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Central Africa: Nzongola-Ntalaja Speech, 2
Central Africa: Nzongola-Ntalaja Speech, 2 Date distributed (ymd): 981111
Document reposted by APIC
+++++++++++++++++++++Document Profile+++++++++++++++++++++
Region: Central Africa
Issue Areas: +political/rights+ +economy/development+ +security/peace+
Summary Contents:
This posting contains the second part of a slightly condensed version of
a speech by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja on the crisis in the Great Lakes region,
with particular emphasis on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
+++++++++++++++++end profile++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(continued from part 1)
Unfortunately, Lumumba remained in power for less than three months.
Right after independence, the Congo was plunged into a major crisis, following
the mutiny of the former colonial army and the secession of Katanga, its
richest province. The Congo Crisis, as it was known, lasted four years
and involved up to then the largest deployment of United Nations peacekeeping
forces. ...
The main beneficiary of the Congo Crisis and the man the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and policymakers identified as the strongman
needed to rule the Congo was none other than Joseph-Desire Mobutu. A former
sergeant in the colonial army, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Congolese
National Army in July 1960 by Prime Minister Lumumba. Having betrayed his
mentor and served his foreign masters well, Mobutu finally took over as
head of state in a military coup d'etat in 1965. ...
In 32 years of absolute power, Mobutu and his henchmen ruined the country
by destroying its economic and social fabric and making it the laughingstock
of the whole world. Mobutu put an end to the democratic experiment of the
first five years of Congo's existence as an independent state. His dictatorship
was backed by military force and a party-state system from which he recruited
his cronies and retainers internally, and by the United States, France
and Belgium, externally. When they were needed, the three external powers
intervened militarily to save the dictator from armed insurgents seeking
to overthrow him. In 1996-97, when that support did not materialize, Mobutu
could no longer hang on to power. He was forced to flee the country. And
he died in exile less that four months later, in September 1997.
Before Mobutu's demise, a movement for multiparty democracy had arisen
under the leadership of Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba in 1980, to help
pull the country out of the unending political and economic crisis in which
the dictator had plunged it. By 1991, the leaders of the democracy movement
had rejected Mobutu's plans to set up a constitutional conference and insisted
on the holding of a Sovereign National Conference. Following the example
set earlier that year in Benin, national conferences had become popular
in Africa as democratic forums of all the relevant social forces of a nation
designed to take stock of what has gone wrong in the past and to chart
a new course for the future.
National conferences were conceived as a combination of a truth and
reconciliation commission and a constitutional commission to serve as both
a forum for a national catharsis in the African tradition of conflict resolution
through the palaver, and a modern rule of law mechanism for setting into
motion a successful transition to democracy. They were also seen to be
all the more critical in countries like Congo-Kinshasa, which lacked the
minimum infrastructure for free and fair elections. The conference, whose
decisions are meant to be binding on all parties or groups, was therefore
the most appropriate forum from which a transitional government could emerge
to prepare the way for multiparty elections and progress towards democracy.
In the Congo, the Sovereign National Conference (Conference Nationale
Souveraine, CNS) took place from 7 August 1991 and 6 December 1992 in Kinshasa.
For progressive forces, it was the most appropriate arena for the transfer
of power from the forces of the status quo to those of change, from the
agents of external powers to nationalist leaders committed to seeing the
country recover its full sovereignty, which constitutes the sine qua non
of raising the standard of living of the popular masses. Unfortunately,
Mobutu's resistance to change and monumental errors by the opposition combined
to make the conference fail with respect to one of its primary missions,
namely, the establishment of an orderly and non-violent transition to democracy.
At the same time, the CNS has left a legacy of freedom, popular resistance
to illegitimate authority, commitment to political openness, diversity
and the rule of law.
The Fall of Mobutu and Kabila's Rise to Power
The failure of the democratic transition in the Congo was part of a
violent backlash of authoritarian regimes against the democracy movement
in a number of African countries, including Rwanda and Burundi. In the
Rwanda case, the late President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, had been in
power since 1973. During 20 years of personal rule, he steadfastly refused
to allow Tutsi victims of the 1959 pogrom and subsequent violence, who
were in exile in neighboring countries, to return home. Under the leadership
of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi diaspora in Uganda launched
a military campaign to overthrow the Habyarimana regime in October 1990.
France, Belgium and Mobutu's Zaire came to the dictator's rescue and prevented
a RPF victory.
Under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), negotiations
over two years between Habyarimana's government and the RPF to end the
civil war led to the signing of the Arusha accords in 1993. These included
the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993, a cease-fire agreement, and
six Protocols on the rule of law, power sharing, repatriation of refugees
and resettlement of displaced persons, integration of armed forces and
other issues. In spite of having signed these accords, President Habyarimana
did his best to undermine them, and this played into the hands of Hutu
extremists bent on exterminating the Tutsi.
The shooting down of Habyarimana's plane on 6 April 1994 gave these
extremists the occasion they needed to unleash their genocidal machine
against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu. With nearly a million people killed,
the genocide ended in July after the RPF military victory and seizure of
power in Kigali. France's supposedly humanitarian Operation Turquoise (June-August
1994) saved the Hutu genocide machine, which was made up of the defeated
Forces Armees Rwandaises (FAR) and the Interahamwe militia, by helping
them to escape with virtually all of their weapons into the UNHCR refugee
camps in the Congo. There, they were able to regroup to stage repeated
raids into Rwanda against the RPF regime. It was precisely the Rwandan
initiative to destroy the Hutu refugee camps and, consequently, the military
bases of the ex-FAR and the Hutu extremist militia in the Congo, that helped
propel Laurent Kabila to power in Kinshasa.
According to his interviews with the Washington Post (9 July 1997) and
with Ugandan Professor Mahmood Mamdani (Mail and Guardian, 8 August 1997),
General Paul Kagame, the Rwandan strongman, stated in no uncertain terms
that the seven month war leading to Mobutu's overthrow was planned in Kigali
and led by Rwandan military officers. This is not surprising, since Mr.
Kabila had no credible autonomous organization and no coherent social project
or political programme. He was recalled from his business ventures by the
coalition of states led by Rwanda and Uganda with the aim of ending the
Mobutu dictatorship, to provide a Congolese facade for what was actually
an external military intervention. Much is made of the role of Congolese
Tutsi known as Banyamulenge. If it is true that their rebellion against
expulsion orders by Kivu provincial authorities did play a critical role
in the outbreak of the war, they represent such a tiny minority that by
themselves, they are incapable of sustaining a major military operation
across our vast country.
I applauded and continue to defend the role that Uganda, Rwanda, Angola,
Eritrea and others played in removing Mobutu from power. The fact that
Mobutu's own army hardly fought to keep its master in power is a clear
demonstration of how discredited the regime had become in the eyes of the
people. However, in asserting their Pan-African right of intervention to
help free the Congolese people from oppression, the external coalition
made a serious error. This consisted in handpicking Kabila as the leader
to replace Mobutu. A national leader, as Nelson Mandela declared in 1990
when he got out of jail, is chosen at a national conference. He or she
should not be chosen by foreign governments or be self-proclaimed. What
needed to be done was to convene a roundtable of Congolese patriots and
democrats so they could choose the leader and a broad-based government
of national unity.
Having no solid political base in the country, Kabila established personal
rule based on nepotism, cronyism and hero worship, and characterized by
incompetence and general lack of political direction. Instead of a national
leader with vision for the country's future, he gave the impression of
a leader cut off from the people and relying primarily on a small circle
of associates chosen on the basis of family, ethnic or clientelist ties.
Moreover, he sought to turn the clock backwards politically, by denying
the significance and legacy of the Sovereign National Conference, banning
political activity and jailing opposition leaders, and attempting to close
the space of democratic freedom and civil liberties that the people of
the Congo had dearly won against the decadent Mobutu dictatorship.
The Current War in the Congo
The current war is a function of both external and internal factors.
The external factor relates to the national security interests that Rwanda
and Uganda have with respect to the northeastern region of the Congo. These
interests include issues of cross-border violence as well as economic and
geopolitical stakes, which led the two countries to support the war of
liberation against the Mobutu regime in 1996-97. Today, the two countries
seem determined to impose a weak regime in Kinshasa, one that would not
question their control over the eastern part of the country and its considerable
natural wealth, now being openly exploited by their political authorities
and businesspeople. As for Kabila's new allies, the defense of international
law and OAU principles is a convenient pretext for their own economic and
geopolitical calculations. The case of Zimbabwe is particularly revealing
in this regard.*
Having led the military operations against the old regime, Rwandan military
officers and many of their soldiers remained in the Congo to help Kabila
secure his rule. For over a year, President Kabila kept a Rwandan officer,
Commander James Kabarebe, as chief of staff of the national army, the Forces
Armees Congolaises (FAC). With Rwandan nationals and Congolese Tutsi with
close ties to the Rwandan leadership occupying high level positions in
the DRC, Rwandan authorities could be assured that their interests were
being protected. As for Uganda, joint patrols by its army and Congolese
troops on the Congo side of the border helped to strengthen its attempt
to stop infiltration by armed militias based in the DRC.
This arrangement came apart as both Rwanda and Uganda became dissatisfied
with mounting incursions by rebels operating from the Congo, and with what
they perceived as lack of concern for their security by President Kabila.
If it is true that these two countries, like Burundi and Angola, have legitimate
security interests along their borders with the Congo, they cannot place
all the blame for continued insecurity on Kabila. After all, what prevented
the mysterious "Commander James" and the other Rwandan commanders
in the FAC from working with Rwanda to ensure the latter's security? As
for Uganda, which actually had troops inside the DRC, is Kabila to blame
for the Ugandan army's failure to stop rebel infiltrations?
These questions suggest that the security issue as narrowly defined
with respect to rebel infiltrations does not in itself explain the determination
of Kabila's former allies to dump him. His erratic style of leadership,
the animosity towards him by the United States, the major external partner
of both Kampala and Kigali, and his own desire to play the nationalistic
card to win popular support at home, must have played a role. There is
evidence that a palace coup was attempted against Kabila, and this resulted
in an irretrievable breakup of the 1996 alliance. President Kabila's decision
on 27 July 1998 to send all Rwandan officers and troops home triggered
the flight from Kinshasa of virtually all Congolese Tutsi senior officials.
On the 2nd of August, less than a week later, a rebellion aimed at ousting
him from power with the support of both Rwanda and Uganda, was launched.
Internally, the war has a lot to do with the failure of the Kabila regime
to meet the people's expectations that his regime will be radically different
from Mobutu's dictatorship. The rebels' declared grievances against Kabila
are shared by many segments of the Congolese population. However, their
sponsorship by Rwanda and Uganda and the fact that close collaborators
of former President Mobutu are found in their ranks, have diminished their
political credibility, in spite of the fact that they are led by such highly
respected intellectuals as Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba and Jacques Depelchin.
If they do win the war militarily, they will find it difficult to govern
a basically hostile population, which perceives them as agents of foreign
powers. In spite of their good intentions, they will have a lot of difficulty
freeing themselves from their cumbersome Rwandan military allies.
The widening of the war with the intervention of Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia
and others on the side of the Kabila regime has created a situation that
may degenerate into a larger regional war in Central Africa. The longer
it continues, the more suffering it will inflict on innocent civilians,
who are daily subject to gross violations of human rights, including crimes
against humanity. This is particularly the case with respect to incitement
to ethnic hatred and genocide against the Tutsi by Congolese officials.
Conclusion
There is no military solution to the current war in the Congo. Given
their evident limitations in capacity, all the parties to the conflict
cannot sustain a long and costly war. Even Angola, the militarily strongest
of all the belligerents, cannot afford to stretch its resources too thin
by embarking on an all-out conquest of the territories lost by the Kabila
regime in the eastern region of the counry. A political solution is needed,
and this is possible only after genuine negotiations towards a cease-fire.
So far, efforts to obtain a cease-fire have failed because of the contested
status of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), the rebel
alliance, and Rwanda's denial of its involvement in the war. Not only does
the RCD have to be included as a genuinely Congolese party to the conflict,
but Rwanda must also acknowledge its own involvement in it. Without these
two realities being acknowledged by all concerned, negotiations towards
a cease-fire are doomed to failure. Why should the RCD accept to stop fighting
if it is not a party to the negotiations? And how can Rwanda withdraw troops
that supposedly are not on Congolese territory?
Once a cease-fire is achieved, it must be followed by the withdrawal
of all foreign troops and the deployment of a small African or international
force to monitor the peace accords. However, the establishment of a durable
peace in the Congo can come only through a lasting political solution to
the internal and external challenges facing the country. Internally, there
is a need for a more inclusive government, and one that will reconcile
the revolutionary legacy of the AFDL destitution of the Mobutu regime with
the democratic legacy of the Sovereign National Conference. National reconciliation
and the transition from personal rule to the rule of law must be accompanied
by ending impunity, introducing transparency in public finances, creating
a truly national army to replace paramilitary and militia forces, and strengthening
state institutions to enhance their capacity for national reconstruction
and economic development. This process must include the protection of the
space of democratic freedom and civil liberties gained since 1990. Without
freedom, reconstruction and development, any talk of an African renaissance
is meaningless.
Externally, the DRC must strengthen its capacity to police its borders
so as to take into account the legitimate security interests of its neighbors.
Rebels from Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Angola should not be allowed to
use Congolese soil for armed raids into their respective countries. The
best safeguards for these countries' security interests is the presence
of an inclusive government in Kinshasa, backed up by a modest but well
trained professional army whose members are drawn from all over the national
territory. The test of the neighbors' commitment to Pan-Africanism and
the African renaissance will be the degree to which they put African interests
ahead of their commitments to external partners.
Finally, an all-parties conference is needed as the most appropriate
forum for resolving the crisis of transition in the Congo. This involves
the adoption of a legal and institutional framework of transition. Such
a framework should include a provisional constitution, defining the length
of the transition, its priority tasks, and the institutions that will carry
them out; a minimum government programme of action for the transitional
period; and a national unity government to implement this programme and
help other transitional institutions fulfill their tasks.
I appeal to all of you and through you, to the South African government,
to give strong support to this idea of an all-parties conference as an
indispensable step for resolving the present crisis in the Congo.
Thank you for your attention.
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
* See Robert Block's article, "Zimbabwe's Elite Turn Strife in
Nearby Congo Into a Quest for Riches," The Wall Street Journal, 9
October 1998.
This material is being reposted for wider distribution by the Africa
Policy Information Center (APIC). APIC's primary objective is to widen
the policy debate in the United States around African issues and the U.S.
role in Africa, by concentrating on providing accessible policy-relevant
information and analysis usable by a wide range of groups and individuals.
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