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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived document may not work.

Africa: Thinking Regionally, 1
Date Distributed (ymd): 960422

APIC Background Paper 005 (March 1996)
Thinking Regionally:
Priorities for U.S. Policy Toward Africa

by Salih Booker

Recent Congressional action to significantly cut aid to Africa
is only one sign among many of a trend to reduce U.S.
involvement on the continent. How much further Africa is
marginalized in the U.S. will ultimately depend on the ability
of Africa's multiple constituencies to reverse this trend.
Nevertheless, events on the continent are likely to compel a
greater commitment of resources than U.S. policymakers
currently contemplate. And engagement at any level needs to be
based on clear identification of U.S. interests in Africa and
well-defined criteria for establishing priorities.

This paper suggests a framework to assure the promotion of
U.S. interests in all five regions of the African continent,
and of three important goals shared by Africans and Americans
alike.

Although conventional wisdom currently tends to dismiss
Africa's importance for the U.S., each one of Africa's five
regions is significant enough in terms of population,
potential economic development, impact on global issues and
even current trade ties to warrant sustained policy attention.
Economic, strategic, political, and societal interests,
intertwined within any one African country, are also easily
influenced by events across porous borders. African policy-
makers are increasingly realizing the need to take this
regional dimension into account.  U.S. policy should also do
so.

Negative goals such as Cold War rivalry no longer define the
U.S. interest. It is in the U.S. interest that, within each
African region, as elsewhere in the world, countries and
peoples should be able to advance the common goals of
achieving security, democracy and development. While the paths
to these objectives may differ, they are inseparable. Economic
progress cannot be isolated from the needs for security and
expansion of democratic rights.

U.S. involvement in averting crises and building a sustainable
future in each of Africa's regions should not be dismissed as
"social work."  It is a genuine national interest because of
the need for the U.S. to establish a responsible role as a
leading participant in the new post-Cold War international
community. It is also justified on the grounds of actual or
potential economic partnerships in each region. A downward
spiral of chaos in any one of these large regions, moreover,
would inevitably have costly fallout for the developed
countries of the North Atlantic, in the form of refugees, drug
traffic, the spread of disease and rising costs for
humanitarian aid.

Rational strategies to achieve these goals cannot be designed
purely in terms of bilateral relations with selected
countries. At the same time, it is not feasible to give equal
weight to U.S. relations with each African country. This paper
singles out five African nations as focus countries where the
U.S. must be consistently involved:  South Africa in Southern
Africa; Nigeria in West Africa; Zaire in Central Africa; Kenya
in East Africa; and Algeria in North Africa.(1)

[Note: for a map defining the regions used here, and charts
comparing regions and focus countries with selected countries
and regions outside Africa, see the typeset version of this
paper -- order information below.]

Giving priority to these countries should not be confused with
making unconditional alliances with their ruling elites, with
seeking to build them up as regional hegemonic powers, or with
granting them automatic first-call in the queue for aid
dollars. The idea of 'focus countries' suggested here should
be sharply distinguished from the similar-sounding concept of
'pivotal states,' which designates regional powers for
virtually exclusive attention within a region, with the
assumption that they will lead their neighbors. Rather, U.S.
policy towards each of these key countries must encompass the
realities of each region and encourage constructive dialogue
and collective problem-solving among neighbors.

We also must recognize that the U.S. has special historical
responsibilities toward a select number of other
countries--Liberia, Angola, Somalia, and Sudan--that also
warrant particular attention.(2) The policy approaches to
these countries also will be most effective if integrated into
policies  toward their respective regions. So will the
responses to crises forced on the international agenda by
their horrendous scale or their momentary passage through the
global media spotlight. Likewise, aid programs to "success
cases" in large or small countries need to be viewed through
the regional prism.

Sustained policy attention to certain countries should always
be placed within the respective regional context. Thus there
should be a Southern Africa policy while acknowledging that
South Africa is a priority within the region, and a West
African policy that recognizes Nigeria's centrality to U.S.
concerns in that region. What happens in Zaire, still saddled
with the dictator installed with U.S. assistance in America's
first major Cold War adventure in Africa, will have profound
effects on the prospects for its neighbors. Although their
regional weight is less overwhelming, Kenya and Algeria will
also have major impacts on their respective regions.

This brief paper does not claim to present a fully elaborated
case for this approach, which would involve more detailed
discussion of policy for each distinct region. The aim here is
rather to offer an initial framework to help answer the
questions of *where* the U.S. should be most engaged in
Africa, and *on what issues*. Even given a consensus on
geographical and program priorities, there will remain the
debates over what methods to employ and which agencies should
have policy leadership and managerial responsibilities.
Overshadowing all of this is the specter of diminished
resources. But such immediate questions should not distract us
from thinking strategically about what are, in fact,
significant and growing American interests in Africa.

Deciding Where to Focus

As budget constraints force reductions in embassy and aid
personnel, including the closure of some country programs,
making decisions about where to focus is inevitable. Yet the
grounds for making these decisions are not self-evident. One
approach is to concentrate on "success" cases, those countries
thought most likely to make it in terms of criteria defined by
U.S. officials, assuming that their success will set an
example and positively influence the decision-making and
behavior of their neighbors. This perspective is often
accompanied by the corollary argument that the U.S. should
simply opt out of involvement in cases involving too much risk
of failure. Since, in Africa, this is often taken to mean most
countries, the obvious consequence  would be to focus only on
the least needy.

At the extreme, some commentators suggest that in Sub-Saharan
Africa only South Africa warrants being considered a "pivotal
state."(3) Yet together the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,
*excluding South Africa*, account for more total trade with
the U.S. than all of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union combined.(4)

The framework presented here is different. The point is not to
limit U.S. perspectives exclusively to bilateral relations
with certain states.  Rather it is to find cost-effective ways
for the U.S. to pursue its interests for each region as a
whole, beginning with consistent involvement with key regional
actors.

Focus Countries

I have designated South Africa, Zaire, Nigeria, Algeria and
Kenya as five countries too important not to be involved in.
Each meets most or all of the following criteria:
(1) they are large countries with large populations;
(2) they boast the strongest and most industrialized economies
in their respective regions;
(3) they are presently among the largest trading partners for
the U.S. in Africa;
(4) the U.S. has diverse and longstanding interests in them
(economic, political, societal and security);
(5) they are potential economic and political powerhouses of
their respective regions;

These countries are all key actors within their respective
regions, whose cooperation will be invaluable to resolving a
wide range of problems. They are likely to be either forces
for regional security or sources of regional instability.
Finally, there are domestic constituencies in the U.S.
concerned with policy toward each of these countries that can
help build and sustain public support for new U.S.
initiatives.

Together, these five focus countries provide nearly 60% of all
U.S. imports from the African continent, and comprise the
markets for 75% of total U.S. exports to Africa.(5) The total
population of these five countries, nearly 250 million, comes
to almost half the population of the entire continent.(6)

The potential for positive (or negative) influence that these
focus countries have within their own regions and elsewhere on
the continent is illustrated, to give only a few examples, by
Nigeria's leading role in the West African peacekeeping force
in Liberia, the South African role in promoting political
settlements of conflicts in Mozambique and Lesotho, and
Zaire's role in alternately accepting, expelling, or arming
refugees from the Rwandan conflict. Nigeria largely determined
who would be the new head of the African Development Bank (in
opposition to the U.S.-supported candidate). Allgeria still
has important influence with the Polisario Front of the
Western Sahara, whose independence struggle against
Morocco--the traditional ally of the U.S. in the
Mahgreb--represents the continent's remaining unresolved
colonial conflict. And South Africa's current increasingly
active foreign policy on Nigeria is a new example of the
potential for African  powers to influence international
policies toward other African states.

Each focus country--and its role within its region--is unique,
and U.S. relations with each one will be different. It is now
possible to conceive of a U.S.-South Africa policy that
considers Pretoria an ally with whom the U.S. can work on a
host of issues. Both government-to-government and people-to-
people ties are growing rapidly and, tentatively, the two
countries share broad policy objectives in South Africa itself
and throughout the region. South Africa is the second largest
trading partner for the U.S. in Africa, and there is a
positive trade balance. With $4.2 billion of trade with the
U.S. in 1994, South Africa is a more important trading partner
than all of Eastern Europe combined.

In Zaire, in contrast, it is neither possible nor desirable to
treat the government as an ally. The U.S. approach there will
require a more creative and energetic combination of
collaboration with the government on specific matters of
mutual concern (e.g. Rwandan refugees, the Ebola virus
outbreak), increasing pressure for measurable democratization
and the observance of human rights, and strengthening ties
with democratic forces.

Economic relations with Zaire are limited and have been
diminishing in recent years. Given the country's vast natural
wealth, however, its future as an important emerging market
should not be discounted solely because of the near chaotic
current state of affairs. Indeed, the past U.S. "investments"
of over $1.3 billion in grants and loans to Zaire should not
be written off so cynically. The country continues to face a
national political crisis, and only a democratic resolution of
it can unlock the country's enormous but long-blocked
potential. It is in the U.S. interest to help achieve such an
outcome, and in doing so, to overcome one of its worst policy
legacies in Africa.

In Nigeria and Kenya similar approaches will be required, at
least in the short term. In both countries the U.S. has
considerable economic interests. Nigeria is the largest
trading partner of the U.S. in Africa and the third largest
U.S. oil supplier after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Importing
some $4.4 billion in Nigerian oil, petroleum and petroleum
products, and exporting only $509 million in goods, the U.S.
ran a trade deficit of nearly $4 billion with Nigeria in 1994
which accounted for most of the total $5 billion trade deficit
with the African continent.

U.S. policy toward Nigeria cannot fail to recognize the
centrality of successful democratization to the country's
prospects for security or for development. Thus despite the
significance of U.S. trade with Nigeria, U.S. long-term
interests require re-prioritization of elements in current
U.S.-Nigerian relations. The fate of Nigeria's democracy
movement holds significant import for the evolution of
democratic political systems in other countries in West
Africa, and across the continent more generally. The rising
calls in the U.S. and internationally for sanctions including
an oil embargo against Nigeria will have to be taken seriously
sooner or later.  Washington will find it difficult to adopt
a different standard toward Nigeria than that applied to South
Africa, which involved the successful implementation of a
comprehensive sanctions policy during the latter 1980s.
Similarly, combining sanctions with significant investments in
supporting the growth of democratic civic forces makes just as
much sense in Nigeria as it did in South Africa.

Likewise, a revitalization of U.S. support for democratization
in Kenya is crucial to avoid that country's slippage into a
violent ethno-regional crisis, and to provide a positive
example of the economic benefits that can accrue from
democratic governance. In addition to its economic interests
in Kenya, the U.S. still depends on access to Kenyan ports and
airfields for various military planning scenarios involving
the projection of U.S. force into the Gulf as well in East
Africa itself. This should lend some urgency to U.S. efforts
to support democratic reform and state observation of human
rights in Kenya. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the
Cold War era, the U.S. cannot afford to elevate basing rights
over human rights. Kenya is also a potentially important "hub"
around which regional economic development can be built as
well as greater economic cooperation between the countries in
the Economic Community of Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA).

In Algeria the complicated challenge of "mainstreaming"
Islamic fundamentalism into a new democratic system is a
problem with important regional implications across North
Africa, in parts of West and East Africa, and in Western
Europe as well. Algeria is also the fourth largest trading
partner of the U.S. in Africa with total trade of $2.9
billion. Altogether, the countries of North Africa represent
some $7.3 billion in trade for the U.S. The dual threats of
radical religious fundamentalism and the anti-democratic
authoritarianism of governments in most North African states
require a strong policy response if the U.S. is to help
increase the chances for sustainable democracy and decrease
the chances for conflict in this vital region.

There is a need to find rapid ways of pressing forward on
human rights and democratization issues, in part because they
deserve urgent attention in themselves.  This is also
imperative because to fail to do so may jeopardize the ability
of the U.S. to promote solutions to larger regional problems.

Historical Obligations

In addition to the focus countries identified above, U.S.
policymakers should publicly accept greater responsibility for
this country's "unfinished business" on the continent. The
U.S. should acknowledge that many of its Cold War policies--
which shaped U.S. relations with Africa from the era of
independence until this decade--have done considerable damage
in a number of key African states. We should feel a national
obligation to help the people and governments of these
countries to recover from the devastation that superpower
rivalry inflicted upon them, and helped them to inflict upon
themselves.

This is not a matter of pleading guilty and feeling remorse
for past deeds. As appropriate as that might be, it would do
very little for Africa. More constructively, the U.S. must
commit itself to sharing the burdens of reconstruction and
reconciliation in order to promote a new international order
which fosters  accountability for state actions and the
international rule of law. We should be particularly concerned
about intractable cases of civil strife where past U.S. policy
arguably bears substantial responsibility for that result and
where external assistance is required to increase the chances
of resolution. Among these cases are Somalia, Liberia, Sudan,
Zaire and Angola. The U.S. should not simply walk away from
involvement with countries that were former allies, client
states or, as in Angola, the target of attack by American
military proxies.

(continued in part 2)

--------------
(1)While Egypt is obviously considered the top priority in
North Africa by U.S. policymakers -- and receives more in US
assistance than all the rest of Africa combined -- it is
primarily viewed as a key actor in the strategic Middle East.
By choosing Algeria as a focus country, policymakers would
need to reorient their thinking and develop policies more
sensitive to the African context rather than only a Middle
Eastern one.

(2) These are in addition to focus countries Zaire and Kenya,
where the criterion of US historical obligations also applies.

(3) See Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal
States and U.S. Strategy," Foreign Affairs (January/February
1996), 33-51.  The authors also include Egypt and Algeria
among African countries on their list of pivotal states around
the world.

(4) Source: Bureau of the Census, Foreign Trade Division, 1994
data.  These and additional comparisons compiled in APIC, The
U.S. and Africa's Trade: Issue Brief (Background Paper 004),
November 1995.

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Copies of the typeset version of this background paper, which
also includes a map and charts of regions and focus countries,
are available at $2 each, $1.60 each for 20 or more.  Add 15%
for postage and handling.  Send your order to APIC at the
address below.  For more information on publication orders
send an e-mail message to [email protected].
************************************************************
This material is produced and distributed  by the Africa
Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary objective is
to widen the policy debate in the United States around African
issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by concentrating on
providing accessible policy-relevant information and analysis
usable by a wide range  of groups and individuals.  APIC is
affiliated with the Washington  Office on Africa (WOA), a
not-for-profit church, trade union and  civil rights group
supported organization that works with Congress on
Africa-related legislation.

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