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Sudan: Post-Referendum Issues
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Oct 14, 2010 (101014)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"It is in our interest to see that the North remains a viable
state, just as it should be in the interests of the North to see
Southern Sudan emerge a viable one too. The North is our neighbour,
it shares our history, and it hosts our brothers and sisters.
Moreover, I have reiterated several times in my speeches in the
past that even if Southern Sudan separates from the North it will
not shift to the Indian Ocean or to the Atlantic Coast!" - Sudanese
First Vice President Salva Kiir
With less than 100 days to the scheduled referenda on Southern
Sudan and on the border area of Abyei on January 9, 2011, the primary focus
is understandably on ensuring that the referendum is held and that threats
of new war are avoided. But with Southern Sudanese widely expected
to vote overwhelmingly for independence, the prospects for peace
will also depend on much quieter negotiations under way on
post-independence issues. Whatever the legal status of Southern
Sudan will be, the fates of North and South will be deeply
intertwined, and will depend on reaching practical agreements on
such issues as division of oil revenues, citizenship, and borders.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from two documents
related to post-referendum issues, an October 1 speech by Sudanese
First Vice President Salva Kiir, and a blog post summarizing a
September 2010 report by Wolfram Lacher of the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs. Kiir's full speech is available
at http://tinyurl.com/3xktgzj and Lacher's blog entry, with a link
to a pdf of the full report, is available on the Making Sense of
Sudan blog at http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan
Other recent reports of interest on Sudan, with relevant analysis
and background, include the following:
Africa Confidential, Sudan: A New York Divorce
October 12, 2010
http://allafrica.com/stories/201010121107.html
Amnesty International
Agents of Fear: The National Security Service in Sudan
July 19,2010
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR54/010/2010/en
Ecumenical Delegation of Sudanese Religious Leaders at UN
October 13, 2010
http://allafrica.com/stories/201010130840.html
International Crisis Group
Defining the North-South Border
September 2, 2010
http://tinyurl.com/2dp2dcj
Sudan Tribune
North-South talks over Abyei referendum fail, new round scheduled,
October 13, 2010
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article36576
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Sudan, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/sudan.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note++++++++++++++++++++
Speech by Gen Salva Kiir Mayardit on his return from the USA
October 1, 2010
http://www.gurtong.net Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/3xktgzj
Gen Salva Kiir Mayardit, First Vice President of the Republic of
the Sudan and President of the Government of Southern Sudan
...
As we get closer to the zero hour of the Interim period, our
commitment is that the exercise of the right to self-determination
must take place on time January 9th, 2011. This is the bottom line
and a hard won right whose ultimate price is more than 4 million
lives lost during the long two civil wars since independence in
1956.
This has been my message everywhere during my recent visit be it to
the Congressional Black Caucus, at the United States Institute for
Peace (USIP), the UN International Peace Institute (IPI), the UN
High-Level Meeting on Sudan, to the Sudanese Diaspora and the
media. ...
The CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) remains the vital foundation of peace today, and will
remain so in the months ahead. ...
Today, we are left with less than 100 days to reach the vital
moment in the history of the CPA, the Referendum. This is an
extraordinary moment in the history of Africa. We must not let the
enemies of peace and spoilers to disrupt the forthcoming momentous
event. We must be realistic and clear-sighted about what lies ahead
of us. The referendum is a golden opportunity when Southern
Sudanese and the people of Abyei will make an informed choice of
either unity of the Sudan or secession. Therefore, I urge all
Southern Sudanese eligible voters to register en masse in order to
decide the fate of their existence come January 9th, 2011.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Over the last 5 years, it has become clear that unity has not been
made an option for our people. Our partners in the North showed
very little interest or activity to make unity a realistic
proposition. At the moment, all signs point to the fact that on
January 9th, 2011 Southern Sudanese people will vote overwhelmingly
for independence. This is what I told the international community
in New York and throughout the United States that we must together
prepare for this eventuality.
We have been moving heaven and earth to ensure that the necessary
referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei should take place correctly
and on time but there have also been worrying signs of
foot-dragging from our partners in the North. I would like to make
it clear and sundry that no disruption or delay to these referenda
can be tolerated.
...
Critically important is that the referenda take place on time, as
stipulated in the CPA. Delay or denial of the right of
self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and Abyei risks
dangerous instability. There is without question a real risk of a
return to violence on a massive scale if the referenda do not go
ahead as scheduled.
...
Once the vote for self-determination has taken place, different
challenges will emerge. Here again, we will need the leadership of
peace loving peoples of the world, particularly the guarantors of
the CPA, to ensure a peaceful transition. It will be vital that the
international community respect its stated commitment to accept the
results, and help the parties make the necessary arrangements for
a new situation to emerge.
As we prepare for the referendum, we have also begun negotiations
on post-referendum issues. The Government of Southern Sudan has
approached these negotiations with seriousness and good intentions.
We are genuinely willing to negotiate with our brothers in the
North, and are prepared to work in a spirit of partnership to
create sustainable relations between Northern and Southern Sudan
for the long-term. It is in our interest to see that the North
remains a viable state, just as it should be in the interests of
the North to see Southern Sudan emerge a viable one too. The North
is our neighbour, it shares our history, and it hosts our brothers
and sisters. Moreover, I have reiterated several times in my
speeches in the past that even if Southern Sudan separates from the
North it will not shift to the Indian Ocean or to the Atlantic
Coast!
We will strive to be good neighbors by building good relations and
peace between the people of Northern and Southern Sudan. We will
develop trade and economic relations on the basis of equality and
mutual benefit. We will negotiate post-referendum issues fairly and
consistent with international law. We will work to preserve and
enhance the livelihoods of all Sudanese people, including those
depending on traditional migrations across the North/South border.
Distinguished Compatriots,
I would like to particularly point out a number of issues of
well-known concern: The first is oil, where everybody seems to
think that in order for Southern Sudan to become an independent
state, it must give up most of its oil reserves to the North. Now
where is justice here? The North has been sharing with us the oil
from the South while having exclusive utilization of revenues from
northern oil turn out. We should have mutually agreed for a formula
that is satisfactory to all so that our populations should have
equal economic benefits from the oil sector.
That notwithstanding, we believe that there is a very real
opportunity to demonstrate how two states can work together
cooperatively to bring economic prosperity to both of their nations
in the event of secession. To this end, we have recently agreed
with the NCP for a full independent audit of Sudan's petroleum
sector along with the publication of daily production figures in
order to promote an atmosphere of trust and accountability between
North and South.
The second particular and critical issue is citizenship - we would
like the safety and rights of Southerners in the North and safety
and rights of Northerners in the South, as well as for the peoples
who have traditionally travelled through the border areas, to be
fully protected. On our side, we are committed to provide and
guarantee adequate security for all Sudanese in a manner that
respects the rule of law and the rights and freedoms of all
individuals, no matter what their tribe, origin, religion, or
ethnicity. We look for a reciprocal commitment from our brothers in
the North.
The third is the pressing issue of Abyei, where stability now and
in the future depends. I urge our partners to implement the
Permanent Court of Arbitration's (PCA) decision, which Khartoum
claims to have accepted, but where there has been continual delay.
We do not want Abyei to become the potential trigger for conflict
to reignite again between the South and the North. The SPLM and the
NCP will be meeting in Addis Ababa this weekend and I hope that a
final solution should be found for the implementation of the Abyei
Protocol. I mentioned it before and I will repeat again that there
is no reverse to war because of the lack of implementation of the
Abyei Protocol. Ya jama, I am not a coward but it is only those who
have not tested the anguish of war who can still drill for it. I
promise you that it will not be easy if war breaks out again for it
could lead to the total dismembering of the country. Therefore let
us all work for peaceful divorce so that we can still afford
smiling at one another whenever mutual business brings us together.
I know that the media is also fueling the situation and bad media
has often attempted to speak on behalf of the leaders of the NCP
and the SPLM. They have done this several times by misquoting both
the NCP and the SPLM leaders including putting words in President
Bashir's mouth and my mouth too. We will surmount any attempts to
trigger war again!
...
We must also be realistic about these negotiations because it is
unlikely that we will agree on all aspects of the post-referendum
arrangements before January 9th, 2011. We will work hard to get as
far as possible. But the timing of the referendum is sacrosanct and
is not contingent on the conclusion of any post-referendum
negotiations, including over the border, as the CPA itself makes it
clear. Elsewhere, referenda have successfully been held even when
borders were not completely resolved and why should Southern Sudan
be different?
...
We are committed to sustainable peace and stability irrespective of
the outcome of the referendum. We have achieved a lot in the past
few years since the CPA was signed, but we still have a lot of work
before us after the referendum. We are committed to establishing
transparent and accountable government consistent with the
requirements of statehood. We will uphold democratic principles and
guarantee all kinds of freedom for all our diverse communities.
...
Sudan: Negotiating Southern Independence: High Stakes in the Talks on Post-referendum Arrangements
Wolfram Lacher
Wolfram Lacher is a researcher on Sudan and the Horn of Africa at
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
German Institute for International and Security Affairs
http://www.swp-berlin.org
[posting on http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan]
The ruling parties in northern and southern Sudan, as well as
international actors in Sudan currently are almost exclusively
focussed on the referendum on southern independence. Given the
delays to the referendum timetable and the ongoing war of words
between the NCP and SPLM, this is not surprising. Nevertheless, the
almost exclusive focus on the January vote threatens to divert
attention away from the negotiations underway between the NCP and
SPLM on post-referendum arrangements. Whether the parties are able
to progress and strike viable deals in these negotiations is of
crucial importance for the referendum and the associated potential
for conflict. In my briefing, Negotiating Southern Independence:
High stakes in the talks on post-referendum arrangements
(
http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=7438) I argue that deals could be based on existing interdependencies
between north and south. Regardless of the referendum's outcome, an
expansion of north-south relations based on these interdependencies
would provide the best options for stability - but close and stable
relations between the two states are particularly important if (as
is most likely) the south becomes independent.
North-south negotiations began in July and have since been taking
place behind closed doors, excluding external observers or
mediators. The parties may resort to the mediation of the African
Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP), led by
former South African President Thabo Mbeki, or employ the expertise
of external consultants, but to date have hardly used these
options. Little is known about their progress to date - partly
because the talks are in their infancy on many points, partly
because both parties have largely kept quiet thus far. As both
sides and external actors are all occupied with the referendum
itself, the talks are unlikely to be well-advanced by the date of
the vote (i.e. 9 January 2011, according to the current schedule);
moreover, it is questionable whether the two parties will have
reached compromises on all key issues by the end of the CPA interim
period on 15 July 2011 (when southern independence would become
effective). The more protracted the talks are, the more likely is
the emergence of conflicts between the two sides or their proxies
in the run-up and aftermath of the referendum. Destabilising
tactics and proxy warfare (such as through tribal militias and
other armed groups) have long been part of both sides' repertoire
in negotiations, meaning that the risk of increasing instability is
associated not only with the possibility of southern secession as
such, but also part of the negotiations themselves.
Contentious points and possible solutions
The negotiations are structured into four areas, each of which is
covered by a working group comprising representatives of both
parties: Citizenship; Security; Economic, Financial and Natural
Resources; as well as International Treaties and Legal Issues. Key
negotiating points include an arrangement to divide up oil export
revenues; the rights and duties of citizens across the common
border (including rights of residence, work, trade and land use);
the currency and national debt; water; and security arrangements.
In addition, two issues that are not part of the negotiations in
this context are nevertheless of major importance for future
north-south relations: the delineation of the common border, and
the status of Abyei.
There are a number of opportunities to stabilise the difficult
relations between the two future states in the critical first few
years after the referendum, by drawing on existing
interdependencies. The arrangement whereby revenues from oil
produced in the south were shared equally between the central and
southern governments was perhaps the single most important factor
behind the CPA's success to date, as both sides had a vested
interest in continuing the agreement. There is an opportunity to
establish a mutually beneficial arrangement for the post-referendum
era that could play a similarly stabilising role as its equivalent
in the CPA. The necessity of such an arrangement is clear to both
sides, not least because the southern government currently has no
other option. Until the viability of an alternative southern export
pipeline is established, an arrangement between the two sides will
be primarily a question of how significant the northern share of
southern oil revenue will be, and the method by which it will be
calculated. This is not to say that there is no potential for
conflict on this point: should either side use the instruments of
pressure available in this area - such as a temporary export
blockage by the north - this could potentially trigger war.
Another case in point are the rights and duties of northern and
southern citizens on the other side of the common border. The
central government has begun to exert pressure by threatening to
expel southern Sudanese living in the north following southern
independence. On the other hand, southward migration by northern
groups is more developed than vice versa, including for
cattle-herding Arab nomads (Baggara), who are an important
constituency for the NCP. This strengthens the southern
government's negotiating position. Moreover, the regulation of
southerners' residence rights in the north will be linked to those
of northern traders in the south. To increase the chances of a
relatively stable transition to southern independence, the central
and southern governments would have to build on these existing
interdependencies to strengthen their bilateral relations, rather
than trying to outdo each other in restricting access for the other
state's citizens. The more complicated - but ultimately more stable
- solution would be a 'soft' border. This would require the
detailed regulation of northern and southern citizens' rights and
duties on the other side of the border, given that unregulated
migration and land use would be a recipe for conflict between local
groups. An agreement on an open border with clear rules for
cross-border movements would help stabilise north-south relations.
An expansion of infrastructure linking the two future states could
further bolster such a border regime.
These points are also relevant to the Abyei dispute, which is not
part of the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements as such.
The preparations for the Abyei referendum have experienced even
more delays than the independence referendum, and the criteria for
voter eligibility are fiercely contested. As a result, doubts are
growing whether the vote will be held on time, and the Abyei
dispute is increasingly becoming a negotiating point. In September,
the NCP suggested that the Abyei referendum should be cancelled and
the area should be turned into a demilitarised zone whose residents
would have dual nationality. The SPLM has rejected the proposal,
not least because it would represent a departure from one of the
key components of the CPA, and therefore could ultimately raise
questions about the independence referendum itself. Nevertheless,
a negotiated solution would offer an opportunity to defuse the
Abyei dispute. The Abyei referendum would be very likely to lead to
violence in the region. The conflict not only has a national
dimension (related to the oilfields located in Abyei) but is
particularly explosive at the local level, where the rights to
residency and land use of two groups are at stake - the Ngok Dinka
(a key constituency for the SPLM) and the Misseriya (a Baggara
tribe). The only stable solution would be one where the rights of
both groups are guaranteed, regardless of whether Abyei becomes
part of the north or the south.
A common currency could form another stabilising link after
southern secession. Given that oil revenues are a fundamental
factor for both states' budgets, the Sudanese Pound could
conceivably be used as a common currency. The question then becomes
how the influence of each side on the institution responsible for
monetary policy (the Central Bank of Sudan) would be regulated.
From the central government's perspective, a common currency would
have to be backed up by mechanisms controlling fiscal policy in
both states, as a fiscal or current account crisis in the south
could destabilise the currency. The alternative solution - less
attractive from the viewpoint of north-south relations, but
currently favoured by the SPLM leadership - would be a temporary
dollarisation of the southern economy.
There are a number of negotiating points where no obvious
interdependencies exist, such as on the question of Sudan's
external debt, or on security arrangements. Nevertheless, there are
opportunities for external actors to support compromises and
function as guarantors of a wider north-south arrangement. With
regard to Sudan's external debt, for example, the central
government will seek to hand part of its this debt over to the
south in the event of secession. The SPLM strongly rejects this.
Donor states have two basic options in this regard: either to
initiate a multilateral debt relief addressing the entirety of old
Sudanese debt (regardless of its repartition between north and
south) or to apply such relief only to that part of the debt passed
on to the southern government in the negotiations. The first
option, planned as a process lasting several years, could have a
major stabilising impact on north-south relations, by significantly
increasing Western donors' leverage over the central government.
Admittedly, an expansion of bilateral relations in parallel to the
secession process will require significant effort - particularly
for the south, which has already begun to strengthen its ties with
its southern and eastern neighbours, as well as Western donors
(particularly the United States). The SPLM, as a former rebel group
that continues to be deeply suspicious of Khartoum, will likely
seek to contain northern influence in order to assert the
sovereignty of the emerging southern state. Conversely, the NCP is
likely to see existing ties between the two states primarily as an
opportunity to maintain and exploit its dominant position vis-�-vis
the south. Both tactics run counter to the stabilising impact that
close interdependence could have. Finally, there is a danger that
too close relations between the two states could have a
destabilising impact if the south is too exposed to Khartoum's
influence through its dependence on the northern oil export
infrastructure, trade and currency.
Ultimately, the compromises necessary for close and stable
relations will have to be reached by the two parties themselves.
Nevertheless, the two sides should be encouraged to resist their
likely reflex of erecting barriers and curbing ties between
themselves. This is particularly relevant with regard to the
southern government, which seeks the backing of Western donors as
a counterweight to Khartoum's influence. However, unless it is
coupled with closer relations with the north, the expansion of
southern ties with its southern and eastern neighbours and the West
could deepen the polarisation between the two states. Instead of
hastening the south's uncoupling from the north and raise the risk
of conflict between the two sides, external actors should seek to
promote their integration, and prevent imbalances in north-south
relations.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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