland authorities unless and until there is measurable
improvement;
(c) The Security Council encourage Member States to provide
capacitybuilding and training and other relevant forms of support
for the operations of the Transitional Federal Government and the
Somaliland coastguard forces, as well as other branches of the
security services engaged in the fight against piracy;
(d) All Member States engaged in counter-piracy operations off the
coast of Somalia consider deployment on vessels of trained military
forensic teams or trained coastguard policemen to improve the
collection, registration and preservation of evidence.
D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
281. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Security Council urge the Secretary-General to initiate a
genuinely independent investigation of the WFP Somalia country
office, with authority to investigate contracting procedures and
practice, including any discriminatory practices and preferential
treatment, to undertake an accurate ground assessment of delivery
operations, and to make recommendations for action;
(b) WFP revise its internal procedures to truly diversify the
issuance of contracts, and to ensure meaningful oversight of the
Somalia country office and transparency in the organizational
adjustments it makes;
(c) The United Nations Somalia country team empower the new position
of Risk Management Officer to conduct rigorous due diligence with
regard to companies to be awarded major contracts and their
subcontractors, with specific reference to who is actually in
control of a business as opposed to who is formally presented as
responsible;
(d) The United Nations Somalia country team, the United Nations
Support Office for AMISOM and the United Nations Political Office
for Somalia, with the Monitoring Group, develop a means of
information-sharing regarding the Somali business community
contracted by the United Nations, with due regard to social/clan,
business and political affiliations;
(e) The United Nations Somalia country team, in consultation with
the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, the United Nations
Political Office for Somalia and the Monitoring Group, should
establish a database of businessmen, their associates and
subcontractors involved in supporting or financing armed groups, or
who have engaged in corrupt practices in the context of United
Nations contracting. Financial audits are only one means of
identifying corruption, and regular investigations beyond formal
paperwork are necessary and feasible;
(f) The Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, in
collaboration with the United Nations Somalia country team and the
NGO Consortium, establish a database of individuals identified as
perpetrators or facilitators of kidnapping of aid workers for the
purposes of blacklisting or taking further action.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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