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Western Sahara: Forgotten Conflict
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Jun 29, 2010 (100629)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
The Western Sahara conflict, notes analyst Yahia Zoubir, is now in
the 35th year, with no sign of resolution. While the United Nations
is ostensibly responsible for its resolution, France and the United
States provide implicit support for Moroccan occupation of the
territory, failing to support a referendum which might include the option of
independence. The issue continues to poison relations between
Algeria and Morocco, blocking hopes of regional economic
integration in the Maghrib.
Recently France and the United States again blocked the inclusion
of human rights monitoring in the UN peacekeeping mission for
Western Sahara, the only UN peacekeeping mission lacking such a
mandate. And although U.S. policymakers were reported to have
successfully pressured for release of Saharan human rights activist
Aminatou Haidar last December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
has stressed that there is no change in U.S. policy. And 54 U.S.
senators have signed a letter endorsing Moroccan occupation.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from an article by
Zoubir, as well as a report by Stephen Zunes on the U.S. Senate
resolution.
The article by Zoubir is part of a special issue of the Association
of Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin on "U.S. Militarization of
the Sahara-Sahel". The issue also includes analytical articles by
editor Jacob Mundy, Stephen Harmon, Caroline Ifeka, Alex Thurston,
Konstantina Isidoros, Vinjay Prasad, Anne McDougall, Daniel Volman,
and Jeremy Keenan, covering a range of countries and aspects of the
security situation in the region. See
http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/85.
For pervious AfricaFocus Bulletins on Western Sahara, see
http://www.africafocus.org/country/westernsahara.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++++++++
The Western Sahara conflict: regional and international
repercussions
By Yahia H Zoubir
June 2010
Concerned Africa Scholars Bulletin (ACAS) Bulletin 85:
US militarization of the Sahara-Sahel: Security, Space &
Imperialism
[Excerpts: Full article with references available on
http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/85/]
A second round of informal talks between Moroccan government and
the Frente Popular de Liberaci�n de Sagu�a el Hamra y R�o de Oro
(Frente POLISARIO) conducted under UN auspices and in the presence
of Algeria and Mauritania as observer countries, was held on 10-11
February 2010. Announced as a preliminary, informal meeting leading
to the fifth round of direct negotiations between the Western
Saharan independence movement and Morocco, these discussions
followed four sessions of direct talks, which began in June 2007,
without producing any tangible results.
At least for the informed analyst, the latest meeting would likely
hold few differences from the previous rounds -- which was indeed
the case -- even if the international context has changed somewhat
since the arrival of Barack Obama to the White House one year
prior. The Western Sahara conflict, defined as a 'forgotten
conflict' or 'frozen conflict' (Zoubir 2010) is approaching its
35th year; it has had significant damaging effects. A proposed
regional trading bloc, L'Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA, Arab Maghrib
Union), inaugurated with great fanfare in February 1989, has been
in hibernation since 1996, precisely because of this dispute. The
question has poisoned relations between Algeria, the main sponsor
of Western Saharan self-determination, and Morocco, which claims
the territory it has illegally occupied since 1975.
Even if the issue very rarely makes the headlines, the Western
Sahara conflict has had a significant impact on the development of
the region. Indeed, the lack of regional integration is a serious
consequence: economic exchange between the Maghrib states
represents only 1.3% of their trade, the lowest regional trade in
the world. Economists in the United States have shown that an
integrated Maghrib market and free trade area would produce highly
beneficial results for the populations of the region (Hufbauer &
Brunel 2008).
In addition, the land border between Algeria and Morocco has been
closed since August 1994, seriously affecting the economic life of
the city of Oujda, which depended heavily on trade with and tourism
from Algeria. ...Furthermore, not surprisingly, the tension between
Algeria and Morocco has led to a rather costly and dangerous arms
race.
In addition, the dispute has generated other consequences. It has
affected relations between France (defending the Moroccan
monarchy's irredentist claims) and Algeria, as well as relations
between Spain (the former colonial power in Western Sahara) and, on
the one hand, Morocco, and, on the other, Spain and Algeria. The
United States, which during the Cold War allowed the occupation of
the former Spanish colony by Morocco (Mundy 2006a/b), has also
suffered some of the consequences in its policy in the Maghrib: Its
repeated calls for Maghrib integration have proven fruitless.
Only a geopolitical perspective can explain the stalemate that has
persisted in the Western Sahara conflict. The alleged technical
difficulties to ensure a referendum have been mere pretext to allow
Morocco to continue its colonization of the territory. If today
powers like the United States, France and Spain, support, albeit to
different degrees, the concept of 'autonomy for the Sahrawi
people', they have failed to impose it because international law is
on the side of the Sahrawi people (Chinkin 2008).
The conflict has increased even more as a younger generations of
Sahrawis have resorted to active, continued peaceful resistance,
which has succeeded in alerting the international community on
human rights issues. The case of the activist Aminatou Haidar is a
perfect illustration. In fact, her hunger strike, triggered in
November-December 2009 and the diplomatic reaction that ensued,
have had such reverberations that the Personal Envoy of the UN
Secretary-General to Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, asked the UN
Security Council on January 28, 2010, during a closed-door meeting,
to include human rights monitoring in the prerogatives of the
Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un R�f�rendum au
Sahara Occidental (MINURSO, UN Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara) -- the only United Nations peacekeeping force that
does not include, as part of its mandate, the protection of human
rights. The same request had been made in 2009 but France opposed
it.
On 30 April 2010, France once again, opposed the inclusion of the
protection of human rights in MINURSO's mandate. Therefore, UNSC
Resolution 1920, which has extended MINURSO's mandate for another
year, does not contain any mention of human rights. In the
meantime, the violations of human rights in occupied Western Sahara
have in fact amplified despite their denunciations by respectable
human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International or Human
Rights Watch.
The lack of resolution of the Western Sahara conflict boils down to
two main points: the conflicting positions of Morocco and Western
Saharan nationalists, on the one hand, and geopolitical
considerations, on the other hand. These geopolitical interests
have been the main impediment to the resolution of the conflict
because they strengthened the obstinate position of Morocco, which
argues, thanks to external support, that it will only negotiate on
the basis of 'autonomy' within Moroccan sovereignty. This proposal
currently enjoys the implicit consent of France, the United States,
and Spain, regardless of UN resolutions that refute any
preconditions for the current negotiations.
Morocco and the Sahrawi: Irreconcilable Positions
Despite the acceptance of the original UN Settlement Plan by
Morocco and Polisario in 1991, all attempts to organize the
referendum on self-determination of the last colony in Africa have
failed. Since 2001, Morocco has continuously opposed the inclusion
of the option of independence to any referendum process based on
self-determination. Today, the Moroccans consider the referendum
process altogether as an 'obsolete practice'. Moroccans are
comforted in their position owing to the backing they receive from
France and the United States in the Security Council.
The Security Council has refused to impose a solution that includes
the option of independence, as inscribed in UN resolutions.
...Recently, France, the United States (under George W Bush) and
Spain have made no doubt as to their support for the proposal
Morocco made in 2007 to supposedly grant Western Sahara 'autonomy'
within the Moroccan Kingdom. Implicitly, these countries have
recognized Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, while
adopting an official position that indicates otherwise.
Thus, since the adoption on 30 April 2007, of UN resolution 1754,
Moroccans have reiterated their position that they will not
negotiate anything other than their own proposal, insisting that
they have garnered support from France and, more importantly, from
the George W. Bush administration and the current Barack Obama
Administration, following Hillary Clinton's declarations in Morocco
in December 2009. During all the recent negotiations, Moroccans
refused to discuss the Polisario's counter-proposal, thus ignoring
recent UN resolutions which insist on 'negotiations without
preconditions and in good faith [...] with a view to achieving a
just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which
will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western
Sahara'.
Polisario's counterproposal submitted to the United Nations in
2007, which conforms to international legality, does not reject
outright the Moroccan 'autonomy' option, but insists that the any
proposal be considered only as a third option (independence and
integration being the others) as part of talks between the two
parties. Polisario is also committed to accepting the results of
the referendum whatever they are and to negotiate with the Kingdom
of Morocco, under the auspices of the United Nations, the
guarantees that it is prepared to grant to the Moroccan population
residing in Western Sahara, as well as to the Kingdom of Morocco,
in terms of Morocco's political, economic and security interests in
Western Sahara, in the event that the referendum on
self-determination would lead to independence.
The perpetuation of this impasse is inevitable, despite the
optimism of former US diplomat, Christopher Ross, formally
appointed in January 2009 to serve as UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon's Personal Envoy to Western Sahara. Prudently, Ross first
arranged for an informal meeting between the two parties in
D�rnstein, Austria, on 10-11 August 2009. Unsurprisingly, no
progress was made despite a fairly positive statement issued at the
end of the meeting. The two parties however agreed to pursue yet
another informal round of discussions in Armonk, near New York.
...
But the talks produced little headway because reality on the ground
was and still is favorable to Morocco, not only because Morocco has
consolidated its colonization of the territory, but it also
exploits illegally, with no fear of punishment, the natural
resources of Western Sahara, primarily phosphates and fisheries.
The European Union is complicit in this exploitation through the
fisheries agreement with Morocco, which includes Western Saharan
waters, notwithstanding the doubts that the European Parliament has
expressed on the reasonableness of EU policy; in fact, it deemed EU
fishing in Western Saharan waters to be illegal. ...
Geopolitics as Impediment to Resolution of the Conflict
The United Nations is responsible for the decolonization of Western
Sahara, but the key to breaking the stalemate and implementing the
legal solution lies in the hands of France and the United States,
which, even if they do not recognize Morocco's sovereignty over the
territory, have allowed Morocco to consolidate its control over
Western Sahara. ...
France, regardless of its 'official' position, considers Western
Sahara as an integral part of Morocco. Since 1975, successive
French governments have never hidden their opposition to an
independent Sahrawi state that would purportedly fall under
Algeria's influence. In addition, the emergence of an independent
Sahrawi state is seen as a destabilizing factor for the Moroccan
Kingdom, in which France has considerable political, economic,
military and cultural interests. With nearly 70 percent of total
Foreign Direct Investments in Morocco, France is the largest
trading partner and major investor. ...
The United States, too, supports the position of Morocco, a
reliable ally in the Arab world (Zoubir 2009a). A priori, the U.S.
does not oppose the right to self-determination of peoples, but in
the case of Western Sahara, geopolitical considerations are the
driving force in the US attitude toward this particular question.
There were times, as under the George HW Bush administration, in
the late 1980s, when the United States was open to the idea of an
independent Sahrawi state. Then in 2003, the United States,
supported the second Baker Plan, under which the Sahrawis were to
enjoy autonomy for a period of five years before holding a
referendum on self-determination that would include the three
options, of which independence was one, as inscribed in UN
resolutions. Moroccans have objected to such referendum in spite of
the numerical advantage of Moroccan settlers in the territory, who
would have been allowed to vote under the 2003 proposal. At the
time, the George W Bush administration had promised Algerians that
if Algiers and Polisario accepted the plan, the United States would
impose that solution at the Security Council. However, perhaps not
wishing to aggravate the rift with the French over the issue of
Iraq, coupled with the threat of veto from France, the United
States was pushed to renege on its promise. The Bush administration
then supported the 2007 Moroccan autonomy proposal despite its
illegality -- for what gives Moroccans the right to offer autonomy
to Sahrawis? -- and its utter ambiguity (Theofilopoulou 2007).
It would be na�ve to believe a reversal of the US position in this
conflict under the current Obama Administration despite the seeming
shift in attitude towards the autonomy proposal. There have been
some indications that the Obama administration may not be decidedly
biased in favor of Morocco. Indeed, in June 2009, it appeared that
the U.S. no longer supported unequivocally the Moroccan autonomy
plan; Obama evaded mentioning the autonomy plan in his letter to
King Mohamed VI, which was interpreted as a reversal in US policy
on the question. ...
Undoubtedly, by referring to international legality, which in the
case of Western Sahara would include the option of independence,
Obama seemed to abide by the values he promised to uphold.
However, as UNSC Resolution 1920 demonstrates, the United States
does not seem to have undertaken any shift in policy toward Western
Sahara. What is certain is that the administration is torn between
continuing to support a traditional ally and setting a new course
that would contradict the interests of that ally. The conflicting
pronouncements in Obama's letter and those issued by Hillary
Clinton during her visit to Morocco in November 2009 highlight the
policy constraints of the new administration. During her visit to
Marrakesh in November 2009 to attend the Forum for the Future,
Hillary Clinton responded to the question as to whether the Obama
administration had changed its position on the autonomy plan by
saying that, 'Our policy has not changed, and I thank you for
asking the question because I think it's important for me to
reaffirm here in Morocco that there has been no change in policy'
(Clinton 2009a). In another interview, she was asked, what she
meant by her affirmation that there was 'no change in the Obama
Administration's position as far as the Moroccan autonomy plan in
the Sahara is concerned'. Her response was:
"Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton
Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and it
remains the policy of the United States in the Obama
Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations process
because we think that if there can be a peaceful resolution to the
difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both to the east and
to the south and the west that is in everyone's interest. But
because of our long relationship, we are very aware of how
challenging the circumstances are. And I don't want anyone in the
region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our policy, which
remains the same." (Clinton 2009b)
This being said, the U.S. displayed a tougher stand toward Morocco
during the hunger strike of Haidar. The U.S. was instrumental in
resolving the case (Jama� & Rhanime 2010), thus making it possible
for Haidar to return to Western Sahara.
One of the major questions to be asked is whether the White House,
despite the seemingly evenhanded approach, will succumb to the
Senate's pressure to endorse Morocco's illegal annexation of
Western Sahara (Zunes 2010), at the risk of alienating Algeria, a
major actor in the war against terrorism in the region (Zoubir
2009b).
About the Author
Yahia H. Zoubir is a professor of international relations and
management and director of geopolitical research at the Euromed
School of Business and Management (Marseille). He is the co-editor
with Amirah-Fernandez Haizam of North Africa: politics, region, and
the limits of transformation (Routledge 2008).
Acknowledgments
This article was originally published as 'Le conflit du Sahara
occidental : enjeux r�gionaux et internationaux', in Luis Martinez
(ed), Changement et continuit� au Maghreb (Centre d'�tudes et de
recherches internationales, February 2010),
http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/archive/2010/fevrier/dossier/art_yz.pdf.
It has been revised and updated for publication in the Bulletin.
For notes and references see the web version of the article at
http://concernedafricascholars.org/bulletin/85/
U.S. Lawmakers Support Illegal Annexation
Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco
April 7, 2010
http://www.huffingtonpost.com /
Direct URL: http://tinyurl.com/2atkfxx
In yet another assault on fundamental principles of international
law, a bipartisan majority of the Senate has gone on record calling
on the United States to endorse Morocco's illegal annexation of
Western Sahara, the former Spanish colony invaded by Moroccan
forces in 1975 on the verge of its independence. In doing so, the
Senate is pressuring the Obama administration to go against a
series of UN Security Council resolutions, a landmark decision of
the International Court of Justice, and the position of the African
Union and most of the United States' closest European allies.
More disturbingly, this effort appears to have the support of
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Senator Dianne Feinstein
(D-CA), head of the Senate Intelligence Committee and principal
author of the recent Senate letter supporting Moroccan
aggrandizement, claims that the two "are on the same wavelength" on
the issue.
The letter, signed by 54 senators, insists that the United States
endorse Morocco's "autonomy" plan as the means of settling the
conflict. As such, the Senate opposes the vast majority of the
world's governments and a broad consensus of international legal
scholars, who recognize the illegality of such an imposed
settlement. More than 75 countries recognize the Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic (SADR), which represents the people of Western
Sahara under the leadership of the Polisario Front. The SADR is
also a full member state of the African Union, and has governed
nearly half of the people in liberated zones in Western Sahara as
well as refugee camps in Algeria for nearly 35 years. The majority
of Congress, however, wants the United States to pressure Polisario
to surrender the Western Saharan people's right to
self-determination and accept the sovereignty of a conquering
power.
How Much "Autonomy"?
The autonomy plan is based on the assumption that Western Sahara is
part of Morocco rather than an occupied territory, and that Morocco
is somehow granting part of its sovereign territory a special
status. This is a contention that the United Nations, the World
Court, the African Union, and a broad consensus of international
legal opinion have long rejected. To accept Morocco's autonomy plan
would mean that, for the first time since the founding of the UN
and the ratification of the UN Charter nearly 65 years ago, the
international community would be endorsing the expansion of a
country's territory by military force, thereby establishing a very
dangerous and destabilizing precedent.
If the people of Western Sahara accepted an autonomy agreement over
independence as a result of a free and fair referendum, it would
constitute a legitimate act of self-determination. Outstanding UN
Security Council resolutions explicitly call for such a referendum
(which the Senate letter ignores). However, Morocco has explicitly
stated that its autonomy proposal "rules out, by definition, the
possibility for the independence option to be submitted" to the
people of Western Sahara, the vast majority of whom favor outright
independence.
International law aside, there are a number of practical concerns
regarding the Moroccan proposal. For instance, centralized
autocratic states have rarely respected the autonomy of regional
jurisdictions, which has often led to violent conflict. In 1952,
the UN granted the British protectorate of Eritrea autonomous
status federated with Ethiopia. In 1961, however, the Ethiopian
emperor revoked Eritrea's autonomous status, annexing it as his
empire's 14th province. The result was a bloody 30-year struggle
for independence and subsequent border wars between the two
countries. Similarly, the decision of Serbian leader Slobodan
Milosevic to revoke the autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989 led to
a decade of repression and resistance, culminating in the NATO war
against Yugoslavia in 1999.
Moreover, the Senate-backed Moroccan proposal contains no
enforcement mechanisms. Morocco has often broken its promises to
the international community, such as its refusal to allow the
UN-mandated referendum for Western Sahara to go forward. Indeed, a
close reading of the proposal raises questions about how much
autonomy Morocco is even initially offering, such as whether the
Western Saharans will control the territory's natural resources or
law enforcement beyond local matters. In addition, the proposal
appears to indicate that all powers not specifically vested in the
autonomous region would remain with the kingdom. Indeed, since the
king of Morocco is ultimately vested with absolute authority under
Article 19 of the Moroccan constitution, the autonomy proposal's
insistence that the Moroccan state "will keep its powers in the
royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external
relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His
Majesty the King" appears to give the monarch considerable latitude
in interpretation.
In any case, the people of Western Sahara will not likely accept
autonomy rather than independence. For years, they have engaged in
largely nonviolent pro-independence protests only to be subjected
to mass arrests, beatings, torture, and extra-judicial killings.
The Moroccan authorities would not likely change their ways under
"autonomy."
That did not stop Clinton from apparently endorsing Morocco's
"autonomy" plan during a visit to Morocco last November, a
controversial statement cited by the Senate letter's authors to
bolster their case. Just days after Clinton's visit, the emboldened
Moroccan authorities expelled Aminatou Haidar, Western Sahara's
leading pro-independence activist. Haidar's resulting month-long
hunger strike nearly killed her before President Barack Obama
pressured Morocco to allow her to return.
The Senate Letter
There has long been concern that Morocco's ongoing illegal
occupation of Western Sahara, its human rights abuses, and its
defiance of the international community, has jeopardized attempts
to advance the Arab Maghreb Union and other efforts at regional
economic integration and security cooperation. However, the Senate
letter turns this argument on its head, arguing that the
international community's failure to recognize Morocco's annexation
of the territory is the cause of the "growing instability in North
Africa." The letter ominously warns that "terrorist activities are
increasing" in the region, ignoring the fact that the Polisario
Front has never engaged in terrorism, even during the years of
guerrilla warfare against Moroccan occupation forces between 1975
and 1991. The Polisario has scrupulously observed a ceasefire ever
since, despite Morocco breaking its promise to allow for a
UN-sponsored referendum. Furthermore, Islamist radicals have little
sympathy for the secular Polisario and the relatively liberal
version of Islam practiced by most Western Saharans.
The letter's signatories included 24 Republicans, including ranking
Intelligence Committee member Kit Bond (R-MO), Assistant Minority
Leader Jon Kyl (R-AZ), and John McCain (R-AZ). There were also 30
Democratic signatories of the letter, including such erstwhile
liberals as Ron Wyden (D-OR), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Carl Levin
(D-MI), and Mark Udall (D-CO). Not surprisingly, most of the
signers have also gone on record defending Israel's occupation of
Palestinian and Syrian territory, and previously supported
Indonesia's occupation of East Timor. A majority of the signatories
also voted to authorize the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq.
When a majority of the Senate goes on record calling on the
administration to pursue a policy that fundamentally denies an
entire nation its right to self-determination, undermines the UN
Charter and other basic principles of international law, and
challenges a series of UN Security Council resolutions, it shows
just how far to the right this Democratic-controlled body has
become.
U.S. support for Indonesia's occupation of East Timor didn't end
until human rights activists made it politically difficult for the
Clinton administration and members of Congress to continue backing
it. Similarly, voters who care about human rights and international
law must make it clear they won't support any lawmaker who favors
the right of conquest over the right of self-determination.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
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a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
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