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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published by the Africa Policy Information Center (APIC) from 1995 to 2001 and by Africa Action from 2001 to 2003. APIC was merged into Africa Action in 2001. Please note that many outdated links in this archived document may not work.

Zaire: USCR Issue Brief
Date Distributed (ymd): 960618

U.S. Committee for Refugees
Zaire Issue Brief Executive Summary
June 7, 1996

Ethnic Cleansing and Displacement in Eastern Zaire

Masisi and surrounding areas of the North Kivu province of
eastern Zaire have been the scene of sporadic but intense
violence since 1993. Since late 1995, a marked escalation in
conflict and instability has rocked the remote but heavily
populated area.

The ethnic cleansing of one group, local ethnic Tutsi, is now
virtually accomplished. Yet the violence continues, driven by
several factors. Long-standing inter-ethnic rivalries over
economic and political power are being inflamed by Zairian
politicians. Militia of ethnic Hunde and ethnic Hutu attack
villages where the other ethnic group is a minority. The
presence of some 600,000 Rwandan Hutu refugees in the region
since 1994 has greatly exacerbated the situation.

Strong evidence exists that many refugee camp occupants
accused of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 are attacking members of
other ethnic groups in eastern Zaire, particularly local
Tutsi. To date, the government of Zaire has refused to take
aggressive action to put an end to the fighting.

The area experienced heavy violence in 1993. Following a year
of precarious peace, the most recent round of conflict between
Banyarwanda (Hutu and Tutsi) and autochtones (people of
Zairian origins) broke out in July 1994, and escalated
dramatically in November 1995.

Lack of access and insecurity preclude an accurate casualty
count, but humanitarian organizations estimate that between
100,000 and 250,000 people from all ethnic groups are now
displaced. More than 60,000 persons have become newly uprooted
since March 1996, according to some estimates.

Thousands of persons are believed to have been killed since
late 1995--this is in addition to widely divergent estimates
of 6,000 to 40,000 deaths during the 1993 violence. The
region's economy is virtually destroyed. Once known as the
granary of Zaire, the agriculture and livestock base is now in
ruins.

The spark creating the most recent outbreak in fighting is not
entirely clear, but appears to be linked to efforts by Rwandan
Hutu refugees near Goma to carve out an exclusively Hutu
enclave in Masisi. This effort may partially be a reaction to
Zaire's move in the late summer of 1995 to close the Rwandan
refugee camps.

Although Zairian soldiers have been sent to the province to
restore order, they arrived late. Those who are there are
undisciplined, poorly equipped, and often appear more
interested in seizing their share of war spoils than in
protecting local populations. Witnesses say that Zairian
soldiers have sold their services to the highest bidder, which
often is the Hutu militia, intensifying the conflict and
aggravating the situation.

The Hutu militia involved in the conflict are referred to by
local populations as Interahamwe, while the predominantly
Hunde militia are called Mai Mai or Bangilima. There are
strong indications that soldiers from the regime of Rwanda's
former President Juvenal Habyarimana, who have access to
sophisticated new weapons, are participating directly in the
fighting and are facilitating the ethnic cleansing of the
area.

Hutu and Hunde ethnic militia have increasingly targeted
Tutsi, who are now the most vulnerable people in Masisi. Many
Hunde see the Tutsi as an enemy because the Tutsi are
Banyarwanda, while many Hutu view them as an enemy simply
because they are Tutsi. Senior government officials in Zaire
have actively encouraged the expulsion of Tutsi as well as
direct attacks against them.

Some 10,000 Tutsi from the region have been forced across the
border to northwestern Rwanda, almost completely cleansing
eastern Zaire of its remaining Tutsi population. Only a few
thousand Tutsi are believed to remain in the area as of early
June 1996. Those who remain in Masisi and neighboring zones
are among the poorest and least able to fend for themselves.

The arrival of thousands of Zairian Tutsi refugees in
northwestern Rwanda has added a new source of tension in the
region and contributes to the downward spiral of relations
between the governments of Rwanda and Zaire.

Just as the world responded slowly to the genocide in Rwanda
two years ago, the international community again has been slow
to recognize the full scope and ruthlessness of the ethnic
cleansing and other conflict now underway in northeast Zaire.
Left unchecked, the conflict contributes to instability in a
region that already is dangerously unstable.

..............................
Excerpts from Recommendations

Instability, especially in the Great Lakes region, is an
infectious disease.

The conflict in North Kivu should be addressed by the
international community, but not merely with humanitarian
relief. There is a danger of placing a humanitarian band-aid
on what is at root a political crisis. Ultimate responsibility
for the crisis lies with the government of Zairian President
Mobutu--a government known more for manipulating conflicts for
political advantage than for restoring stability. To date,
Zairian authorities have neither taken the steps necessary to
broker a political compromise, nor have they used the proper
military resources available to protect civilians and police
the region effectively.

The humanitarian situation in Masisi and nearby areas could
deteriorate quickly. Updated assessments of the humanitarian
situation are desperately needed. Most relief agencies in the
area have geared their programs toward assisting Rwandan
refugees near Goma. Meanwhile, a few miles down the road, open
conflict rages.

The U.S. Committee for Refugees makes the following
recommendations to establish security in the short term,
maintain order in the long-term, and address humanitarian
needs related to the conflict in Masisi zone and in
neighboring areas of Zaire:

I. Establish Security in the Short Term

1. The international community should formally condemn Zairian
officials' complicity in the conflict and demand that Zairian
authorities take immediate and effective measures to calm the
violence.

International condemnation can be an important tool given
President Mobutu's professed desire to improve his image. The
United Nations, the United States, and other major nations
should: * formally condemn Zairian authorities' role in the
ethnic cleansing and related violence occurring in North Kivu;
* press Zairian officials to take proper action to restore
stability in the conflict area; * insist that Zaire allow
unhindered access by international media; * facilitate a UN
investigation into the situation, perhaps headed by an
internationally known figure or "eminent persons group"; *
pressure President Mobutu to uphold his past pledges to stop
arms flows to the Goma refugee camps--pledges he has thus far
ignored.

A UN condemnation of Zairian government complicity in the
violence should be included in an official UN Security Council
resolution, to convey the gravity of the situation and
stimulate international media attention. The U.S. government
should use official channels to express its ongoing
condemnation, beyond statements already made. Private
interlocutors, such as the Carter Center and prominent private
Americans with substantial business dealings in Zaire, should
be urged to use their influence to alleviate the situation.

2. Zairian officials should cease their inflammatory rhetoric
and actions that contribute to ethnic hatred.

Public comments and actions by Zairian officials have at times
appeared to condone and even encourage ethnic violence in
Masisi zone and other areas of North Kivu. North Kivu's
Governor Mupenda has been particularly guilty of espousing
hate rhetoric and other activities to instigate ethnic
cleansing of the Tutsi population from his province. Despite
the disintegration of Zaire's national government, President
Mobutu continues to exert control over the appointment of key
regional officials and influences their policies. Mobutu
should: ensure that Mupenda and other officials immediately
cease inciting violence; dismiss Governor Mupenda and other
officials whose words or actions incite or condone continued
conflict and ethnic cleansing. Local authorities and the
military should: cease the confiscation of national identity
cards from Tutsi; stop the harassment and arbitrary arrest of
prominent Tutsi in Goma.

3. Zairian officials should deploy troops with proper
training and discipline to help restore calm in the conflict
area. Undisciplined or unreliable Zairian troop contingents
should be withdrawn.

Zairian officials have made only half-hearted efforts to
restore peace and security to the conflict area. Some official
actions have worsened security. Most Zairian troops are too
undisciplined to ameliorate the situation. Many Zairian
soldiers, lacking regular pay or official support, have become
little more than uniformed bandits who make security worse.
They should be withdrawn. The international community appears
unwilling to provide armed security for the Masisi area.
Mobutu does have at his disposal, however, elite troops with
sufficient training and discipline to restore security to the
general Masisi area. In 1993, large numbers of DSP troops were
able to help restore at least some order in the region. ...

4. After calm has been restored, Zairian troops should disarm
ethnic militia in North Kivu province, including the
Interahamwe.

A large percentage of the violence in Masisi zone and in
neighboring areas is perpetrated by gangs of youths who
exploit the anarchy for their own material gain. Theirs is
often little more than opportunistic violence and banditry,
using ethnic identity as an excuse. A proper show of force by
disciplined security personnel would likely curtail this level
of violence. The failure during the past two years to disarm
Interahamwe militia operating out of the Rwandan Hutu refugee
camps near Goma has contributed mightily to the violence in
North Kivu. Disarmament of the Interahamwe may prove difficult
and dangerous, but is necessary if regional stability is to be
achieved. Disarmament efforts should begin after calm has been
restored, and should be monitored closely by outsiders (see
next recommendation).

5. The international community should immediately station
military observers in North Kivu to monitor activities of
Zairian troops.

The United Nations or the Organization for African Unity
should arrange to deploy a sufficient number of international
military monitors in the conflict area to help facilitate
internal peace and security. This includes monitoring the
proper conduct of Zairian troops and reporting on soldiers'
abuses against civilians.

6. The Zairian army should neutralize the military capability
of the former Rwandan military (FAR) by arresting FAR officers
and confiscating FAR weaponry.

This clearly is an ambitious task that neither the Zairian
military nor the international community has been willing to
do for the past two years. FAR and its weapons are a dangerous
and destabilizing influence throughout East-Central Africa,
and will remain so unless dealt with. Many top officers of FAR
live and operate openly in Lac Vert military camp near Goma.
FAR and its weapons are not the sole source of conflict in
Masisi, but they are one ingredient. Steps to neutralize FAR
would not eliminate all violence in Masisi, but such steps
would help improve the situation there. The international
community should indicate to President Mobutu that strong
Zairian action against FAR is one of several prerequisites for
improving his relationship with the outside world.

7. Rwandan officials and UNHCR should move the new refugee
camp in Rwanda to a location that is safer and more conducive
to humanitarian assistance. ...

II. Maintain Order in the Long Term

8. Zaire and UNHCR should move the Goma refugee camps.

The Goma-area refugee camps, housing 600,000 persons and
providing a base of operations for FAR and Interahamwe
militia, have led to insecurity in northwest Rwanda and have
fueled violence in Masisi zone and surrounding areas of Zaire.
Zairian authorities and UNHCR should move the refugees farther
from the Zaire-Rwanda border. Zairian officials thus far have
refused to consider moving the camps. UNHCR has not forced the
issue due, in part, to the expense and other considerations.
UNHCR and the international community should now press to
relocate the camps. It appears that large numbers of refugees
in Goma will not repatriate voluntarily to Rwanda. Local
resettlement and integration in Zaire may become the primary
durable solution for many of them. Shifting the refugees to
elsewhere in Zaire would be controversial among Zairians and
would exact a toll on their nation. The past two years have
demonstrated, however, that the current location of the
refugee camps near Goma is a recipe for sustained regional
instability.

 9. Zaire officials should resolve the Banyarwanda citizenship
issue in North Kivu by setting fairer, more realistic
standards for citizenship. Valid Banyarwanda citizens of Zaire
should have the opportunity to participate politically.

At the core of the conflict in the general Masisi area is the
tension between the Hunde and Banyarwanda communities over
Zairian citizenship of the Banyarwanda population. This
dispute over citizenship predates the arrival of the Rwandan
refugees. It should be resolved in a fair manner. Not all
Banyarwanda in Zaire are citizens, but many do have valid
claims. Many Banyarwanda have lived in Zaire for generations
and were classified as Zairian citizens under Zairian law
during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s, however, their
citizenship was effectively revoked, leaving them stateless
and vulnerable. Zairian authorities should set realistic
standards for proof of citizenship. Many Banyarwanda--and
other Zairians, for that matter--lack written documents such
as ancestral birth records that would support their valid
citizenship claims. Zairian authorities should allow
alternative standards of proof, such as witness testimonies
and other anecdotal evidence, in determining Banyarwandans'
citizenship. Zairian military and security authorities should
cease their practice of confiscating national identity cards
from Tutsi, and cease the harassment and arbitrary arrest of
prominent Tutsi in Goma. Banyarwanda Hutu are the dominant
demographic power in North Kivu, yet local political power
belongs almost exclusively to Hunde. This is another source of
tension. Creation of local power-sharing committees to resolve
land tenure and other local disputes could help alleviate
ethnic animosities.

10. The United Nations should deploy human rights monitors in
conflicted areas of North Kivu.

Areas of North Kivu will likely remain tense long after overt
violence subsides. Drawing on lessons learned from the human
rights monitoring program still underway in Rwanda, the
international community should establish a human rights
monitoring program in North Kivu with adequate resources and
personnel. ...

11. The United States and other Western countries should build
linkages to grassroots civic groups in Zaire.

Working with President Mobutu and Zaire's fractured,
undependable government presents difficulties for the United
States and other nations. Zairian society, however, boasts a
variety of civic, church, and human rights groups that operate
at a grassroots level and are trying to address problems in
North Kivu. Their efforts should receive international
support. One example: Campagne Pour La Paix au Nord Kivu
(Campaign for Peace in North Kivu), an inter-ethnic coalition
of church leaders and local development NGOs, hosts mediation
sessions and has advanced a number of constructive proposals.
The U.S. Agency for International Development and the UN
should provide funds to support similar indigenous programs
that boost civil society.

III. Address Humanitarian Needs

12. A specific UN agency should be designated as the lead
coordinator for humanitarian assistance to North Kivu.

Currently, no specific UN agency has primary responsibility
for monitoring and addressing humanitarian needs in the
general Masisi area. UNHCR has substantial resources and
personnel in North Kivu providing assistance to Rwandan
refugees near Goma, but internally displaced Zairians in North
Kivu currently fall outside UNHCR's mandate. A high-level UN
team including representatives from UNHCR, UNICEF, and the UN
Department of Humanitarian Affairs was attempting to conduct
an assessment mission to the conflict area as this report went
to press. The UN team should recommend that increased pressure
be brought on Zaire to solve the political roots of this
crisis, and that an appropriate UN agency be charged with
primary responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs in the
conflict area. In the meantime, private international NGOs
interested in providing proper humanitarian assistance should
confer with ICRC and MSF/Holland, which have the most
experience in Masisi zone and neighboring areas. Assistance
that is piecemeal or poorly coordinated could aggravate the
situation.

13. Humanitarian organizations should establish a contingency
fund to respond to current and future humanitarian assistance
needs in the general Masisi area.

The international community has largely ignored the crisis in
the Masisi area. International relief organizations have
earmarked relatively little money for it. Scores of
international NGOs operating in North Kivu have devoted
massive resources to the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma,
leaving those NGOs with precious few resources readily
available to help the general Masisi area. The UN should
establish a special fund to address current and future needs
in the conflict zone. This fund could provide transitional
development assistance if the conflict subsides, or provide
emergency relief if the conflict worsens in coming months.

14. The UN and NGOs should improve local roads and bridges,
and take other steps to bolster the infrastructure and
economic base of North Kivu.

One of many problems in North Kivu is its relative
inaccessibility, which complicates humanitarian assessments,
hampers delivery of relief, and isolates the area's people and
their disputes. Improvements in basic infrastructure would
help humanitarian assistance, facilitate better security, and
improve opportunities for stability. The goal in North Kivu
should be not only to end violence, but to help the area
restore its important role as the "granary of Zaire."

U.S. Committee for Refugees
1717 Massachusetts Ave. NW #701
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 347-3507; Fax: (202) 347-3418

For a copy of the report, call or fax Raci Say at the above
numbers. For more information by e-mail, send a message to
Katie Hope at [email protected].

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