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Zimbabwe: Public Opinion Report
AfricaFocus Bulletin
Jan 26, 2011 (110126)
(Reposted from sources cited below)
Editor's Note
No one knows whether there will be an election in Zimbabwe this
year, or under what conditions. But public opinion polls show that
the majority of Zimbabweans are convinced elections should take
place, even though they also feared they would be victims of
election violence, and are increasingly reluctant to tell pollsters
for whom they might vote. While in May 2009 64 percent felt free to
choose who to vote for, only 47 percent expressed such confidence
in October 2010, a 17-point decline.
This AfricaFocus Bulletin contains excerpts from a new report by
Afrobarometer on a national poll taken in late October 2010, noting
the current state of opinion and changes since previous polls.
Another AfricaFocus Bulletin sent out today contains statements by
the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition and the Zimbabwe Electoral Support
Network (ZESN), on the conditions needed to ensure free and fair
elections, and the executive summary of a new report from ZESN on
the state of the electoral roll.
For previous AfricaFocus issues on Zimbabwe, visit
http://www.africafocus.org/country/zimbabwe.php
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Zimbabwe: The Evolving Public Mood
Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 97
December 2010
[excerpts. Full report with tables and graphs available at
http://www.afrobarometer.org]
Introduction
At the end of 2010, Zimbabwean citizens remained broadly supportive
of power sharing as an antidote to political crisis. But they were
increasingly critical of the halting performance of their country's
coalition government. Most people also perceived declining civil
liberties and feared resurgent political violence. Yet clear
majorities called for constitutional reforms to limit the powers of
the presidency and seemingly even for free elections in 2011 to
return the country to legitimate rule.
These are the major findings of an Afrobarometer survey conducted
among a national cross- section of the Zimbabwean adults in late
October 2010.
Context
Following a disputed presidential election in June 2008, the former
ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
(ZANU-PF) entered a power-sharing pact with two wings of the
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September. A Global
Political Agreement (GPA) established an Inclusive Government (IG)
in February 2009 with Robert Mugabe as President and Morgan
Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. In practice, the IG has implemented
few of the major provisions of the GPA, in large part because
Mugabe and ZANUPF have been unwilling to surrender a meaningful
share of executive and military power. By October 2010, the
government was essentially stalemated. With a public outreach
program on constitutional reform marred by violence, with security
forces and ZANU-PF militias redeployed around the country, and with
both sides calling for fresh elections, the country risked relapse
into another dangerous period of political instability.
Afrobarometer
The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude
surveys on democracy, governance and living conditions in Africa.
Each national survey - now conducted in 20 African countries - is
based on a randomly selected national probability sample of at
least 1200 respondents representing a cross-section of adults of
voting age. A sample of this size yields a margin of sampling error
of �3.0 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. All interviews
are conducted face-to-face by trained fieldworkers in the language
of the respondent's choice.
The Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI), the Afrobarometer partner
in Zimbabwe, conducted fieldwork for the present survey in all ten
provinces of the country on 16-29 October, 2010. It was the latest
in a series of Afrobarometer surveys in Zimbabwe, with previous
studies conducted in 1999, 2002, 2005, and May 2009. For the
purposes of tracking trends in public opinion since the formation
of the Inclusive Government, this report adds data from a survey
sponsored by Freedom House and conducted by MPOI in September 2009
that contained many Afrobarometer and country-specific tracking
items.
Reflecting a worsening security situation in parts of rural
Zimbabwe, the target sample in the October 2010 survey fell short
by eight interviews (N=1192). Intimidation by ZANU-PF militias
forced the fieldwork team to withdraw prematurely from a primary
sampling area in Mashonaland Central Province. Since the data from
have been weighted to correct for this anomaly, we are confident
that the results reliably represent a cross-section of the
political opinions of Zimbabwean adults at the time of the survey.
Power Sharing: Popular But Failing
As of October 2010, Zimbabweans continued to place confidence in
power sharing as a mode of governance. Some 72 percent agreed that
"creating an Inclusive Government was the best way to resolve the
recent post-election crisis." This level of popular endorsement
represents an increase over time because only 66 percent felt the
same way in May 2009. By contrast, just 21 percent in the latest
survey regard power sharing as ineffective, believing that "leaders
should have found another way to resolve the crisis."
At the same time, however, a plurality of citizens in Zimbabwe also
regards power sharing as a compromise that falls short of their
preferred method of choosing a government. More than four out of
ten (42 percent) see it as "a second-best solution, to be used only
when elections fail," a figure that held steady over the previous
year. The rest of the electorate is divided, with one quarter (25
percent) seeing power sharing as "a good alternative to competitive
elections, which rarely work well" and another quarter (26 percent)
as "a bad alternative that should never replace competitive
elections."
Moreover, popular evaluations of the IG's performance, while
positive, are in decline. The honeymoon in public opinion following
the introduction of coalition government in February 2009 is over.
Whereas in May 2009, fully 87 percent judged that the IG was
performing "well" or "very well," some 66 percent offered the same
overall assessment by October 2010. Despite a 21-point drop in
perceived performance, it is noteworthy that two out three
Zimbabweans still thought that the IG was doing a good job. We
infer that they are comparing the IG's tenure to the crisis
conditions that prevailed in 2008 and which they worry could recur.
The reasons that confidence in the coalition government is slipping
include leadership struggles and policy deadlock. ...
Political Liberties: A Perceived Decline
These features and trends in public opinion are unfolding in an
environment of recurrent political threats. In October 2010, seven
out of ten Zimbabweans (71 percent) said that, "during election
campaigns in this country," they feared "becoming a victim of
political intimidation or violence."
As a result, and compared to the early days of the IG, when
majorities said they felt at liberty to speak, associate and vote,
only minorities of Zimbabweans express a sense of enjoying these
freedoms today. Instead, confidence in democratic liberties is
being gradually replaced by a resurgence of political fear.
For example, just over one half (51 percent) said they were
"somewhat" or "completely" free to "say what you think" in May
2009, shortly after the IG took office. In the atmosphere of
October 2010, however, when agents of the old party-state were
again engaging in intimidation, only one third (32 percent) held
the same opinion. Looking at the same coin from the other side,
some 67 percent of Zimbabweans do not currently feel free to speak
their minds. This proportion closely matches the 65 percent who
felt that people "always" have to be "careful what you say about
politics" in October 2005, when ZANU-PF held a much larger share of
power.
People also perceive declining opportunities to openly engage in
political action. Whereas 52 percent felt free to "join any
political organization you want" in May 2009, only 41 percent
continued to feel this way by October 2010, an 11-point decline.
And whereas 64 percent felt free to choose who to vote for in May
2009, only 47 percent expressed such confidence in October 2010, a
larger 17-point decline. The fact that belief in the availability
of civil and political rights is now a minority sentiment in
Zimbabwe does not augur well for the quality of any upcoming
constitutional referendum or general election.
Constitutional Reform: Learning About Reform
The largest recent change in public opinion concerns popular
awareness of the constitutional reform process. In September 2009
Freedom House survey, before a parliamentary committee on
constitutional reform (COPAC) had begun a program of public
outreach, just 40 percent of Zimbabweans said they had "ever heard
of the Constitution of Zimbabwe." Within one short year, however,
this figure had almost doubled to a far more respectable 75
percent. The change was due not only to COPAC's effort to involve
citizens in the constitution-making process, but probably also to
a heavy-handed campaign against meaningful change in the legal
framework conducted by ZANU-PF cadres, mainly in rural areas.
...
On balance, respondents gave the IG more positive than negative
marks for its role in the constitutional outreach exercise, though
many admitted to not having heard enough to have an opinion. For
example, 38 percent thought the IG performed well at publicizing
discussions within the government about the constitution; 29
percent thought it performed badly; and 22 percent said that they
didn't know. The IG was held to have done even better at educating
citizens about the issues at stake in constitutional reform (41
percent) and asking ordinary people what they would like to see in
a national constitution (42 percent).
The September 2009 survey provides insight into popular preferences
about the content of a constitution. At that time, large majorities
called for:
- Applying the law to every Zimbabwean, including senior public
officials (86 percent)
- Ensuring all members of the House of Assembly are elected, not
appointed (84 percent)
- Establishing courts that are independent of the executive branch
(80 percent)
- Limiting the president to two terms in office (78 percent)
- Protecting the rights of individuals to freely express political
views (77 percent)
- Ending unlawful detention (74 percent)
- Providing for the independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral
Commission (73 percent)
- Protecting the rights of property owners against illegal seizure
(72 percent)
- Restricting chiefs to roles in local government only, not central
government (64 percent).
This survey evidence suggests that Zimbabweans clearly prefer to
reform the national constitution than to stick with the legal
status quo. Most recently, in October 2010, 41 percent of all
adults who had heard of Zimbabwe's constitution wished to
completely abandon the current document (i.e. the so-called
Lancaster House constitution, amended 19 times since independence).
A similar proportion (40 percent) called for amendments. Only 12
percent insisted that the current constitution be retained without
further changes. This small minority, however, represents a
doubling of those who prefer the status quo since September 2009 (6
percent), probably as a result of ZANU-PF's 2010 campaign for the
retention of a charter featuring an all-powerful presidency.
Elections: Apprehensively Desired
As noted earlier, Zimbabweans prefer open elections - which involve
mass participation and party competition - to elite deals to share
power. This popular commitment is confirmed by the 86 percent who
agree that "we should choose our leaders in this country through
regular, open, and honest elections" as opposed to "some other
method." Support among Zimbabweans for competitive elections is
among the highest recorded among the 20 African countries covered
by the Afrobarometer and is exceeded only in Liberia (88 percent)
and Botswana (89 percent). Such support is also growing over time,
having risen from 80 percent in May 2009. But does this mean that
Zimbabweans are ready for elections in 2011? How firm are popular
commitments to competitive elections if these events threaten to
stir up political violence?
In perhaps the most striking finding in the October 2010
Afrobarometer survey, 70 percent of adult Zimbabweans answered
"yes" to a question that asked: "Do you think that Zimbabwe should
hold elections next year, that is, in 2011?" Relatively few people
favored deferring elections to a later date such as 2012 (6
percent), 2013 (3 percent), or later, including never (14 percent).
That seven in ten would-be voters are anxious to freely elect
leaders of their choice, even in an atmosphere where security
forces and party militias are again on the move, is testament to
the impressive depth of Zimbabweans' commitments to political
rights.
At the same time, caution may be warranted about this result. In an
Alpha Media survey conducted by MPOI in August 2010 (N=1000),
slightly fewer people (60 percent) answered "yes" to the question
about whether elections should be held in 2011. Moreover, just 36
percent said "yes" to a more ambiguous question: "In your view, is
Zimbabwe ready for elections today?" It is unclear whether
respondents were referring to their own personal readiness or the
preparedness of institutions such as the electoral commission (see
below). Either way, one might expect people to feel torn about the
prospect of elections since their strong commitments to political
rights may be offset by vivid memories of past electoral violence.
To be sure, there is broad apprehension about the quality of any
forthcoming vote. Unlike in September 2009, when a slim majority
(52 percent) was optimistic that the next election would be
adequately free and fair, only a minority (46 percent) was
similarly hopeful by October 2010. A strong predictor of the
quality of the next election is the way individuals assess the
quality of the disputed June 2008 presidential contest from which
Robert Mugabe grabbed a pyrrhic victory. Those people who regard
that election as being less than free and fair are prone to expect
the same in the next election.
What can be done to guarantee the quality of the upcoming vote?
Asked to choose the "single most important thing that could be done
to ensure that the next elections are free and fair," Zimbabweans
listed the following:
- End violence, maintain peace (24 percent)
- Employ international and domestic observers or peacekeepers (17
percent)
- Ensure clean voting, prevent rigging (10 percent)
- Reform the constitution (9 percent)
- Guarantee civil and political liberties (7 percent)
- Provide a level electoral playing field for all parties (5
percent)
- Don't know (10 percent)
As for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), more people find it
"unprepared" than ready to run the next election (38 versus 28
percent). But one third of the electorate (34 percent), especially
rural dwellers, have not heard enough about the ZEC to hold an
opinion on this subject.
Party Preferences: Growing Reluctance to Say
The Afrobarometer has tracked the partisan preferences of
Zimbabweans since 1999. Earlier surveys have documented a general
trend of declining popular support for ZANU-PF and a gradually
rising mass preference for MDC-Tsvangirai. But the trend has
occasionally been interrupted by periods of temporary resurgence in
stated loyalties to ZANU-PF, for example, around the time of the
2005 parliamentary elections, when the MDC lost seats in the House
of Assembly.
Here we report expressed party preferences for the period of the
Inclusive Government, 2009-2010. The question takes the following
form: "If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's
candidate would you vote for?" In May 2009, 57 percent stated an
intention to vote for MDC-T, falling to 55 percent in September
2009 and 36 percent in October 2010. The parallel tallies for
ZANU-PF were 10 percent in May 2009, 11 percent in September 2009
and 18 percent in October 2010.
It is worth noting in passing that Zimbabwean elections have turned
into a two-party race. In the last three surveys, including in
October 2010, no minor party - including MDC-Mutambara,
Movambo-Kusile-Dawn (MKD) led by Simba Makoni, and the revived
Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of
Dumiso Dabengwa - has ever garnered more than one percent of the
intended vote.
Most important, however, the proportion of the electorate unwilling
to reveal a partisan preference has increased dramatically. Over
the 18-month period from May 2009 to October 2010 the share of
respondents who insisted on the secrecy of the ballot and refused
to say for whom they would vote rose from one quarter (25 percent)
to one third (32 percent). In addition, the proportion who said
they would not vote also rose (from 4 to 7 percent) as did the
share of those who said "don't know" (from 4 to 5 percent). All
told, therefore, the partisan preferences of fully 44 percent of
the Zimbabwean electorate are today unknown, mainly because people
are increasingly reluctant to reveal these affiliations to survey
researchers.
Under such circumstances, we insist that the present data should
not be used to make predictions about any forthcoming election,
especially one whose date has yet to be announced. At this early
moment, and with almost half of all adults holding their voting
intentions close to their chests, there is simply no empirical
basis for any such speculation.
Instead, activists across the political spectrum will interpret the
data to their own partisan advantage. Proponents of ZANU-PF may be
tempted to see early evidence of their party's resurgence, perhaps
bolstered by an electoral and military war chest extracted from
newly exploited diamond fields. Adherents of MDC-T will have cause
to wonder whether the party's strategy of building political
support via service delivery is enough to guarantee an absolute
electoral majority in the absence of a parallel effort to rebuild
the party's grassroots organization.
We offer a more neutral interpretation here by noting the
connection between declining political liberties and an
individual's natural tendency to protect the secrecy of his or her
vote. Given the precedent of violent elections in the past, and
ZANU-PF's daily threats of civil war if their party loses the next
election, it is entirely understandable that people should conceal
their voting intentions. As evidence, we note the correlation
between a person's perception that they lack a choice of "who to
vote for without feeling pressured" and their refusal to reveal a
partisan preference.
Conclusion
In the latest Afrobarometer survey, Zimbabweans convey their
appreciation for the advantages of power sharing insofar as it has
brought to the motherland a measure of economic and political
stability. But they regard power sharing as a temporary measure to
be replaced in due course by a legitimately elected government.
Accordingly, clear majorities of eligible voters want
constitutional reform and possibly even free elections in 2011. But
because of widespread fears that any referendum or election
campaigns may be violent, they are increasingly cautious about
revealing how they will vote.
This Briefing Paper was prepared by Michael Bratton, Senior
Advisor, Afrobarometer. He is currently on leave from Michigan
State University at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C The
Afrobarometer is produced collaboratively by social scientists from
20 African countries. Coordination is provided by the Center for
Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Democracy in
South Africa (Idasa), and the Institute for Empirical Research in
Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin.
AfricaFocus Bulletin is an independent electronic publication
providing reposted commentary and analysis on African issues, with
a particular focus on U.S. and international policies. AfricaFocus
Bulletin is edited by William Minter.
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