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Note: This document is from the archive of the Africa Policy E-Journal, published
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Zaire: USCR Statement
Any links to other sites in this file from 1996 are not clickable,
given the difficulty in maintaining up-to-date links in old files.
However, we hope they may still provide leads for your research.
Zaire: USCR Statement
Date Distributed (ymd): 961127
This posting contains two press releases from the United
States Committee for Refugees, released Nov. 21 and Nov. 26,
respectively. For further information contact Roger P. Winter
or Jeff Drumtra, at the U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1717
Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 701, Washington, DC 20036; Tel:
(202) 347-3507; Fax: (202) 347-3418; E-mail: khope@irsa-
uscr.org.
***********************************************************
MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN EASTERN ZAIRE WOULD BE MISGUIDED;
TALK OF DEPLOYMENT THREATENS TO IMPEDE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
November 21, 1996
Continued calls for the deployment of U.S. and other
international troops in eastern Zaire have inadvertently
hindered rather than helped efforts to provide humanitarian
assistance to hundreds of thousands of uprooted persons in the
area, according to an assessment on the ground by the U.S.
Committee for Refugees (USCR).
The most rapid and effective way to deliver humanitarian
assistance to Rwandan refugees, Burundian refugees, and
internally displaced Zairians in eastern Zaire is to negotiate
with Zairian rebel leaders to allow the delivery of
cross-border relief supplies from neighboring Rwanda, USCR has
concluded. Rwanda should serve as a base for humanitarian
operations that can stabilize both sides of the Rwanda-Zaire
border. The U.S., Canada, and other nations should undertake
a military intervention in eastern Zaire only if the force is
willing to confront and disarm soldiers and militia members
controlled by Rwandan extremists. A military intervention
without that mandate risks being counterproductive.
The extended debate about an international military deployment
to save lives in eastern Zaire is now inadvertently hindering
the saving of lives, said Roger Winter, director of USCR.
Zairian rebels who control eastern Zaire are concerned that an
international military force will have the effect of
strengthening their adversaries, and this has slowed their
cooperation with international relief workers. Rebels are more
likely to open humanitarian relief corridors more quickly if
the rebels are assured that they are not about to be invaded
by international troops. Basing relief operations in Rwanda
would probably assuage the rebels' security fears.
Winter returned yesterday from an 11-day site visit to eastern
Zaire and Rwanda. During that period, an estimated 600,000
Rwandan refugees repatriated from Zaire. Winter met repeatedly
with Zairian Tutsi rebel leader Laurent Kabila to learn about
the military and political goals of the rebel movement.
The United States and other nations continue to debate whether
to send troops to eastern Zaire. U.S. officials have indicated
that any troop deployment would operate under tight
restrictions and would not attempt to disarm combatants or
separate Rwandan refugees from their armed extremist leaders.
We should only send troops to eastern Zaire if their purpose
is to disarm Rwandan Hutu killers who participated in the 1994
genocide, Winter said. As long as the international force
pledges not to confront the killers, the force would not be
useful and could be counterproductive.
U.S. officials have indicated that a small American military
contingent will help provide humanitarian assistance inside
Rwanda to 600,000 former refugees who have returned home in
the past week. Some $140 million of U.S. aid will flow into
Rwanda in coming months for short term relief and long-term
development. The U.S. government policy is the correct one,
Winter said. As Rwanda is trying to get back on its feet, we
would threaten Rwanda's security now if we fail to invest
generously to meet the needs of the 600,000 persons who have
returned home. Rwanda's returnees need tools and shelter
materials, temporary food aid, ongoing medical care, schools,
and the presence of more UN human rights observers in isolated
rural areas.
Uncertainty persists about the number, locations, and
condition of Rwandan refugees in Zaire in the aftermath of
violence in the past month. Several hundred thousand Zairians
have also been affected by the violence. Those concerns can be
resolved most rapidly by negotiating humanitarian access to
eastern Zaire with rebel leaders rather than by raising
tensions on the ground by threatening a military deployment.
Zairian rebel leader Kabila sees it in his own interest to
have the Rwandan refugees go home, Winter said after extensive
discussions with Kabila. There is reason to believe that,
under the right circumstances, the rebels would work with
relief officials to make that happen.
**************************************************************
HOW MANY REFUGEES ARE IN EASTERN ZAIRE?
WHY ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY
November 26, 1996
How many refugees remain in eastern Zaire? The confusion over
the number of Rwandan refugees still in eastern Zaire has been
one of several factors undermining assistance plans.
Journalists and the American public have expressed incredulity
at the wide gap in estimates supplied by sources in the field.
Some observers have alleged that the discrepancy in population
estimates is proof of ulterior motives by relief agencies and
international diplomats, who are assumed to have a vested
interest in reporting refugee numbers that are artificially
high or unrealistically low. This advisory attempts to
clarify, step by step, the reasons why a large discrepancy has
developed in estimates of the size of the refugee population
in Zaire.
The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) has provided
statistical information and analysis on refugee crises
worldwide since 1958 and is familiar with the difficulty
inherent in measuring accurately the size of massive refugee
populations. USCR has conducted nine site visits to eastern
Zaire and Rwanda since 1994, including an assessment trip
completed last week.
The following table reviews the range of estimates for five
populations: 1) Rwandan refugees in Zaire two months ago; 2)
Burundian refugees in Zaire two months ago; 3) Rwandan
refugees who have repatriated from Zaire to Rwanda during the
past two weeks; 4) Burundian refugees who have fled from Zaire
to Burundi and to Tanzania during the past two weeks; 5)
Zairians displaced internally by the recent violence.
Uncertainty about the size of each of these five groups has
snowballed into an unusually large discrepancy in aggregate
population estimates. The table illustrates how various
sources have derived minimum and maximum estimates of the
refugee population remaining in eastern Zaire.
Populations Being Estimated****Assumption 1****Assumption 2
(a)Rwandan refugees in Zaire
in Sept. 96********************900,000*********1,100,000
(b) Rwandan refugees
repatriated in Nov. 96*********600,000***********500,000
(c) Rwandan refugees currently
remaining in Zaire [a minus ]**300,000***********600,000
(d) Burundian refugees in
Zaire in Sept. 96**************140,000***********140,000
(e) Burundian refugees fled
Zaire Oct.-Nov. 96**************80,000************40,000
(f) Burundian refugees currently
remaining in Zaire [d minus e]**60,000***********100,000
(g) Rwandan & Burundian refugees
currently in Zaire [c plus f]**360,000***********700,000
(h) Zairians internally
displaced**********************150,000***********250,000
(i) uprooted Rwandans, Burundians, &
Zairians in E.Zaire[g plus h]**510,000***********950,000
As the preceding table indicates, various sources estimate
that the number of Rwandan refugees remaining in Zaire (line
c) is 300,000 to 600,000, a huge range. This highlights only
part of the discrepancy, however. Some observers estimate that
100,000 to 200,000 of those Rwandans might be directly or
indirectly implicated in the 1994 genocide, calling into
question their refugee status.
Counting Problems
Estimates of the size of large refugee populations worldwide
often encounter a 10 percent margin of error, due to the chaos
of refugee situations, questions of identity, inadvertent
double counting, and attempts by humanitarian workers to
ensure stocks of adequate relief supplies. In some camps, even
a smoothly conducted census can become quickly outdated as
refugee families shift locations. Attempts to count massive,
uncooperative refugee populations, such as the Rwandan
refugees in Zaire during the past two years, are susceptible
to even greater error.
A census of the Goma-area refugee camps in February 1995 by
UNHCR and other relief groups was hampered by significant
fraud orchestrated by Rwandan refugee leaders, relief workers
reported at the time. Representatives of some relief agencies
withdrew from the census exercise because of the fraud. As a
result, the final 1995 census statistics in Zaire were
imprecise, although they were useful for planning humanitarian
programs and budgets. An attempt by UNHCR to refine its
refugee estimates in late 1995 using a combination of aerial
photography and on-the-ground checks indicated that official
population estimates remained high.
In view of these indicators, USCR's annual World Refugee
Survey, published in April 1996, estimated that the actual
number of Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire at the beginning
of 1996 was approximately 900,000, in contrast to the official
UNHCR estimate of 1.1 million.
The Goma-area refugee population again frustrated UNHCR's
efforts to conduct a reliable census in September 1996. Groups
of young men in the camps reportedly destroyed several census
registration booths and threw rocks at vehicles of relief
agencies, according to a report received at the time by USCR.
The census was cancelled, depriving UNHCR and the
international community of a consensus on the baseline for the
number of Rwandan refugees who were in eastern Zaire prior to
the outbreak of recent violence. As the preceding table
indicates, uncertainties over the numbers of Burundian
refugees still in Zaire, as well as confusion about the
numbers of internally displaced Zairians, have created even
larger discrepancies.
Beyond the Numbers
The debate over refugee numbers has, unfortunately, been
allowed to obscure wide agreement among relief workers and
analysts that a significant number of people are uprooted or
war-affected in eastern Zaire and need humanitarian
assistance. Relief workers have managed to travel up to 40
miles beyond Goma and Bukavu in recent days. Additional access
to other areas of eastern Zaire is necessary to conduct rapid
humanitarian assessments and address health and nutritional
needs.
It has become increasingly clear that a multinational military
force will not deploy in eastern Zaire in the near future. Nor
should it. Zairian rebels and the Rwandan government have
stated that they oppose use of a multinational force. U.S.
officials have indicated they will not deploy troops without
local approval on the ground. A multinational force is not
mandated to disarm extremists or rescue refugees held hostage.
USCR continues to recommend that the most rapid and most
practical way to assist uprooted persons in Zaire including
Rwandans, Burundians, and Zairians is to assuage Zairian
rebels' military concerns by officially shelving discussion of
a multinational military deployment and, instead, to negotiate
improved access by humanitarian workers into eastern Zaire
using Rwanda as a staging base for humanitarian supplies.
************************************************************
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by the
Africa Policy Information Center (APIC), the educational
affiliate of the Washington Office on Africa. APIC's primary
objective is to widen the policy debate in the United States
around African issues and the U.S. role in Africa, by
concentrating on providing accessible policy-relevant
information and analysis usable by a wide range of groups and
individuals.
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