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Sudan: New Violence, Uncertain Future
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Jun 22, 2011 (110622)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
"The remainder of [Sudan] remains saddled with the 'Sudan
Problem', where power, resources and development continue to be
overly concentrated in the centre, at the expense of and to the
exasperation of the peripheries. A 'new south' is emerging in
the hitherto transitional areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile that -- along with Darfur, the East and other marginal
areas -- continues to chafe under the domination of the NCP.
Unless their grievances are addressed by a more inclusive
government, Sudan risks more violence and disintegration." -
International Crisis Group
In the last two months, fighting in the disputed border region
of Abyei and in South Kordofan province of North Sudan, where
the Nuba Mountains are located, has produced an unknown number
of casualties and, according to United Nations estimates,
displaced some 113,000 people in Abyei and over 60,000 in South
Kordofan. Reports indicate that while there have been some
instances of provocation by Southern forces, the overwhelming
responsibility for the use of extreme force against civilians
has been on the part of Northern Sudanese troops and militia. In
South Kordofan, the hard-line governor was previously
responsible for similar actions in Darfur, and is under
indictment by the International Criminal Court.
With news this week of an African Union agreement for Ethiopian
troops to separate the parties in Abyei (see
http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/sud1106b.php), and the South's
reluctance to return to war only weeks before its scheduled
independence, it may be that a ceasefire can be established in
South Kordofan as well, albeit at the price of high levels of
human suffering that has already taken place. Both the
international community and South Sudan are focusing on
preventing a return to all-out war before the scheduled
independence data of July 9. But past experience indicates the
high probability of an even greater toll from the scorched earth
policies of the Khartoum regime, with consequences similar to
those in Darfur. The people of the Nuba Mountains, whose status
was left undetermined by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, may
well be the principal casualties.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains links to additional sources
for commentary on the current crisis, but the material included
in the Bulletin, excerpts of analyses from commentator Ahmed
Hussain Adam and from a recent report by the International
Crisis Group, focuses instead on the issues posed for the Sudan
as a whole. The fundamental issue of a highly centralized and
undemocratic regime, dedicated to suppressing the rights of
marginalized and peripheral populations, will not be resolved by
the independence of the largest such region as South Sudan. The
same dynamics of inequality, lack of representation, and brutal
violence to repress revolt are present and likely to revive even
if temporarily suppressed, with the truncated state of North
Sudan.
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin released today, not sent out by email
but available on the web at
http://www.africafocus.org/docs11/sud1106b.php, contains the
full text of the United Nations summary of the UN Security
Council meeting on Sudan of June 20, 2001. This includes the
briefing by African Union mediator Thabo Mbeki and by Haile
Menkerios, the Secretary-General's Special Representative to
Sudan, as well as of comments made during the debate.
Despite the limitations of diplomatic language, the summary
gives a good sense of the approach being taken by the African
Union, the United Nations, and the "international community"
more generally to the current crisis.
Additional useful sources with additional commentary as well as
background on the current crisis, include:
(1) Recent Human Rights Watch reports and statements
http://www.hrw.org/africa/sudan
(2) Articles by Julie Flint on the situation in the Nuba
Mountains
June 18, 2011 in The Guardian (http://tinyurl.com/3t3ewcy)
June 21, 2011 in the Daily Star (http://tinyurl.com/3kt3bo7)
(3) Samuel Totten, "Fear Pervades Nuba Mountains that Sudan
Government Intent on Genocide," June 11, 2011
http://tinyurl.com/3mqfy9z
(4) Critique of U.S. response by the Enough Project
Sudan: Obama Overstates Role of 'Both Sides' in Conflict
Enough Project Blog, June 16, 2011
http://enoughproject.org / direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/65b34kd
For ongoing updates on the humanitarian situation as well as
news, commentary and analysis on the broader context of conflict
in Sudan, see http://www.sudantribune.com and Relief Web's Sudan
page at http://reliefweb.int/taxonomy/term/220
++++++++++++++++++++++end editor's note+++++++++++++++++
Sudan: The depth of the crises and the scenarios of regime
change
By Ahmed Hussain Adam
Sudan Tribune
http://www.sudantribune.com
[Article also available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/201106201327.html]
The author is a Visiting Scholar at Columbia University,
Institute for Human Rights, New York, can be reached at:
[email protected] or [email protected]
[Ahmed Hussain Adam was formerly spokesperson for the Justice
and Equality Movement in Darfur.]
June 19, 2011 -- Change is a universal phenomenon; it is coming
to Sudan. The question is; how, when and who is going to lead
and manage the forthcoming change in Sudan? The conditions in
Sudan are ripe for change. The political, economic, social and
security situation is deteriorating, day by day. For example,
when the South Sudan officially declares its independence, the
budget of the North Sudan will lose more than 70 percent of its
revenue. Such fiscal crisis will implode the economic growth in
the North Sudan, and make possible a popular uprising against
the regime in Khartoum.
There are certain ingredients that set the stage for change. The
first ingredient is the corruption of the inner circles of the
regime, including Al Bashir's family, which has become a central
issue of the youth in the ruling party and the public as well.
The family misappropriated public funds for private gains and
they have become as notorious as Al Trabulsy family in Tunisia.
It is no surprise; the government of Sudan is now in the top
list of the most corrupt country in the world, according to the
recent index of Transparency International.
The second ingredient, the separation of the South, has created
a political and constitutional vacuum. In this respect, there
are many fundamental questions that needed to be answered, such
as: will this political and constitutional new reality, which
resulted from the separation of the South, open a new window of
opportunity for the restructure of the rest of Sudan? Will the
peoples of the remaining Sudan succeed in establishing a new,
democratic, free and just Sudan? Sadly, the regime is still
stubborn about opening serious national political dialogue to
address any of these unprecedented challenges. In fact, the
ruling clique is exploiting this constitutional and political
vacuum to tighten its grip on power and starting a new era of a
fascism, and racism in context of cultural superiority.
The third ingredient, the division among the ruling clique has
become obvious. This month Shura (consultative) Council of the
ruling (NCP) marked a new phase of divisions and power-struggle
between Al Bashir and Nafie Ali Nafie on the one hand, and ALi
Osman Taha, the Vice President, and his group on the other.
Certainly, Taha was the real loser of the NCP Shura Council
meeting. This division is not based on any philosophical issues,
but it is merely a personality conflict and political
opportunism. Moreover, beneath the surface, is a manifestation
of tribal animosity and power mongering. Given their narrow
racial, ideological agendas and fanaticism; a confrontation is
inevitable.
The forth ingredient for change is, the current ethnic cleansing
in the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and the ongoing genocide in Darfur
which has been orchestrated by Al Bashir, it is further evidence
of the war for survival led by Al Bashir and his ruling clique.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is in the heart of this
battle; Al Bashir is spreading terror and violence everywhere in
Sudan, to use it as bargaining chip in his personal battle with
the ICC. Al Bashir is now fighting his last battle of survival;
the international community should not bail him out of his self
inflicted wounds. No bad behaviour shall be rewarded, that is a
message Al Bashir needs to hear from the free world.
The last ingredient, the regional news and the popular sentiment
is for change, resulting in overthrow all of despotic regimes.
Al Basher is receiving dismal news from Libya, Yemen and Syria;
his fellow dictators are losing legitimacy and power to the prodemocratic
change masses. The slogan of the hour is: it is time
for twins Al Bashir of Sudan and Bashar of Syria to go. When
Abdelaziz Al Hillu called for regime change, it was resonate
well to the other political forces in the country. It is music
to the ear of any freedom fighter; soon the signals of freedom
will vibrate through the walls of tyranny.
Thus, the crises in Sudan are even more horrendous than the
crises that have led to the revolutionary changes in some Middle
Eastern countries. Undeniably, the Sudanese people have proven
in the past 60 years that they can lead democratic change
against dictatorship. Again the history is calling on the people
of Sudan to reclaim the promise of their ancestors and rise up
one more time to save the country from the war mongers and the
bigots. The people of Sudan did it in October 1964 and in April
1985, they will do it again.
The Possible Scenarios of Change in Sudan:
This section will explore four possible scenarios of change in
Sudan.
First Scenario
Scenario one suggests that, the forces from the marginalised
majority of Sudan may attempt to change the regime in Khartoum
by force. The crisis in Darfur and in South Kurdofan could
develop into an agenda of regime change by the forces and
peoples of marginalized regions. Certainly, there is a common
ground, shared history of struggle and aspirations among all the
peoples of the marginalised regions of Sudan. This common trait
could help them to unite and organise their efforts to break the
national deadlock and attempt changing the regime militarily.
However, the challenge before the movements from the
marginalised regions of Sudan is to develop an inclusive
political program to bring the peoples of the north, including
the traditional political parties and civil society in the
North, on board. It is imperative that the marginalized forces
to be inclusive and accommodate the Riverains of the North. They
have to be convinced that, they are part of the change, and they
aren't the target. Any promise of change should be based on a
detailed and comprehensive political program which could
transform the country to a new dawn, based on democratic system
of government that enshrines human dignity, respect for the rule
of law, and equality of opportunity for all. In this context, we
are sensing the opportunity for change. The discussion has
already started among the marginalized forces at some level to
join efforts which could lead for a forging of a broad base
political alliance for change.
Second Scenario:
The current National deadlock in Sudan can be broken by a
popular uprising, similar to the two previous Sudanese uprisings
which occurred in October 1964 and April 1985. Furthermore, the
Sudanese people in the North are also looking with admiration
and hope to the two successful uprisings which took place
recently in Tunisia and Egypt. The revolutionary atmosphere in
the Middle East could inspire and provide the necessary momentum
for the youth, pro-democracy activists and masses in Sudan, to
repeat history and launch their own model of revolution against
the regime in Khartoum. It is true that the hardliners of the
regime have been threatening; to crush any move dares to
challenge them. Such threats will never halt the struggle and
the march for democracy, peace and freedom.
One of the main concerns, however, in this respect is the nature
of the possible position of the Sudanese Army. In the previous
uprisings in particular, during the April uprising in 1985, the
army sided with the people against former President Nimeri.
Today, however, the army is no longer what it used to be, "a
traditional and national army".
The current top ranks of the Army are based on one or two tribal
and ethnic affiliation. It has been evident that, since the 1989
Coup, there have been more than 42 groups of the Islamist and
predominantly northern officers who were graduated from the
Military College. These officers managed to transform the
national military institution to become unprofessional and
racist to its core. It is worth stating that, hundreds of
officers and thousands of soldiers from the marginalised regions
were dismissed from the army recently. The aim of the regime has
been to maintain the domination of the ruling racial group from
the North. Hence, to whom this army resets its loyalty and
support in a time of change is unclear. Is it going to side with
Al Bashir? Or is the army going to stand up for its' own
interests and the interests of the people? It is also important
to differentiate between the high ranking officers of the army
who are for many reasons closer to the political leadership, and
the mid and low ranking officers who are not necessarily
supporting the regime's political leadership.
Third Scenario:
This scenario suggests that change can be realised from within
the regime. It is obvious that, since the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, there has been
undeclared division within the regime, there are two camps: one
camp is under the leadership of Al Bashir and the other is under
the leadership of Taha, the Vice President. In the recent
convention of the NCP Shura Council, Taha was openly criticised
by the hardliners for the problems created by the CPA and for
making too much concessions to the SPLM. This convention marked
a new era of division within the NCP; Taha lost the battle to
Nafie, the later is now the strong man of the regime and has Al
Basher's ear.
Some optimists suggest that the current power-struggle within
the regime, could lead for a change from within. However, the
current internal power-struggle within the regime isn't about
real reform with an agenda of genuine change; it is over power,
wealth and manipulation. This scenario has very limited chances
of success, because the hardliners such as Nafie and AL Bashir's
are in full control of the regime's power structure, including
the security forces and militias.
...
Therefore, it isn't likely that there will be a change from
within the regime, however the regime's power-struggle could
weaken it, and consequently, help the masses, the armed and
civil opposition to over-throw it and realise the democratic
change in the North.
Fourth Scenario:
Peaceful and democratic change can be realised through an
inclusive, political and constitutional conference. Such
conference should address the Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile
Conflicts. There is also a need for advancing concrete measures
for writing a new democratic constitution, the basis for the
future peaceful relations between the South and North as well as
the practical steps towards a new democratic transition in
Sudan. However, this proposed conference can only be
successfully convened inside the Country, when the ruling party
concedes to allow a smooth transition for the Country.
Otherwise, it should be convened outside the Country. The
International community can play a constructive role in
facilitating such a conference. The peoples of Sudan as well as
the international community have a real interest in peaceful
democratic change in Sudan.
To conclude, there is undisputed fact that, Sudan is on the
brink of failure as nation state. Hence, the people of Sudan are
in an urgent need to launch a real, democratic and peaceful
change before it is too late. It is evident that under the
current regime, Sudan will descend into state of total war or
more disintegration. The current regime has no constructive
vision and strategy. It is a known fact; the extremist ruling
clique is very frightened of losing power, as they aren't
courageous enough to face the people, or justice for the crime
they have committed in Darfur and elsewhere. They are fighting
for their survival, by unleashing chaos and terror everywhere in
the country. They are using the entire people of Sudan as human
shields. No doubt, the regime is sending a message: the people
of Sudan must choose between the regime continuing in power,
else they unleash anarchy and total war. Thus, it is clear that,
if this regime continues in power, Sudan would never enjoy
peace, democracy and stability. This regime will never allow any
strategic relationship with a new nation in the South to
flourish; instead it will continue its destabilisation strategy
and war by proxy in the South.
There are many scenarios of change in Sudan; however, one would
advocate the peaceful and democratic scenario of change. This
scenario is still possible under a broad democratic alliance
which includes all the peoples and democratic forces from east,
west north, and the centre. Of course the forceful change by the
marginalized forces is viable alternative, if the peaceful
change is not materialized. History can repeat itself; Sudan
isn't an exception in this wave of democratic change in the
region.
Divisions in Sudan's Ruling Party and the Threat to the
Country's Stability
Africa Report No. 174 4 May 2011
Executive Summary
http://www.crisisgroup.org / direct URL:
http://tinyurl.com/3devjtd
When the South officially secedes, on 9 July 2011, the North's
problems will change little. The National Congress Party (NCP)
has not addressed the root causes of Sudan's chronic conflicts
and has exacerbated ethnic and regional divisions. Facing
multiple security, political, social and economic challenges, it
is deeply divided over the way forward. Its security hardliners
see these as minor issues, not imminent threats to their
survival, and remain committed to a military solution to chronic
instability. Others call for internal party reform -- a "second
republic" -- to address the NCP's problems but are giving little
thought to resolving those of the country. The party has
mobilised its security apparatus to suppress any revolts, has
decided to end the debate about Sudan's diversity and identity,
remains committed to an Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese
and keeping Sharia and is ready to sub-divide key states to
accommodate political barons. These are ad-hoc decisions that
set the stage for continued violence that may not be containable
and could lead to further fragmentation of the country.
Power is now increasingly centralised in a small clique around
President Bashir. However, this centralisation is not reflected
in the armed forces. Concerned about a possible coup, he and
close associates have fragmented the security services and have
come to rely increasingly on personal loyalty and tribal
allegiances to remain in power. Meanwhile, their party has been
allowed to flounder, having long ago lost its strategic vision
and policy coherence. Deeply divided and more concerned with
staying in power, the leadership more often reacts to events
rather than implements a well-thought-out national program. This
is best illustrated by the protracted, very public dispute
between Nafie Ali Nafie (NCP deputy chairman for organisational
affairs and presidential adviser) and Ali Osman Taha (second
vice president of Sudan) and the wildly diverging statements
made by party leaders in the run-up to the South's selfdetermination
referendum. The recent dismissal from his posts of
the formerly powerful Salah Gosh reflects divisions within the
NCP that have the potential to lead to the party's collapse or a
coup.
Bashir, Nafie and the security hardliners have concluded that
the opposition parties are very weak and reject their call for a
more inclusive constitutional conference to draft a permanent
constitution after the South secedes in July. They think they
have the situation in Darfur under control and discount the
possibility of conflict in the transitional areas of Southern
Kordofan and the Blue Nile, believing that those regions are
divided, and their military forces are not an imminent threat to
Khartoum now that the South is focused on other issues. They
continue to pursue divide and rule tactics to prevent the
emergence of a unified counterweight to NCP dominance of the
centre. Taha and more pragmatic allies are willing to negotiate
with other political forces but are undermined by the security
hardliners. They also seemingly remain committed to the party's
goal of imposing an Arab-Islamic identify on all of what remains
of Sudan -- an extremely divisive issue in a country that still
includes hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups.
In the absence of accountability, the leadership enjoys absolute
freedom and has institutionalised corruption to its benefit, in
the process rewarding political barons who can deliver their
constituencies by giving them lucrative government positions to
maintain their loyalty. The governors of each state run their
own patronage network within their respective regions.
Despite the seemingly successful conclusion of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the accord has failed to
resolve the issues that drive chronic conflict in Sudan. It was
intended to lead to the "democratic transformation" of the
country. However, during its six year interim period (to end
formally in July), the NCP resisted meaningful implementation of
many provisions, because they would seriously threaten its grip
on power. The opportunity to maintain Sudan's unity and to
establish a stable, democratic state was lost. Not surprisingly,
Southerners chose separation when they voted in January 2011.
The remainder of the country thus remains saddled with the
"Sudan Problem", where power, resources and development continue
to be overly concentrated in the centre, at the expense of and
to the exasperation of the peripheries. A "new south" is
emerging in the hitherto transitional areas of Abyei, Southern
Kordofan and Blue Nile that -- along with Darfur, the East and
other marginal areas -- continues to chafe under the domination
of the NCP. Unless their grievances are addressed by a more
inclusive government, Sudan risks more violence and
disintegration.
The call by the opposition parties for a wider constitutional
review conference suggests a way forward. Such a conference
should be seen as a more extensive national consultative
process, to accommodate the popular consultations in the
transitional areas and the Darfur people-to-people dialogue.
Those latter two processes, if run separately, will not lead to
political stability and lasting peace in the whole country. The
cardinal issue of governance must be addressed nationally. To
encourage this, a united international community, particularly
the African Union (AU), Arab League and the UN, should put
pressure on the NCP to accept a free and unhindered national
dialogue to create a national stabilisation program that
includes defined principles for establishing an inclusive
constitutional arrangement accepted by all.
Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 4 May 2011
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
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with a particular focus on U.S. and international policies.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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