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Somalia: Economies of War
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Nov 3, 2011 (111103)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"Al-Shabaab's resilience, despite its lack of popular
support and the chronic divisions within its leadership, is
principally due to the weakness of the Transitional Federal
Government, and the latter's failure to broaden its
political appeal or share power with other de facto
political and military forces in the country. The endemic
corruption of the leadership of the transitional federal
institutions ... is the greatest impediment to the
emergence of a cohesive transitional authority and effective
State institutions." - UN Monitoring Group
The report goes on to note that "Given its lack of popular
support, political fractiousness and military limitations,
Al-Shabaab's greatest asset today is its economic strength.
The Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea estimates that
Al-Shabaab currently generates between US$ 70 million to US$
100 million per year in revenue from taxation and extortion
in areas under its control, notably the export of charcoal
and cross-border contraband into Kenya."
In the light of these realities, the primary focus on
military action against Al-Shabaab, as illustrated by recent
news concerning expanded U.S. drone activity and the most
recent Kenyan military intervention, are not only unlikely
to produce any stability or increased capacity to address
Somalia's desperate humanitarian needs. They are also highly
likely to be counterproductive. To date, the Kenyan
intervention not only shows little military advance; it has
only provoked new attacks in Kenya and hindered the escape
of refugees from the famine zone in southern Somalia.
Among recent reports on Somalia, that of the UN Monitoring
Group on Somalia and Eritrea, released this summer, stands
out not only for its length (417 pages) but also for its
focus on measures that might address the central questions
of putting pressure on both Al-Shabaab and the Transitional
Federal Government.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains brief excerpts from that
report. The full report is available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/437743
Other recent thoughtful policy reports and analyses include:
John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, "Twenty Years of Collapse
and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia"
Center for
American Progress and One Earth Future Foundation, September
2011
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/somalia.html
Ken Menkhaus, "A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia's Famine"
Enough Project, September 21, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3cq7xkn
EJ Hogendoorn, "Solving Somalia's Food Security Emergency,"
International Crisis Group, October 3, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3oqtvzs
>Latest (November 1) UN situation report on drought and
famine in Somalia
http://reliefweb.int/node/457056
On Kenya's military intervention in Somalia
"Kibaki Gambles On Regional War With Al Shabaab"
Africa Confidential, October 21, 2011
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/201110211498.html
Jeffrey Gettleman, "Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent
Abductions"
New York Times, October 27, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/6xshbu3
Muthoni Wanyeki, "Shock and awe in Somalia? Sorry, it isnâ�TMt
a board game"
The EastAfrican, October 30, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3rohbol
Charles Onyango-Obbo and Nick Wachira, "Why Capturing
Kismayu Could Trigger Proxy Wars in Kenya."
The EastAfrican, October 30, 2011
http://allafrica.com/stories/201110311711.html
For recent revelations on the expanded U.S. use of drones in
the Horn of Africa, see the following links:
"U.S. Assembling Secret Drone Bases in Africa, Arabian
Peninsula, Officials Say"
Washington Post, September 20, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3qdgkrz
"U.S. Expands Drone Flights to Take Aim at East Africa"
Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3swpmsh
"America's Secret Empire of Drone Bases"
Alternet, October 16, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3bz2h39
"U.S. Drone Base in Ethiopia is Operational"
Washington Post, October 27, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/4xolnh6
For previous AfricaFocus Bulletins on Somalia, including
three earlier this year, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/somalia.php
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
United Nations Security Council
18 July 2011
S/2011/433
Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010)
[Brief excerpts only, on Somalia only. The full report is
417 pages long, and available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/437743 The full report, as
indicated by the title, includes information on Eritrea as
well as Somalia.]
Summary
...
More than half of Somali territory is controlled by
responsible, comparatively stable authorities that have
demonstrated, to varying degrees, their capacity to provide
relative peace and security to their populations. Without
exception, the administrations of Somaliland, Puntland,
Gaalmudug, and "Himan iyo Heeb" evolved independently of
centralized State-building initiatives, from painstaking,
organic local political processes. Much of Galguduud region
is controlled by anti-Al-Shabaab clan militias loosely
unified under the umbrella of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ),
but lacks a functional authority. Consolidation of and
cooperation between such entities represents the single most
effective strategy for countering threats like extremism and
piracy, while expanding peace and security in Somalia.
Other southern anti-Shabaab militias, including the various
factions of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a, "Azania State", and
"Shabelle Valley State" appear to be proxies for
neighbouring States rather than emergent local authorities,
and it is unclear to what extent they may also be able to
deliver enduring peace and security. To a certain extent,
the resort to Somali proxy forces by foreign Governments
represents a potential return to the "warlordism" of the
1990s and early 2000s, which has historically proved to be
counterproductive.
The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, whose
mandate expires in August 2011, has left much of the country
to Al-Shabaab, which controls the greater part of Somali
territory between the Kenyan border and southern parts of
Mudug and Galguduud regions. In Mogadishu, the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), together with pro-Transitional
Federal Government militias, has made some limited gains
against Al-Shabaab, but at a considerable cost in both
military and civilian casualties. In the absence of a
coherent Transitional Federal Government security sector,
the most effective local allies of AMISOM are clan-based
militias with loyalties to individual commanders and who
look to the African Union rather than the Government for
leadership and support. The intense fighting, combined with
a serious drought and Al-Shabaab restrictions on access for
humanitarian organizations, has triggered a new and acute
humanitarian crisis, including a fresh exodus of refugees
into neighbouring countries.
The principal impediments to security and stabilization in
southern Somalia are the Transitional Federal Government
leadership's lack of vision or cohesion, its endemic
corruption and its failure to advance the political process.
Arguably even more damaging is the Government's active
resistance to engagement with or the empowerment of local,
de facto political and military forces elsewhere in the
country. Instead, attempts by the Government's leadership to
monopolize power and resources have aggravated frictions
within the transitional federal institutions, obstructed the
transitional process and crippled the war against AlShabaab,
while diverting attention and assistance away from
positive developments elsewhere in the country.
The response of Al-Shabaab to military setbacks in
Mogadishu, the central regions and the Juba Valley has been
to aggressively expand its control over the southern Somali
economy. Given its lack of popular support, political
fractiousness and military limitations, Al-Shabaab's
greatest asset today is its economic strength. The
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea estimates that AlShabaab
currently generates between US$ 70 million to US$
100 million per year in revenue from taxation and extortion
in areas under its control, notably the export of charcoal
and cross-border contraband into Kenya. Given the corrupt
and predatory practices of the Transitional Federal
Government, many Somali businessmen find Al-Shabaab to be
better for business, and from a purely commercial
perspective have little interest in seeing the group
displaced by the Government.
Al-Shabaab's core leaders have also responded to domestic
difficulties by seeking to align themselves more closely
with foreign jihadist entities and to provide a platform for
like-minded groups in the region. The July 2010 Kampala
bombings were the first successful Al-Shabaab operation
beyond Somalia's borders. They also signalled a new and
alarming trend, in which East African extremist groups
inspired and mentored by Al-Shabaab, including the Muslim
Youth Centre in Kenya, might represent the next generation
of extremist threats in East Africa and the wider region.
Piracy remains another Somali-based threat to regional and
international security. International counter-piracy efforts
have made little or no headway in curbing the number of
piracy attacks and hijackings, but they have helped to
displace the threat further from Somali shores, threatening
an even wider area. The enhanced risks and costs to pirates
associated with operating at greater distances from shore
have helped to drive up ransom demands and prolong
negotiations for the release of hijacked vessels.
The burgeoning engagement in Somalia of private security
companies, whether to deter pirates or to provide security
on land, is of growing concern. The private security sector
lacks a robust regulatory framework, and the operating
practices of many private security companies are opaque. The
Monitoring Group believes that at least two such entities
have committed significant violations of the arms embargo by
engaging in unauthorized training and equipping of Somali
militias � one with the intention of trafficking in arms and
narcotic drugs.
Eritrean involvement in Somalia continues to represent a
small but troubling part of the overall equation. Asmara's
continuing relationship with Al-Shabaab, for example,
appears designed to legitimize and embolden the group rather
than to curb its extremist orientation or encourage its
participation in a political process. Moreover, Eritrean
involvement in Somalia reflects a broader pattern of
intelligence and special operations activity, including
training, financial and logistical support to armed
opposition groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan and
possibly Uganda in violation of Security Council resolution
1907 (2009).
Eritrea's support for such groups can only be understood in
the context of its unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia.
It is also symptomatic, however, of the systematic
subversion of the Government of Eritrea and party
institutions by a relatively small number of political,
military and intelligence officials, who instead choose to
conduct the affairs of state via informal and often illicit
mechanisms, including people smuggling, arms trafficking,
money-laundering and extortion.
Such irregular financial practices, combined with direct
financial contributions from ruling party supporters and
some foreign States, as well as the imposition of a
"diaspora tax" on Eritreans and foreign nationals of
Eritrean origin living abroad, help to explain how a country
as poor as Eritrea manages to sustain support for a variety
of armed opposition groups across the region. From 2011
onwards, however, Eritrea's newly emerging mining sector �
especially gold � is likely to become the country's
principal source of hard currency.
During the course of the mandate, it is the Monitoring
Group's assessment that the Eritrean leadership committed
multiple violations of Security Council resolutions 1844
(2008) and 1907 (2009). Most significantly, in January 2011,
the Government of Eritrea conceived, planned, organized and
directed a failed plot to disrupt the African Union summit
in Addis Ababa by bombing a variety of civilian and
governmental targets. Although many Eritreans harbour
profound and arguably legitimate grievances against Ethiopia
for failing to implement the boundary decision that formally
ended the 1998-2000 border war between the two countries,
the means by which the leadership in Asmara apparently
intends to pursue its objectives are no longer proportional
or rational. Moreover, since the Eritrean intelligence
apparatus responsible for the African Union summit plot is
also active in Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, the
level of threat it poses to these other countries must be
re-evaluated.
II. Context: description of the security-related environment
12. Since the late 1990s, Somalia has been characterized by
the bifurcation of its territory into relatively stable and
secure regions governed by responsible authorities in the
north, and the protracted violence and absence of effective
governance in the south. Security trends since the
submission of the Monitoring Group's previous report in
March 2010 have been uneven and at times contradictory.
13. The principal impediments to security and stabilization
in southern Somalia are the Transitional Federal Government
leadership's lack of vision or cohesion, its endemic
corruption and its failure to advance the political process.
Arguably even more damaging is the Government's active
resistance to engagement with or the empowerment of local,
de facto political and military forces elsewhere in the
country. Instead, attempts by the Government's leadership to
monopolize power and resources have aggravated frictions
within the transitional federal institutions, obstructed the
transitional process and crippled the war against AlShabaab,
while diverting attention and assistance away from
positive developments elsewhere in the country.
14. The authorities in Somaliland maintained security and
stability, kept their coastline pirate-free and consolidated
their nascent democratic institutions with a presidential
election in June 2010 that was widely deemed to be free,
fair and peaceful. In Puntland, the administration also
maintained relative peace and stability � although targeted
killings have been on the rise in major towns � and made
gains against piracy. These authorities, however, face
growing common threats in the disputed regions of Sool and
eastern Sanaag, where the Sool, Sanaag Cayn Army aims to
aggravate local political and social tensions into violence,
and where Mohamed Sa'iid Atom's militia has effectively
merged with Al-Shabaab.
15. In central Somalia, embryonic authorities such as
"Gaalmudug State" (Mudug region), "Himan iyo Heeb" (Mudug
region) and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a (ASWJ) in Galguduud
region, have also made some modest progress towards
achieving local security and stability. Trends elsewhere in
southern Somalia, however, have been largely negative. AlShabaab
remains in control of much of the territory, and the
conflict between AMISOM, the Transitional Federal Government
and allied militias, on the one hand, and Al-Shabaab on the
other, has engendered escalating violence and a
deteriorating humanitarian environment. Meanwhile, the
Transitional Federal Government security forces and their
local allies continue to be little more than clan-based
militias with loyalties to individual commanders and that
look to AMISOM rather than to the Government for leadership
and support.
16. Other southern anti-Al-Shabaab militias, including the
various factions of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a, "Azania State",
and "Shabelle Valley State" appear to be proxies for
neighbouring States rather than emergent local authorities,
and it is unclear to what extent they may also be able to
deliver enduring peace and security. To a certain extent,
the resort to Somali proxy forces by foreign Governments
represents a potential return to the "warlordism" of the
1990s and early 2000s, which has historically proved to be
counterproductive.
XII. Observations and conclusions
A. Somalia
441. Al-Shabaab's resilience, despite its lack of popular
support and the chronic divisions within its leadership, is
principally due to the weakness of the Transitional Federal
Government, and the latter's failure to broaden its
political appeal or share power with other de facto
political and military forces in the country.
442. The endemic corruption of the leadership of the
transitional federal institutions � and the conflicts it
engenders between Transitional Federal Government officials
over power and access to resources � is the greatest
impediment to the emergence of a cohesive transitional
authority and effective State institutions. By extension,
corruption is arguably also the single greatest obstacle to
the defeat of Al-Shabaab and its foreign affiliates in
Somalia.
443. Corruption in the transitional federal institutions not
only prevents consolidation of the security forces. It also
corrodes political cohesion at the top, precludes genuine
power-sharing with non-Transitional Federal Government
authorities (such as Puntland, Galmuduug and ASWJ), and
diverts ministers and other senior figures away from their
official functions into the pursuit of lucrative commercial
opportunities and aid projects. As a result the Government's
operating budget is far below actual income, civil service
salaries go unpaid, soldiers defect to the opposition or
become pirates and ammunition is sold to the opposition.
444. Perhaps more importantly, it means that trade, and the
vital revenues that it generates, is channelled to AlShabaab
-controlled areas, which offer a more disciplined,
predictable and profitable environment for Somali commerce.
In a very real sense, Al-Shabaab is becoming a business: a
network of mutually supportive interests in Somalia, Kenya,
the Middle East, and even further afield. Even businessmen
who are not ideologically aligned with Al-Shabaab have
little incentive to see the Islamists displaced by a
predatory and corrupt Transitional Federal Government. To
the extent that members of the business community also exert
influence over political and military dynamics within their
clans, it is unsurprising that the Government lacks any
significant domestic base of support.
445. Unless steps are taken to alter this equation, the
anticipated reorganization of the transitional federal
institutions in August 2011 is unlikely to produce an
authority capable of expanding Government authority or
regaining the initiative from Al-Shabaab on the battlefield.
The Monitoring Group therefore recommends, in section XIII
below, a number of measures intended both to curb the
corrosive influence and practices of the Transitional
Federal Government's internal spoilers and to discourage the
business community from colluding with Al-Shabaab in its
efforts to seize power through dominance of the Somali
economy.
XIII. Recommendations
A. Somalia
Threats to peace and security
448. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions
751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea
should proceed without further delay to designate additional
individuals and entities proposed by the Monitoring Group or
Member States for targeted measures under Security Council
resolution 1844 (2008) and/or resolution 1907 (2009);
(b) In line with Security Council resolution 1844 (2008),
paragraph 8 (a), individuals and entities that threaten to
destabilize stable areas, to militarize political or social
conflicts or to incite inter-communal violence should be
considered subject to targeted measures, together with their
financiers, facilitators and active supporters;
(c) Any member of the transitional federal institutions
whose actions threaten the political process or undermine
the cohesion of the Transitional Federal Government or its
security forces, or otherwise detract from the Transitional
Federal Government's capacity to fulfil its mandate, should
be considered subject to designation by the Committee for
targeted measures;
(d) The Government of Kenya, in cooperation with community
leaders and civil society organizations, should urgently
consider measures to curb the radicalization, recruitment
and resource mobilization by Al-Shabaab affiliates and
sympathizers in Kenya;
(e) The Government of Kenya consider establishing
rehabilitation centres for returning Kenyan fighters from
Somalia and offering amnesty to any who agree to attend
them.
Al-Shabaab finances
449. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Security Council and the Committee should consider
all non-local commerce via Al-Shabaab-controlled ports to
constitute financial support for a designated entity,
rendering individuals and entities engaged in such commerce
subject to targeted measures;
(b) The Transitional Federal Government should officially
ban all trade by large merchant vessels with Al-Shabaabcontrolled
ports, notably Kismaayo, Marka and Baraawe, and
seek the cooperation of neighbouring States, especially the
United Arab Emirates, as well as States with naval assets in
the Indian Ocean, in enforcing the ban;
(c) The Transitional Federal Government should require all
merchant vessels calling at the port of Mogadishu to fully
discharge all of their cargo and seek the assistance of
AMISOM in monitoring and enforcing this edict;
(d) The Government of the United Arab Emirates, and
especially the authorities in Dubai and Sharjah, should
consider enforcing more stringent measures on dhows
conducting trade with Somalia, especially to verify
conformity of their cargoes with their custom declarations
and/or cargo manifests;
(e) The Gulf Cooperation Council and/or its Member States
should consider imposing a ban on all charcoal imports from
Somalia;
(f) The Transitional Federal Government, and specifically
the Mogadishu Port Authority, should review the rates at
which it imposes taxes and duties on imports, in order to
discourage illicit trade with Kismaayo;
(g) The Transitional Federal Government and other Somali
authorities should introduce, in consultation with
knowledgeable international partners, a legislative
framework for the telecommunications, banking and money
transfer sectors, requiring greater diligence and
transparency (i.e. comprehensive "know your customer"
polices).
...
Arms embargo
451. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
(a) The Security Council should consider clarifying whether
the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia should
apply to Somali territorial waters (12 nautical miles) or
the Somali exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles);
(b) The Security Council should consider requiring all
Member States and international organizations that come into
the possession of weapons, ammunition or military material
on Somali territory, or which are destined for Somalia, or
which have originated in Somalia, to record the identifying
characteristics of those items and communicate them to the
Monitoring Group in accordance with paragraph 6 of Council
resolution 1425 (2002);
(c) The Security Council, NATO, the European Union and
Member States engaged in counter-piracy operations in the
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean should expand the mandates
of those naval forces to enforce the arms embargoes on
Somalia and Eritrea through boarding and inspection of
suspicious vessels;
(d) The Secretary-General, through his Special
Representative, should consider introducing a security
sector programme to assist Somali authorities to:
- Maintain inventories of all of weapons in their possession
- Record the issuance of arms and ammunition to their forces
and monitor their use
- Securely store all arms and ammunition, including those
seized from non-State armed groups and actors
(e) Any support to security sector institutions should
include a component dedicated to security sector governance,
including systems of payment, to enhance transparency,
discipline and accountability while curbing corruption and
the leakage of arms and ammunition to local markets or armed
opposition groups. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance
452. The Monitoring Group recommends that:
...
(c) Donor Governments, whose current regulations potentially
restrict operations in Al-Shabaab-held areas, should engage
with the United Nations system, international humanitarian
organizations as well as international and local
nongovernmental organizations to develop clear operational
guidelines for the implementation of those measures, and
periodically revise them, taking into consideration both the
level of humanitarian need and the perspectives of those
entities with operational experience on the ground;
...
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic
publication providing reposted commentary and analysis on
African issues, with a particular focus on U.S. and
international policies. AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by
William Minter.
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